# EAST EUROPE

A Monthly Review of East European Affairs

#### INTEGRATING THE SATELLITES

The history of "Comecon" and its efforts to overcome the rigors of national economic planning in Eastern Europe through a division of labor among the Satellites.

#### RADIO IN THE SOVIET BLOC

A survey of radio ownership, trends in domestic and foreign broadcasting, and popular response to the programs.

#### EYEWITNESS AT VIENNA

A Hungarian refugee who attended the Communist-sponsored Vienna Youth Festival describes the way it was organized by Moscow and what he was told in confidence by some of the delegates from Eastern Europe.

#### **BULGARIA'S PRESS**

A survey of newspaper publishing and editing in one of the most tightly controlled Soviet Satellite countries.

#### CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

Moon rockets. Hungarian Party prepares for its Congress. Poland's meat crisis. Economic confusion in Bulgaria. Brno trade fair. Yugoslavs criticize China.

#### TEXTS AND DOCUMENTS

A Yugaslav ideologist reverses the Moscow line and accuses Soviet Communists of being traitors to Marxism.



# EAST EUROPE

formerly News from Behind the Iron Curtain

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EAST EUROPE is a monthly review of political, economic, social and intellectual trends and events in the Soviet orbit. Information contained in this magazine is derived in the main from East European sources and is based on a thorough analysis by specialists from Central and East European countries of all major Communist newspapers and publications and the complete monitoring of Communist broadcasts.

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# The Month in Review

POTEMKIN VILLAGES, of course, were the sham facades supposedly built by a minister of Catherine of Russia to impress her with the prosperity of the nation. Masking the horrid or simply unpleasant truth by a structure of total unreality is a practice that has entered deep into Communism. Soviet



Premier Khrushchev himself, back from America, back from China, still indefatigably his ebullient public self, complained about it in a recent speech in Vladivostok: "Just now, as we were coming along the road, we met a woman who was walking with her children. We stopped and I asked her. 'How are things with you?' She replied. 'We are very glad that you have come to see us, that we have the good fortune to meet you.' She stopped and then added. 'In connection with your visit, footwear, fabrics, milk and many other things have been rushed to our stores. Come and see us more often. Then there will be more goods in our stores.' "

Perhaps, it may justly be said, it is a measure of Khrushchev's difference from Stalin that he stopped to chat with a passing family and so was told about the little deception of a bureaucracy eager to keep him happy. Nevertheless, Khrushchev, no less than Stalin, in his relationships with the rest of the world, on his recent American trip, for example, practiced a very similar kind of potenkinism, intending to conceal reality's ugliness. Some of the worst excesses—the Soviet oppression of the Hungarian Revolt, for example—he simply refused to recognize, saying: "The Hungarian question has stuck in some people's mouths like a dead rat; distasteful as it is they cannot spit it out. . . . With especially great pleasure and happiness I gave my answer to the Hungarian people when I was in Hungary as a guest, representing there our valiant Soviet Union. That was soon after the Hungarian events. All Hungary applauded us and I do not know any way of better expressing the true attitude of Hungarians toward the Soviet Union. We have long since solved all questions with Hungary and are marching forward victoriously in one column. They are building Socialism and we are building Communism. Our goals coincide. We have one road and one goal." And he said this very little short of the third anniversary of that day, October 23, when the Hungarian nation rose against the Soviets and their puppets.

Similarly, he ingenuously and tirelessly insisted that in the Soviet Union, and by extension in the other countries of the "Socialist Camp," life was rapidly moving in an unerring course to perfection, that the people were absolutely and enthusiastically at one with the Party, and so forth, ad nauseam.

Doubtless the most important possibility raised by Premier Khrushchev's visit was his disarmament proposal. Indeed, the matter of averting a nuclear war is so important that it is necessary to hope, against all historical experience, that in this regard the Soviet leader was not raising an artificial Potemkin village to bemuse the world, but that some reality may be made of his words.

## Polish Meat Shortage

A MOST UNPLEASANT reality this month caught up with the Polish regime and the Polish people. It was suddenly made clear that there is not now, and not for some time going to be, enough meat for the Polish table. Meatless Mondays have been instituted, the amount of meat each person may buy has been limited, and a Plenum of the Party Central Committee decided on October 17 that an enormous 25 percent increase in meat prices was necessary.

Demands for an increase in the low Polish standard of living—more and better food, better clothing, better housing—were among the factors which produced the upheavals of 1956 and led to the installation of the Gomulka regime. Such an increase was one of the promises made by Gomulka. And the years since 1956 have seen some improvement, although the standard is still very low. Now, in the most dramatic manner possible, an important part of that improvement has vanished.

In an anguish of embarrassment, the regime has tried to explain away the shortage as resulting from excessive meat-eating by the Polish people, from the natural increase in the population, from a rise in incomes—until the reader felt that the only explanation yet unexploited was that NATO troops were stealing Polish hogs by night and mailing them off to Farmer Garst's pigpen in Iowa.

There seems to be little question as to the real explanation: bungled planning. By letting the prices of feed (mostly potatoes) rise, while holding down the prices farmers could get for their hogs, the regime simply made it unprofitable for the farmers to feed their hogs; the farmers sold the potatoes and slaughtered their hogs.

In a completely controlled agrarian economy (like the Soviet), this probably would not have happened; the collectivized farmers would have been forced to supply hogs whether it was economic to do so or not. Nor would it probably have happened in a free economy, where prices are not centrally established in disregard of market realities. But the peculiar Polish anomaly of a centrally planned and controlled economy based on an uncollectivized private agriculture made the shortage possible. Once again events have pointed up the unique difficulties of the Gomulka regime, which is (so far) unwilling to take the political risk of attempting to impose by force orthodox Communist prescriptions.

# Notice to Readers

E AST EUROPE intends to inaugurate as a regular feature a department of Letters to the Editor. Readers who wish to comment on any matters within East Europe's field of interest and scholars who wish to communicate with their colleagues are invited to write. It is intended that the new department will become a primary forum for discussion of every facet of East European life.

Correspondents are requested to keep their letters of reasonable length, to use a typewriter whenever possible and to provide name and address (which will be omitted in publication on request). Letters should be addressed to East Europe, 2 Park Avenue, New York 16, N. Y.

THE EDITOR


# Integrating the Satellites

# The Role of Comecon

R ECENT ANNOUNCEMENTS that ground has been broken for a pipeline linking the oilfields of the USSR with refineries in Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia suggest that the long-discussed economic integration of the countries of the Soviet bloc is at last under way. The stated purpose is to weld the separate national economies of the Satellites into one commonwealth based on international cooperation and a division of labor, much as the six countries of the West European Common Market are seeking to remove the barriers to trade among themselves. In theory at least, the Communist Eight (including the USSR) are out to secure some of the classic advantages of free trade within the framework of national economic planning. In actuality they are a pole removed from this goal, and their progress so far has been a fumbling effort to get rid of some of the strangling halters of the Stalin era. Further progress will depend on their finding ways to coordinate eight national economies without the convenient capitalist mechanism of free prices and flexible monetary systems-and to overcome the ignorance of planning authorities and the vested interests of State ownership.

#### Yugoslavs Excluded

The clearing house for this effort is the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, an intergovernmental organization which includes all the European Communist countries except Yugoslavia. Comecon (or CEMA as the Communists abbreviate it) was founded in 1949. The charter members were Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR. Albania joined almost immediately, and was followed by East Germany in the autumn of 1950. Comecon describes itself as "an open organization which other European countries may join if they . . . desire to participate in broad economic collaboration with these countries," but Yugoslavia is the only European country which has bothered to test this statement. The Yugoslavs applied promptly for admission in 1949, perhaps hoping to heal their rift with Stalin the year before, and were promptly rejected. Years later,



Caption: "Czechoslovakia has granted a 100-million ruble credit for machinery to open and equip big sulfur mines in Poland. The sulfur will be processed in a plant at Wisov."

Czechoslovak Life (Prague), April 1959

when the break had been patched up, Yugoslavia renewed its interest sufficiently to send observers to some Comecon gatherings in 1956-57, but after the Yugoslav-Soviet quarrel reopened early in 1958 it became clear that participation in Comecon involves something more than a simple desire for "broad economic collaboration."\* Although the organization is nominally European, Chinese observers have been present at meetings since 1956, North Korean observers since 1957, and North Vietnamese and Mongolian observers since early in 1958. They attend not only the plenary meetings and major conferences, but gatherings of Comecon's subordinate commissions as well.

Comecon's titular Council consists of high-level government representatives of the member countries.\*\* Meetings rotate among the capitals of the member countries and the chairmanship also rotates, being held by the representative of the host country. The Council's decisions are formally recommendations and not binding on the members until intergovernmental agreements are subsequently concluded to carry them out. Comecon is explicitly an intergovernmental organization, not an organization of Communist Parties like the Comintern (1919-1943) and Cominform (1947-1956). Officially, the Council's decisions must be unanimous—i.e. each member theoretically has effective veto power, though this is surely tempered in practice by the political and economic realities of the Soviet bloc.

In addition to the top-level Council, there is a permanent Comecon secretariat, located in Moscow. The current chairman of the secretariat is a Soviet citizen. Mikhail Faddaev. and his deputies are H. Rozanski (Poland) and F. Hamous (Czechoslovakia). The Moscow headquarters also houses another subordinate organ-a conference of deputy representatives to Comecon who are empowered to make current executive decisions and are theoretically in more frequent session than the Council. Since 1954 a variety of working commissions have been established. There are now twelve permanent commissions, with headquarters distributed among the capitals of the member countries; these commissions have in turn their own more or less permanent subcommissions, as well as a plethora of temporary subsections and ad hoc working groups. The size and ramifications of this structure are suggested by a report of a six-day meeting of the Transport Commission in its Warsaw headquarters, April 15-21, 1959, at which 92 experts from 12 Soviet bloc countries were present. (Radio Warsaw, April 15, 1959.)

## The Early Years

Comecon's growth is a thing of recent years. At its foundation in 1949 it was touted as Communism's response to the United States' Marshall Plan, and great

\* There is, in fact, reason to believe that one of Comecon's major early functions was to facilitate the economic blockade imposed on Yugoslavia by the other Communist countries.

#### Table of Organization

		Date
Body	Headquarters	Established
The Council	None	April 1949
The Secretariat	Moscow	April 1949
Conference of Deputies	Moscow	April 1949
Commissions:*		
Agriculture	Sofia	May 1956
Electric Power	Moscow	May 1956
Coal	Warsaw	May 1956
Machinery	Prague	May 1956
Petroleum and Gas	Bucharest	May 1956
Ferrous Metals	Moscow	May 1956
Nonferrous Metals	Budapest	May 1956
Chemicals	East Berlin	May 1956
Transportation	Warsaw	June 1958
Construction	East Berlin	June 1958
Food and Consumer		J
Goods	Prague	Dec. 1958
General Economics	Prague?	June 1958

\* These are multilateral standing commissions, composed of experts and officials representing the member countries. Observers from the Asian Communist countries also attend the meetings. The chairman of each commission is the Minister of the relevant industry in the headquarters country. Commissions covering extensive and heterogeneous ranges of products may have a number of more or less permanent subcommissions—e.g., the Machine Tool, Automo-Shipbuilding and Electrotechnical subcommissions of the Machinery Commission. Subcommissions meet in various places-e.g., a meeting of a working group of the troleum and Gas Commission took place in Baku (USSR) on October 8, 1958 (Rude Pravo [Prague], October 9, 1958) and a meeting of the Mining Machinery section of the Machinery Commission in Ostrava (Czechoslovakia) on October 29, 1957 (Rude Pravo, October 30, 1957). Most commissions seem to hold full meetings twice a year, with subcommission meetings in the interval; occasionally there are joint sessions when the interests of two commissions overlap-e.g., a joint session of the Coal and Ferrous Metals Commissions took place April 3-4, 1959 (Rude Pravo, April 7, 1959).

benefits were promised through "broad economic collaboration" and "mutual aid" on a basis of "equality of rights."\* Optimistic Communist commentators stressed that "economic cooperation of the members . . . is not limited to the exchange of goods" and foresaw that the member countries would "coordinate their economic plans, establish joint investment programs, [and] begin joint production programs . . . from the point of view of setting up a division of productive forces according to the requirements of each country and its natural and historical conditions."\*\*

<sup>\*\*</sup> A list of the representatives at the Council's Ninth Session in June 1958, published by *Prace* (Prague), July 2, 1958, shows that the current practice is to send the first deputy premier or deputy premier in charge of economic affairs.

<sup>\*</sup> The Marshall Plan, in contrast, was alleged to "violate national sovereignty and national economic interests," and both Poland and Czechoslovakia were required by Moscow to revoke their original decisions to participate in the preliminary Marshall Plan conference and to denounce their original acceptances of the US invitation.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Planovane Hospodarstvi (Prague), No. 6, 1949, p. 143.

The broad regional cooperation and area-wide development implied in these statements might have brought benefits to Eastern Europe similar to those received by Western Europe from the cooperation fostered by the Marshall Plan. The resources of the East European countries were diverse and mutually complementary to a considerable degree; and in 1949 there was scope for national division of labor and specialization-especially in raw and semi-processed industrial materials like coal, petroleum, some major non-ferrous metal ores, basic metal products and many agricultural commodities. The area's geography and population promised substantial economies from coordinating the output of national manufacturing industries through a single mass market.\* The uneven level of industrial development might have been turned to good account if the more highly developed countries (Czechoslovakia and East Germany) had harnessed their capital and skill to the economic resources of the others.

However, no such program was undertaken. The history of Comecon's first five years shows no attempt at integrating the economies of its members, or even at coordinating the national economic plans, beyond regulating the output of the armament industries (and the latter function may not have been Comecon's-there is, of course, no record). Instead, beginning in 1949, all of the East European countries commenced long-term economic plans which substantially duplicated each other.\*\* These plans emphasized iron, steel and heavy machinery regardless of national resources. Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, for example, although short on coal and ore, each set out to develop steel industries and to exploit their poor and costly deposits of coal and ore. In economists' language, the pattern was autarkic. Each country strove for selfsufficiency as though the rest of the "Socialist camp" did not exist. Stalin's formula for "building Socialism in one country"-dating from 1929-was tacitly applied to each East European country, without allowing for their lack of the Soviet Union's diverse resources and studiously ignoring the technological revolution in chemicals and metallurgy which had occurred in the past twenty years.

#### Mikoyan Was Surprised

The fatuous nature of much of this planning suggests that the plans were scarcely examined by the imperial authorities in Moscow. The savage purges of East Euro-



Caption: "East German excavators in operation in Poland."

Polish Foreign Trade (Warsaw), No. 43, 1958

pean Communists for "bourgeois nationalist deviations," instituted by Stalin after Tito's defection in 1948, spurred the surviving leaders to "build Socialism" by the only orthodox formula in their experience and to avoid like the plague any thought of national peculiarities. Nevertheless, there was nothing in Soviet planning techniques that required a country to build a steel mill when it had neither iron ore nor coal, and nothing that required them all simultaneously to turn out the same machine in slightly different designs, held together by slightly different-sized nuts and bolts. The contents of these plans were dictated by purely political considerations, and the Soviet authorities who reviewed them were apparently more concerned with what the USSR could get out of them than with whether they made economic sense.

The late Imre Nagy, twice Premier of Communist Hungary, wrote that the Soviet official Anastas Mikoyan had expressed surprise to him at "the excessive development of your iron-smelting industry." (Imre Nagy, On Communism, New York, 1957, p. 106.) Mikoyan's surprise may have been genuine, but Premier Khrushchev's claim that "we have often spoken in vain" against such economic policies (Radio Budapest, July 21, 1957) can hardly be taken seriously.

<sup>\*</sup> Czechoslovakia and Poland had, in fact, already made an agreement in 1947 to "apportion the manufacture of certain products" between their industries (quoted by N. Spulber, The Economics of Communist Eastern Europe, New York, 1957, p. 427) and it was subsequently reported that this had been done with regard to lathes and internal combustion engines, with steps taken to standardize national output in several lines of heavy transportation equipment. (Rzeczpospolita [Warsaw]), March 1950.) This kind of effort, however, fell by the wayside in the subsequent scramble to "build Socialism" individually.

<sup>\*\*</sup> All the plans except Poland's Six Year Plan ran for five years, but only two (East Germany's and Romania's) coincided with the USSR's Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951-1955) or even with each other.

The official account of Comecon's activities in the early years is that the organization dealt almost exclusively with international trade. It "devoted great attention to the constant expansion of the trade relations of member countries,"\* and achieved "a fundamental change . . . in the structure and direction of foreign trade between the Socialist countries."\*\* The West's embargo on strategic goods shipments imposed in 1948 in response to the Berlin blockade, and Stalin's decision to blockade Yugoslavia after the Cominform break in June 1948, necessitated trade readjustments for all countries simultaneously.\*\*\* After 1948 the Satellites became increasingly dependent upon trade with the Soviet Union and with each other. While in 1948 their trade with non-Communist countries varied from 25-30 percent of total trade (Bulgaria and Romania) to 65-70 percent (Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary), by 1952 the free world's share had been cut in half and trade with Yugoslavia had ceased entirely. Comecon's Second Session in August 1949 is said to have drawn up the general agreement for long-term trade pacts among the member governments which brought this about,\*\*\*\* and certainly Comecon was the ideal vehicle for working out the complex readjustments in trade which the new policy required.

Comecon had also to deal with the foreign trade questions created by the Korean war, and especially with the effect of the war on world prices of raw materials. The rapid rise in prices not only made some imports from the outside world far more expensive, but also had a disrupting effect on trade among the Communist countries themselves. In the Communist economic system, currencies are purely internal-i.e., the prices of specific goods in one country have no real relationship to the prices of the same goods in another. The currencies are consequently not translatable into each other at a simple rate of exchange. For keeping foreign trade accounts among themselves, the Communist countries have always used a world price base of some kind, translated into a unit called the "clearing ruble" at the official rate of exchange. \*\*\*\*\* Until the Korean War, the Comecon countries had used current world prices as a standard in their negotiations. In 1950, presumably to avoid disruption in their long-term planning from radical price changes in the outside world, they shifted to a "fixed world price" basis, and this decision was apparently made within the framework of Comecon. However, the ensuing trade agreements were bilaterally negotiated, and the USSR's superior bargaining power was used to the substantial disadvantage of the smaller countries.

#### Years of Inaction

After 1950, Comecon appears to have played no further role even in the foreign trade field. The official histories indicate only one plenary Council session between August 1949 and March 1954, probably in 1950. These were years during which the Stalinist economic policies were leading Eastern Europe into a crisis. Some of the difficulties, such as bottlenecks in raw material supplies which might have been alleviated by a few general readjustments, were aggravated by the rigid bilateral trading among the member countries.

In 1953, when the crisis came to a head, it would have been logical to give Comecon the job of setting matters to rights. But when, after Stalin's death, the East European countries began revising their economic programs, not a word was said of Comecon. Each country worked out its own "new course" which usually consisted of cutting investment in heavy industry, increasing the supply of consumer goods and paying more attention to agriculture—under a general inspiration stemming from the Malenkov policies in the USSR. In 1954 a Soviet book devoted 23 pages to "the development of the economic and foreign trade ties of the countries of People's Democracy" but did not find it necessary to make any mention of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.\*

<sup>\*</sup> N. I. Ivanov et al., Khozyaistvennoe Razvitie Stran Narodnoi Demokratii (The Economic Development of the Countries of People's Democracy), Vneshtorgizdat (Foreign Trade Publishing House), Moscow, 1954.



A new plant at Humenne in eastern Slovakia, which will manufacture Kapron, a Soviet synthetic fiber. Trial production is said to have begun last January.

Czechoslovak Life (Prague), January 1959

<sup>\*</sup> Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), April 26, 1959.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Rude Pravo (Prague), April 28, 1959.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Official Communist sources now attribute Comecon's foundation entirely to the "hostile embargo" and have dropped all mention of the Marshall Plan.

<sup>\*\*\*\*</sup> N. Siluianov, "Brotherly Cooperation and Mutual Assistance among Socialist Countries," Voprosy Ekonomiki (Moscow), No. 3, 1959. This is one of the most extensive historical articles on Comecon and possibly the model for most of the others.

<sup>\*\*\*\*\*</sup> To give a hypothetical example, if Poland and the USSR exchange coal for iron ore, a free world price per ton of coal in dollars is agreed upon, and then entered in the accounts in "clearing rubles" at four rubles per dollar and multiplied by the number of tons of coal in question. For the ore, the same procedure is applied, and the "clearing ruble" figures thus accurately express the relative values of the two shipments, just as though actual dollar prices were used for keeping the account.

		CHRON	OLOG	Y		
1949:	January 25	Announcement that representa- tives of Bulgaria, Czechoslo-				missions. Chinese and Yugo- slav observers attend.
	vakia, Hungary, Poland, Ro- mania and the USSR, after economic consultations in Mos- cow, have agreed to establish an intergovernmental Council	1957: J	une	18-22	Eighth plenary Council Session in Warsaw. Chinese, North Korean and Yugoslav observers attend.	
		for Mutual Economic Assist- ance.	S	ept.	19-20	Conference of deputy representa- tives to Comecon.
	February	Albania joins the proposed Council.	S	ept.	25-27	Consultation meeting in Prague of the chairmen of the State
	April 26-28	First plenary Council Session in Moscow.				Planning Commissions of Com- econ countries.
	August 25-27	Second plenary Council Session in Sofia.	1958: N	May	20-23	Conference in Moscow on eco- nomic cooperation, attended by First Party Secretaries and
1950:	September	East Germany joins.				Premiers of Comecon countries,
	November 24?	Third plenary Council Session in Moscow.				and by high-level observers from Communist China, Mon-
1954:	March 26-27	Fourth plenary Council Session in Moscow,				golia, North Korea and North Vietnam.
	June 24-25	Fifth plenary Council Session in Moscow.		une	26-30	Ninth plenary Council Session in Bucharest. Observers from all four Asian Communist coun-
1955:	December 7-11	Sixth plenary Council Session in				tries attend.
		Budapest. Establishment of temporary branch commissions for various economic sectors.	I	Dec.	11-13	Tenth plenary Council Session in Prague. All Asian Communist countries represented.
1956:	May 18-25	Seventh plenary Council Session in East Berlin. Establishment of first permanent branch com-		May	13-16	Eleventh plenary Council Session in Tirana. All Asian Commu- nist countries represented.

#### Revival

New Life was breathed into Comecon almost exactly a year after Stalin's death. The Council convened in Moscow for its Fourth Session in March 1954, and the Fifth was held a few months later, again in Moscow. The brief communiques of these meetings stressed the necessity for raising living standards and the need for more cooperation between the member countries. The economic situation at the time made both of these tasks urgent. In most of the countries, living standards had fallen sharply in Stalin's last years and the "new course" measures taken in the second half of 1953 had been of a short-term relief nature. These provided no long-run solution to the problem of consumer supplies-the urgency of which had been underlined by workers' risings in Czechoslovakia and East Germany in June 1953-and the agricultural improvement programs would not become really effective for several years. At the same time the Satellites, because of their imitative planning, were all suffering shortages and bottlenecks in the same industries. The USSR, their major supplier, had itself become pinched for food (under the Malenkov government's pro-consumer policies), and was not oversupplied with the industrial materials which the East European economies needed in growing quantities,\*

At the end of 1954 Malenkov's policies were sacked by Moscow and the economic winds veered back to "priority for heavy industry." Whereas Malenkov's consumer-oriented program had implied a slower rate of industrial expansion in the Soviet orbit, the new "general line" in 1955 emphasized higher growth rates without neglecting agriculture and consumers' industries. This obviously required greater economic efficiency, and regional coordination seemed to offer the answer.

In 1955, the promise of greater cooperation began to take more concrete shape. All governments except that of Bulgaria indicated their intention to synchronize their new long-term plans with the forthcoming Soviet Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-60). The new plans, it was said, would be coordinated "on the basis of a new international division of labor" and official spokesmen began to outline the directions this would take. Natural resources would be

<sup>\*</sup> The United Nations' Economic Commission for Europe has found that Soviet shipments of many important raw materials levelled off in 1953, indicating that the USSR's reluctance to keep on with the expansion of deliveries played a significant role in the general East European raw materials crisis of 1954-56. (Economic Survey of Europe in 1957 [Geneva], 1958.)



Caption: "A series of machines received from the USSR." Polish Foreign Trade (Warsaw), No. 43, 1958

taken into account, with "priority to be given to the development of the oil industry in Romania, the coal industry and a number of branches of the chemical industry in Poland, and the aluminum industry in Hungary."\* Czechoslovakia would play a major role as a producer of heavy machinery for other countries, and a general division of tasks in manufacturing was to "relieve . . . [each country] of the need to organize production of goods which would be unprofitable because of small demand or the absence of necessary economic prerequisites. Poland, for example, in producing tractors of medium capacity to satisfy both internal need and export demand, counts on being able to import tractors of small and large capacity."\*\*

Comecon was mentioned often in the Communist press, in contrast to the silence of earlier years, and was described as the active agent in the work of coordination. Its activities in 1955, however, seem to have been limited and poorly organized. Temporary working commissions were reportedly set up at this time.\*\*\* They have been described as rather broad working groups, composed of representatives of the planning commissions and ministries of the member States, which prepared proposals for the Council's consideration. The actual drafting of plans, however, continued to be done individually by each nation, and purely bilateral economic consultations were reported so frequently in the press during this year that it is doubtful whether the mechanics of economic cooperation had yet been much affected by Comecon's revival.

#### Crisis of 1956

T SOON BECAME clear, however, that coordination was easier in theory than in practice. It was easy to agree on certain rough and obvious lines for division of labor between countries, but when the separately drafted national plans were put together for review at the Council's plenary session in December 1955 they evidently did not form a regional program.\* The only concrete decisions taken at this meeting were to limit the varieties of machinery produced and to divide up the production of automobiles, tractors, railroad rolling stock and some types of agricultural machinery. The Council recommended further work on the national economic plans, and established a set of temporary branch commissions (so called because each concerned a specific branch of the economy) to work on the problem of coordinating the plans, preparatory to another Council session in May 1956.\*\*

The basic difficulty was that the East European plans, when added up, fell short of providing enough fuel and raw materials to ensure their success. Despite the rough scheme for national specialization, and despite substantial increases planned in the output of many materials, there were deficits in "such industrial materials as coal, petroleum products, iron ore, coke, several types of non-ferrous

<sup>\*\*</sup> Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 3, 1959.




Caption: "Equipment and specialists from the German Democratic Republic are helping to build a chemical plant at Novaky in Slovakia.' Czechoslovak Life (Prague), April 1959

<sup>\*</sup> According to the East German refugee cited previously, whose story is corroborated in all instances by known events, "inside" when the capacity reports were added up and compared to the plan targets (set largely by Party authorities) the means for meeting the targets were obviously lacking.

<sup>\*</sup>I. Dudinsky, "The Heavy Industry of the People's Democracies, Foundations of Their Economic Power," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 7, 1955.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Dudinsky, op. cit.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Voprosy Ekonomiki (Moscow), No. 3, 1959. This source is vague as to when they were established, except that it was some time before the Council's Sixth Session in December 1955. According to a well-informed East German refugee who worked in the Planning Commission at this time, experts from the Soviet Gosplan appeared in East Germany as early as August 1954 to Gospian appeared in East Germany as early as August 1954 to study industrial capacities. It was these capacity reports, according to the source, which were presented to the Council for consideration in December 1955. (See the articles in *The Observer* [Londou] by Fritz Schenk and Richard Lowenthal, November 9, 16 and 25, 1958.) A Polish source, on the other hand, states that the drafting of coordinated plans began in April 1955. (E. Szyr, Trybuna Ludu [Warsaw], June 7, 1956.)



Part of a new oil refinery in Bratislava (Slovakia), built to process crude oil imported from the Soviet Union

Czechoslovak Life (Prague), January 1959

metals and also several types of agricultural products."\*

The problem of filling this gap raised conflicts of national interest which still plague the work of Comecon. The raw material and power shortage stemmed from a general reluctance on the part of all the member countries, including the USSR, to invest in their extractive industries. Such investment usually requires large long-term capital outlays, and hence is unattractive to Communist planners who work in conditions of capital scarcity resulting from rapid industrialization. The Satellite planners either could not or would not supply the lack, and the USSR was not prepared to increase its raw material exports. Solution of the problem required hard decisions as to which countries within the "Socialist camp" would add to their investment burdens, abandon other projects, and revise their long-term plans to allow for raw materials development.

The solution propounded at the Comecon Council's Seventh Session in May 1956 for the problem of the "raw materials gap" seems to have favored the interests of the Soviet Union and to have been generally unsatisfactory to the East European countries. The USSR reportedly agreed to supply iron ore, but otherwise the Satellites were to develop their own raw material base—quite a large order considering past neglect of the problem and the ambitious plans for further industrial expansion. Poland, for example, was to supply the area with bituminous coal—already in short supply—and other countries were to search for "hidden reserves."\*\* The temporary commissions were

made permanent, with headquarters distributed among the capitals of the member countries. There were eight of them, covering the main raw material and capital goods sectors, and they constituted the first attempt to coordinate national economic plans by other than the rule of thumb.

#### The Warning of Poznan

But this did not solve the immediate problem of bottlenecks and shortages. The Polish case was probably typical:
the regime was already straining to maintain its high level
of coal production by the use of Sunday shifts and forced
labor, when Comecon laid upon it the assignment to export
more coal to the other Satellites. The issue was tragically
underlined by the June 1956 Poznan uprising. Hungary,
East Germany and Poland all evidently needed help, for
each procured some relief from Moscow in the late summer and fall. The East German contribution to the maintenance of Soviet occupation troops was halved in midJuly. Poland in September, and Hungary early in October,
each got emergency loans of 100 million rubles, partly in
Soviet goods and partly in hard currency. Repayment of
Poland's past debts to the USSR was postponed for five
years.

The need for radical revision of the 1956-60 plans must have been obvious even before the October upheavals in Poland and Hungary sent them to the scrap heap. These events had profound effects on the economies of all the Satellites. Hungary suddenly became a negative factor in the balance sheet and the recipient of large-scale relief. One of the first acts of the new Gomulka regime in Poland was to cut coal production and exports; the Poles also won substantial economic concessions from the USSR, including large new long-term loans and cancellation of all past debts. Late in 1956, a general round of Soviet credits followed to other East European countries. At the end of the year, the USSR announced that its Sixth Five-Year Plan would be

<sup>\*</sup> Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 3, 1959.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Voprosy Ekonomiki, No. 3, 1959. The May 1956 session also made further recommendations for dividing labor in machine production, reportedly covering over 600 types of machines and equipment, including machine tools, ships, railroad engines, forging and pressing equipment and electric power equipment. According to other reports, metal products (27 types), chemical products (23) and agricultural products (16) were also covered. Most of these decisions were invalidated by the political upheavals of late 1956.

revised, and similar plan revisions were also underway in other Comecon countries.

The Comecon organization evidently played a part in picking up the pieces and effecting temporary repairs during 1957. Meetings of commissions and sub-commissions were reported frequently during the spring of 1957, and the Council's Eighth Session in June took up the Polish coal problem as the major item on its agenda.\* The Council arranged for Poland to receive assistance, in the form of long-term loans, from the major coal-consuming countries (Czechoslovakia and East Germany); the loans were tagged for capital investment in the coal industry. A project to draft coordinated "perspective" plans for periods of 10 to 15 years was also broached at this session, although a definite agreement was not announced until the meeting of national planning chiefs in September. \*\* It is reported that the East European members of Comecon were advised at this time that the Soviet Sixth Five-Year Plan was being not merely revised but abandoned, and were provided with a tentative list of revised targets.\*\*\*

Throughout the rest of 1957 the Comecon commissions were very active, and in September two major conferences took place: a conference of the deputy representatives to Comecon and a meeting of the chairmen of the State planning commissions of the member countries. Their business probably related to the new Soviet long-term plan, since the decision to abandon the old plan (1956-60) and draft a Seven-Year Plan for 1959-65 was made public on September 25, and a general draft was no doubt already available for review. The planning commission chairmen reportedly also agreed on a Polish proposal that broad "perspective" plans should be projected to 1975 and detailed planning begun for the period to 1965, in order to avoid some of the past difficulties in coordinating plans and mutual supplies.\*\*\*\* A number of bilateral agreements to coordinate production along the lines of the 1956 Comecon recommendations were concluded between member governments during this year, and some new trade agreements were negotiated running to 1960 and apparently designed as interim arrangements pending the more definitive coordination of future plans.\*\*\*\* However, a really vigorous resumption of progress toward integration did not come until well into 1958.

The delay may have been connected with some lingering hope that Yugoslavia, a potentially valuable member for its mineral resources, would join the organization. Yugoslav observers had come to the Council Sessions in 1956 and 1957, and attended several commission meetings during the tall and winter of 1957-58. But in April 1958 a new political clash was caused by the publication of the Yugoslav Communist League's Draft Program, and Yugoslav representatives have not been reported at Comecon meetings since that time.


### Green Light Ahead

An important top-level conference of Communist leaders of Soviet bloc countries took place in Moscow in May 1958, with observers present from the Asian Communist countries. The gathering launched a "new phase" of economic cooperation and "enhanced the role of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance." The importance of the conference—according to Moscow's Pravda—was "proved by the fact that the First Secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist and Workers' Parties and the heads of the governments . . . took part in its work."

The political conference was followed in June 1958 by a meeting of Comecon's Council in Bucharest. The Council called for the completion by mid-1959 of coordinated economic plans for the period ending in 1965. The longer-term "perspective" plans for the years up to 1975 were to be ready in outline by the end of 1960.\* The Ninth Session also resumed the work done by the Seventh, in May 1956, on "division of labor" among the member countries. This task was carried further by two subsequent Council sessions, those of December 1958 and May 1959, implemented on the working level by a network of bilateral and multilateral inter-government agreements.

The top-level conference of May 1958 evidently agreed on several points of general principle, but left an important group of practical issues undetermined. It agreed to pay more attention to the oft-sung principle of equality among member countries. It also recognized the desirability of speeding the development of the less industrialized countries. Although it is officially accepted that only the USSR and China are capable of fully diversified industrial development, it is apparent, as United Nations analysts have pointed out, that "any idea of carrying specialization to the lengths of foregoing the establishment of

<sup>\*</sup> Rocenik, op. cit.



Caption: "The T435 diesel railway engine has now gone into mass production in the CKD plant in Prague. Some will go to the Soviet Union; others to help modernize our railways."

Czechoslovak Life (Prague), January 1959

<sup>\*</sup> Voprosy Ekonomiki. No. 3, 1959.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Voprosy Ekonomiki, op. cit.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Schenk and Lowenthal, op. cit.

<sup>\*\*\*\*</sup> Rocznik Polityczny i Gospodarczy, Warsaw, 1959, pp. 1344-1354.

<sup>\*\*\*\*\*</sup> UN, Economic Survey of Europe in 1957, Ch. VI.

any major branch of production in a particular country has been tacitly rejected."\*

If these principles are sincerely upheld by all the members of Comecon, their practical implementation still poses very serious problems. Communist economic institutions do not yet provide any objective yardstick for measuring and comparing real costs or the burdens of investment in different countries. Each has its own unique system of prices, and these prices have no necessary relation to real costs or actual values. This problem of pricing affects every aspect of Comecon planning and trade and, though it has been extensively discussed in Communist economic journals since 1957, no general solution has been found. A multilateral payments scheme was reportedly set up in 1957, designed to clear the mutual foreign trade balances of the Comecon countries through the USSR's State Bank and thus provide greater flexibility in intra-bloc trade. However, according to United Nations analysts, this "seems to have been virtually inoperative," presumably because no reasonable common unit of account has been found.\*\*

The Ninth Session of the Council in June 1958 established a new type of permanent commission. This was the Economic Commission, which was given the task of dealing with "broad problems of division of labor." From a report that it met in October 1958 to discuss methods of drawing up balance sheets of national income, it may be concluded that it is beginning to make an international approach to some of the highly technical but by no means purely academic problems of useful economic and statistical concepts for Soviet orbit planning.\*\*\*

#### Council of Equals?

In the meantime these questions remain unsettled, and much room is left for political haggling and diplomatic browbeating as methods for settling economic problems. The procedures currently used within Comecon are un-

\* Economic Bulletin for Europe, No. 1, 1959, pp. 60-61.

•• Ibid. The "clearing ruble" in which Communist foreign trade bookkeeping is done does not, so far, serve as such because the value of a "clearing ruble" depends on which free world price the Communist trade negotiators agree upon in each specific transaction. Thus a "clearing ruble" credited to Czechoslovakia in its account with Hungary does not necessarily equal that of a Polish credit on account with Czechoslovakia and cannot simply be transferred.

\*\*\* The meeting was held in Prague, October 13-17, according to Rude Pravo, October 22, 1958.



Czechoslovakia's top economic planner, Deputy Premier Otakar Simunek, visiting the Polish shipyards in Gdansk (Danzig).

Czechoslovak Life (Prague), April 1959

known, but it was reliably reported (by the East German planning official previously cited) that in 1956 and 1957 Soviet dictation was the basic means of allocating economic tasks and that the USSR was not above using the full leverage of its superior economic resources to bring the smaller countries into "unanimous" agreement. When a country demurred at a Soviet order to undertake or to abandon a given line of production, the USSR threatened to stop deliveries of vital raw materials. In one instance cited, when Poland refused to drop its automobile industry the USSR put a ban on purchases of Polish automobiles by other Comecon members. This technique is probably still in use despite the lip-service paid since 1958 to principles of "equality and unanimity," and the avowals that Comecon is fully consonant with national sovereignty. More recently, a slight refinement of this heavy-handed arbitration has been reported: the USSR is said to offer certain economic projects out for competitive bidding among the Satellites, with final assignments going to those who promise to complete the undertakings most quickly and cheaply; the tasks in which no country is interested are simply assigned by Soviet fiat. Whatever the technique employed, it seems inevitable that Soviet desires must predominate, for the East European countries are all heavily dependent on the USSR as a raw materials supplier.

An article analyzing the economic effects of Comecon will appear in a future issue.

#### Sources for This Article

Precise information on the structure of Comecon and its functioning has been difficult to obtain until recently. On the tenth anniversary of the organization in April 1959 a number of articles appeared in the press of the Soviet bloc which made it possible to compile the chronological chart shown on page 7. Chief among these sources are: Voprosy Ekonomiki (Moscow), Nov. 3, 1959; Rominia Libera (Bucharest), April 29, 1959; Rude Pravo (Prague), April 28, 1959; and Neues Deutschland (East Berlin), April 26, 1959. The organizational chart on page 4 is based on an article in Rocznik Polityczny i Gospodarczy, 1958 (Warsaw), 1959, pp. 1344-54.

# Radio in the Soviet Bloc

## Propaganda and Culture in an Age of Communication

A roundup of what the Communist-controlled radio in Eastern Europe is offering in the way of programs and facilities in its current drive to regain old audiences and win new ones at home and abroad. The article discusses the latest refinements in domestic programming, the growth in radio listening, and the size and content of foreign propaganda broadcasting.

Despite the rapid changes occurring on both the political and technological plane, radio is still the primary instrument of mass communication in the Soviet bloc. For the people of Eastern Europe, even with the recent increase in other kinds of contact with the West, it is also still the major link with the free world. And by the same token, although other means are increasingly employed, the Communists are utilizing radio more, not less, as a channel for exporting their message to the non-Communist target areas.

Inside the Soviet bloc, radio facilities are continually expanding. Television is being developed, but is not yet a mass medium in Eastern Europe. Radio is still regarded as a growing medium; although it may (as in Poland) already be reaching more people than do newspapers, it is still a novelty in large sections of the area.

Radio is, of course, organized and operated under pervasive State and Party controls. Programming is under the direction of a Radio-TV Commission or a radio section responsible to the Ministry of Education and Culture (in Poland, to the Premier)\* while the technical side is run by the Ministry of Communications. Broadcasting is highly centralized: almost all programs originate from one or two central stations, with the provincial stations functioning primarily as relay points. Furthermore, most programs are transmitted from recordings, rather than live, thus ensuring maximum editorial control.\*\*

Radio was early (in the 1920's) recognized and seized upon by the Communists as an incomparable mechanism for the control and indoctrination of the masses. In the orthodox "Leninist" view, radio is not, as in the free world, primarily a source of either information or entertainment,

but a "collective organizer" and "agitator" whose function is to spread the Party line and program far and wide. Thus, the bulk of broadcasting is built around the latest Party decrees, official speeches of the leaders, economic plans and "successes," peppered with fierce attacks on sundry "enemies" within and without. The political material is supplemented by lectures on Marxist-Leninist theory, and elucidation of new work techniques to farmers and factory workers. This was the pattern of the home radio programs throughout the Soviet orbit, with few national variations, during the Stalin era.

Radio listeners, however, developed an almost uniform reaction to this kind of fare: mistrust and boredom. In Eastern Europe, listeners—reviving the widespread practice of wartime—turned to the foreign radio, above all for uncensored information, and secondarily for entertainment, especially music. (Western jazz thus found an audience among a small but influential segment of young intellectuals in the Soviet bloc.)

The Communists have contrived to meet the challenge of competing broadcasts in a number of ways. Intimidation is one: listening to Western broadcasts, while not in itself illegal in the Soviet bloc, can be cited as evidence of "anti-regime attitudes," and spreading the contents of such broadcasts is a crime in the Communist penal codes.

During the Stalin era countermeasures against Western broadcasting were negative and technical. Massive jamming was employed, and reception equipment limited: popular-priced radio sets were only strong enough to pick up programs from the nearest large transmitter in the country. Even more restrictive were the wired radios. These are loudspeakers which receive no aerial transmissions at all, but are connected by overhead lines to a Party-controlled radio center which is tuned to the main official program. The listener's only option is to turn it on or off,

None of these measures was ever fully effective. Adept amateur mechanics were able to "modify" radios to receive

Ouring the period of mounting tension before the Revolt in Hungary in 1956, the Rakosi regime placed the radio under the direct supervision of the State Security Police (AVH); during the summer of 1956 AVH men occupied the Budapest station.

<sup>\*\*</sup> Almost 90 percent of the Polish Radio broadcasts in 1957 were transmitted from tape or records, according to the 1958 Political-Economic Annual | Warsaw |

distant stations, and standard or short-wave radios could be found in the second-hand market. In November 1955, Prasa Polska (Warsaw) coolly suggested that the Polish radio guide, Radio I Swiat, publish the time schedules of the opera broadcasts from Milan, concerts from Paris, etc., "since—let's not beat about the bush—people listen to them anyway."

Shortly after Stalin's death, official Communist radio policy began to undergo a slow "relaxation." Poland—but Poland alone—went so far as to jettison its jamming activities at the end of 1956. On June 30, 1957, a spokesman for Polish Radio declared over Radio Warsaw: "In connection with numerous letters concerning the jamming of Western broadcasts, I have been authorized . . . to state that no station jamming foreign broadcasts has been in operation in this country since November 24, 1956.\* Interference with [these] broadcasts in our country is caused by jamming stations in other countries."

All other Soviet bloc regimes continue to jam broadcasts from the West. But the regimes are concerned not only with blocking the competition, but more positively with inducing their subjects to listen to, and credit, the Communist radio.

\* Until 1956 the regime categorically denied the existence of any jamming stations in Poland. Widespread public knowledge of them was, however, revealed during the Poznan riots in June 1956 when the rioters attacked the jamming station in Poznan. After the October upheaval there were many confirmations of the existence of jamming.



A Hungarian radio quiz program for youth.

Front page of Radio Ujsag (Budapest), December 1, 1958

#### A New Program

A RADICAL REFORM in their own programming was clearly indicated. The Communist-controlled radio, including that of the Soviet Union,\* now aims at greater variety, entertainment and art in its home program, which is molded (at least in some degree) to listeners' tastes as revealed in letters and polls. Some 60 percent of the broadcast time is devoted to music of all kinds (the Polish Radio, with a show of reluctance, even plays rock and roll), making radio now more a source of entertainment and less of political propaganda than any other mass medium in the area. It is not that the primary propaganda function of radio has been downgraded; the Communist objective would appear to be to restore the authority and popular appeal of the regime radio from its low estate under Stalinism.

Listeners in Eastern Europe traditionally look to radio as a medium of culture and education, and the Communist regimes encourage the scheduling of programs on science, literature, linguistics, agriculture and drama, which attract large audiences.

In news reporting, the Soviet bloc radio now gives somewhat fuller coverage and more objective presentation of foreign news, without the grosser extravagances of language. However, in this sphere of broadcasting the propagandistic bias is still decisive. Local news consists mainly of announcements of production records and explanations of local shortages and other minor troubles. Most of the regime radios have a question-and-answer program to which listeners contribute criticisms and suggestions about various trivia of living and working. This program provides the regime with information about conditions and morale while at the same time conveying to the public an impression of regime interest in their daily concerns.

Most of the bloc radio broadcasts "commercials," in the form of simple announcements of the arrival of shipments to stores or the appearance of a new service or product on the market.\*\* Advertisements are delivered before or after, never during the course of, a regular program.

A peculiar feature of the Soviet bloc radio, apparently following the Soviet and Chinese radio "example," are the

<sup>\*</sup> The home radio in the USSR broadcasts in one day enough political material (news, commentary, press reviews) to "fill five or six dailies like \*Izvestia," according to \*Izvestia (Moscow). May 7, 1959. (The paper usually has six standard-size pages.) Remaining broadcast time is devoted to literary and dramatic, children's and musical programs. (Total daily broadcasting time within the USSR reportedly exceeds 580 hours, in 58 languages.)

dren's and musical programs. (Total daily broadcasting time within the USSR reportedly exceeds 580 hours, in 58 languages.)

The need for improving radio and TV programming in the Soviet Union was discussed at the 21st Party Congress in February 1959. Izvestia's May 7 report said that "the level of broadcasts is still lagging behind the requirements of listeners. As Comrade Y. Furtseva noted in her statement [to the 21st Congress], radio and television still produce boring programs. . . . Literary, artistic and musical programs are poorly executed. . . . There is not enough variety."

<sup>\*\*</sup> Except in Poland, press and radio advertising are handled by a central agency connected with the "Socialized" retail trade organization; no private retail store or service is allowed to publicize its goods. In Poland, however, each plant or shop has independent access to media of advertising.

daily (or more) programs of calisthenics. (In a Polish poll, this was cited as one of the least popular radio features.)

#### Czechoslovakia

In Czechoslovakia an officially inspired and directed drive to enliven the regime radio began as early as 1953, a drive for which the authorities make broad claims of

Jaromir Hrebik, director of the Czechoslovak Radio, said in a speech in Prague in August 1958, that the period since 1953 had seen a "great unleashing of the creative powers of the radio personnel" and "strenuous efforts to make the program both politically more alert and aggressive and also more variegated and entertaining." He claimed that better editing had brought about more topical radio newscasting which had "begun successfully to unmask the hostile propaganda of Free Europe, VOA, and other enemy stations." (Radio Prague, August 26, 1958.)

Improvement and enlargement of musical broadcasts, which make up about half the total program, has been emphasized. The director of the music section of the Czechoslovak Radio admitted that the radio music arranged according to the Zhdanovist-Stalinist line of 1948-53 had suffered from the "typical errors" of this period. ("Dogmatism" in musical programs, it seems, manifested itself in a plethora of "crude choruses and technically inferior brass bands.") The director maintained that these shortcomings had been overcome and "the program line stabilized." (Hudebni Rozhledy [Prague], May 22, 1959.)

American-style quiz programs have been featured on a small scale on the Czechoslovak radio. Radio drama, including variety shows, which had fallen into complete neglect, has been restored, although the authorities admit a great shortage of good material. Contests for scripts are frequently announced; currently the Czechoslovak Radio is holding a contest in collaboration with the Hungarian, Polish and East German Radios for original plays from writers in any of the participating countries. (Mlada Fronta [Prague], May 5, 1959.) According to Svobodne Slovo [Prague], June 10, 1958, close to 90 percent of the radio audience listens to plays and would like more. (The most popular program, the paper said, is a lecture series called Radio University,\* which has been on the air since 1947. Language programs are also popular.)

In August, Radio Prague announced a new and enlarged news service, which will broadcast every hour on the hour throughout most of the day. This is contrary to traditional radio practice in Czechoslovakia, and is apparently modelled on the practice of the Western radio.

#### Hungary

The content as well as the tone of the Hungarian radio is resolutely cultural, and, at least by comparison with the press, non-political. From 60 to 70 percent of newspaper space is devoted to government and Party decrees, speeches, etc., while out of a 16-18 hour total of daily broadcasting time, only two or three hours are devoted to political affairs.

The Hungarian radio offers a wide variety of musical programs, ranging from gypsy dances to classical sym-

Dosen de A. Poch

The popularity of foreign radio broadcasts among Satellite listeners—despite the heavy jamming of Communist transmitters—is attested by this cartoon in a Romanian magazine. "A tube has burned out," says the caption, "so this evening we shall be obliged to invent our own rumors."

\*\*Urzica\*\* (Bucharest), April 15, 1959\*\*

<sup>\*</sup> Some of the topics covered on this program have been: natural history, nuclear energy, agricultural methods, history of hygiene, history of "human thought," youth education, history of Socialism. It would seem to be rather a mixed bag of education and propaganda.

phonies. It also broadcasts a large number of high-level literary and dramatic programs, almost entirely derived from Hungarian non-Communist or West European work. Literature and drama are permitted more latitude than in either the press or live theater, with the result that radio has become the refuge of the artistic avant-garde, the medium by which many young actors and poets establish contact with the public. Poetry series featuring modern Western poetry (Rimbaud, Eliot, Auden, Rilke); a workshop studio which produces new works interpreted by young actors; a radio literary review called "Thought," are among some of the regular programs. Plays, including original scripts, dramatizations of Hungarian and foreign novels, and broadcasts direct from the theaters, are frequently featured. A new narrative play by leading writer Aron Tamasi will be broadcast as a Christmas feature of the radio this year.

The Hungarian radio has periodically taken audience opinion samples (in 1950, 1952, 1954 and 1955). Musical programs have consistently ranked first in popularity. (Magyar Radio [Budapest], January 1956.)

Advertising, which was banished from the radio by the Communist regime in 1949, was restored in 1958; it is restricted to "Socialized" products and services. The "commercials" are run off in a series together in a program called "Advertising Column," broadcast two or three times a week in the early morning. In its May 19, 1959 issue Radio Ujsag spoofed the naivete of radio advertising with more than a touch of scorn:

"It is always with a sense of excitement that I listen when the 'Advertising Column' is announced on the radio. I warn my wife in advance on Wednesday morning: hurry out of the bathroom, the advertising is about to begin. The whole family gathers around the radio; we look forward to these broadcasts. We wait, with tremors shaking the depths of our souls when we hear:

> 'The rose belongs to the garden, The ripple of foam to the brook, The verse to the song, Sidol to cleanliness.'

"I don't have time to answer my wife's remark ('I hope the housewares stores are also listening to this program') because the music stops and the advertisements are pouring forth. Then comes the finale of a spectacular grand opera in verse:

'Primadonna: I am yours, and you are mine, And yet I am not happy, Because I can find neither a pot

Nor a pan store.

'Comic dancer: You ought to know that:

There are many streets,

And many corners on every street,

And stores on every corner,

"The primadonna is satisfied. . . . I further learn that it is best to order shoes from the shoe store, flowers from the

And many goods in every store."

### "Our Baby Radio"

"Our baby radio is really an individualist. For instance, in October it played every other week, in November did not work at all, in December it suddenly began to play, then fell silent. In January I gave it to the repair shop—and it has not yet been returned to me—apparently there is a wait for some spare parts. I have some delightful recollections: when kicked it played the long waves, when hit with the hand, the short. . . Our radio liked brutality; struck with a right-hand haymaker it switched to Free Europe; after a left jab one could hear Moscow. Who would not be fond of such a radio?" (Slowo Powszechne [Warsaw], February 25, 1959.)

flower shop, and children . . . should wear only children's clothes.

"Fellow citizens! Let's consume more of everything, and let us get it only at the right place. A hat from the hat maker, a ticket from the ticket profiteer, advertising from the radio."

Although direct Communist indoctrination has little place in Hungarian programming, the radio is by no means free from Party propaganda. This is disseminated in news and commentary and in programs addressed to specific groups—youth, workers, farmers. There are a number of regular programs for the home audience whose sole purpose is to attack Hungarian emigres and conditions in the West. In "Saturday Evening Letter," a well-known Communist journalist, Sandor Fekete, details the alleged moral and physical hardships of the emigrants. Miklos Szabo, a former Smallholders' Party politician who defected to the West after the Revolt and quickly "re-defected" under dubious circumstances, now has a weekly broadcast in which he attacks the exile leadership in the West. Another program "reviews" the emigre press.

By contrast, the programs intended for the Hungarians living abroad avoid polemics, and often adopt a humorous and slightly deprecating attitude toward conditions in Hungary in order to disarm listeners' skepticism.

#### Polish Radio

The craving of radio listeners for full and trenchant news reporting found vociferous expression during the Polish "thaw." "Complaints about radio newscasting have become de rigeur," wrote Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw) on February 14, 1956. "Its slogans and monotony are regularly satirized. . . The ordinary listener complains that it is boring." Improvement in foreign news coverage was already noticeable: this, according to Trybuna Ludu, was "to a great extent rid of slogans, more concise, comprehensible, and closer to the real core of events." But domestic news "remains the most neglected component of radio programming."

Regular coverage of religious news—such as Cardinal Wyszynski's visit to Rome—was inaugurated by the Polish

radio after the October 1956 Revolution. Another post-1956 innovation is radio observance of national achievements and milestones (the May Third Constitution, the Battle of Monte Cassino) without concern for the specific politics involved.

#### The Sovereign Listener

Characteristic of the post-October Polish Radio is the way in which it applies to its public for guidance (within, of course, the framework of regime policy), in contrast to the old and orthodox system of simply following directives handed down from "above." While all the Soviet bloc radios have perforce given more consideration to audience opinion, none have done so as systematically, extensively and pointedly as the Polish. It maintains a highly organized Bureau of Research and Program Evaluation to analyze listeners' letters (of which there are more than 140,000 a year, according to the 1958 Political-Economic Annual) and conduct frequent polls, with a view to determining program preferences.\*

The Bureau has a corps of several hundred volunteer interviewers who carry out the radio polls in their own communities. In a program addressed primarily to these interviewers, Radio Warsaw, January 4, 1959, described a projected poll which, the commentator warned, would be "slightly more difficult" than previous ones. The questionnaire was longer, and touched on somewhat "sensitive" subjects: "Certain questions, such as, 'Do you think that the Polish Radio information about current events is reliable, adequate and up to date?" might be considered embarrassing by some persons. We have decided, however, to include these questions, confident of your skill and tact, dear colleagues. . . .

"We assume that you will be able to convince the people you question that, apart from its complete anonymity, our research has a scientific character which enables the Polish Radio to draw conclusions essential for the improvement of our information service and of radio journalism in general."

As for the letters from listeners, these are analyzed and the results published for the Board of Directors and editorial offices of the radio. "Such a wide and methodical utilization of letters as a source of information about listeners' opinion is unknown in foreign broadcasting stations," said Radio Warsaw. "It is a specific activity of our radio which we have no intenion of giving up." Listeners were urged to help strengthen the links between the radio and the public by writing letters and volunteering to take part in the polls.

#### New Programming

Polish surveys affirm that, as elsewhere in the bloc, music is the most popular radio fare, with drama also rating high. Radio, the Polish Radio's literary and dramatic programs "may be considered among the best in Europe." (Trybuna Ludu, February 20, 1959.)

An enormously successful program has been "The Maty-

According to W. Sokorski, chairman of the Committee for

An enormously successful program has been "The Matysiak Family." Originally modelled on a BBC serial called "The Archer Family," it is a "soap opera" about the daily life of a typical Polish family living in the city. Enthusiastic followers in the rural districts have clamored for a similar family serial with a country setting.

The Polish Radio claims to be one of the first radio networks in the world to feature programs especially for preschool children. It also transmits educational programs direct to classrooms in the general schools.

One of the main weaknesses of the Communist radio is its centralization, which leaves little leeway for catering to diverse interests in the nationwide audience. Listeners in the countryside are interested, for example, in programs on agriculture, and respond negatively to the jazz, linguistic and literary programs which appeal to the urbanites. In September 1958, the Polish Radio reorganized its broadcasting to meet, at least in part, the different tastes disclosed by audience surveys. Warsaw I now broadcasts a program predominantly for rural interests; Warsaw II is aimed at audiences in the cities; and Warsaw III, inaugurated in March 1958, is a cultural program comparable to the BBC "Third."

#### Bulgaria and Romania

Bulgarian and Romanian programming, comparatively unreconstructed, remains the model of an earlier era in Communist radio. Rabotnichesko Delo (Sofia), May 7, 1959, cited the direction Bulgarian radio "progress" had taken: "[It] is closer to life and the needs of building Socialism; it is totally connected to the struggle for the realization of the economic leap. . . . To this task—fulfillment of the Five Year Plan in reduced time—the radio bends all its efforts."

In conjunction with Party leader Todor Zhivkov's announcement of the economic speed-up, a special program on "The Five Year Plan in Reduced Time" was broadcast by Radio Sofia every Monday from January 26 to February 23, followed by a special program on new industrial methods for workers, and another series on new forms of payment and labor organization in the kolkhozes.


Early in 1959 Radio Sofia began transmitting a special program two hours daily for the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. The program is a mixture of Turkish music and Marxist-Leninist propaganda.

Although the Bulgarian program schedule still follows the Stalinist formula, some change has taken place in the presentation of news and commentary. The "Weekly Review of Events," which was introduced in 1958, comments on international developments, interpreted according to the Party line in a less aggressive and obviously distorted manner than was the case before.

Bulgarian radio authorities have made some attempts to sound out listener preferences and reactions. The only revealed criticism was the complaint of rural listeners that

<sup>•</sup> The Public Opinion Research Center of the Polish Radio, which began as a sub-section of the Bureau of Letters, is now the major social research agency in the country, having been given independent and official status in February 1958. It conducts research projects on contract from outside social organizations, enterprises, etc. One of its permanent activities is studies relating to mass communications.

# YOUNG RADIO ACTORS





Without any props or costumes, Michala and Jitka, two "Little Frogs at School", express joy and horror with equal fervour.



Radio director Miloslav Disman, who has made a career of teaching children. The article stated: "These are the merry voices all Czech children love to listen to on a Sunday morning, in the Young Pioneers Program...."

Czechoslovak Life (Prague), June 1959

programs are too "citified" (Radio Pregled, March 12 and October 12, 1956.)

In Romania and Bulgaria, both predominantly agrarian countries, the rural radio plays a key role. The village radio centers, controlled by local Party workers, relay the programs from the central radio stations to the wired radios in houses and public buildings, and most of them also broadcast a supplementary local program.\*

\* Although the radio audience in the rural districts is in one way the most highly controlled, because of the prevalence of wired radio, it is also, because of relative freedom from jamming as compared to the cities, one of the most accessible to foreign broadcasts.

An article in *Rominia Libera* (Bucharest), May 30, 1959, described the functioning of these rural radio centers. In the village of Sintana (Oradea Mare), a group of kolkhoz managers and members, technicians and "village intellectuals"—presumably teachers and writers—form a "radio collective" whose announced objective is to assist the raising of agricultural production. To this end they broadcast the experiences of production leaders, new work techniques, and other relevant information. In the framework of the local program, they also popularize books and present artistic programs. "In short," said the paper, "they

give to the working peasants of Sintana a new, wholesome, Communist education."

By contrast, Rominia Libera cited a miscreant radio station in the village of Cuza Voda (Calarasi). "The radio center has been moved from one house to another and finally settled in a location ill-suited to its needs, although there are many buildings on the same street better fitted for this purpose. . . . The same situation prevails in the hiring of its personnel. A year ago an incompetent man was hired as a technical operator, and while handling the equipment he caused a short-circuit. The station was out of operation for several months. . . The new operator hired to replace him is no more equal to the mission entrusted to him. He dares to come to the station drunk and address insults to the people of the village over the microphone. Under such conditions how could the Cuza Voda station possibly perform its required task?"

#### Radio Facilities

Technical facilities, both sending and receiving, maintain a steady growth in the Soviet bloc.\* FM broadcasting is just being introduced in the area. The first FM station in Poland began operating in March 1958 and now transmits the Warsaw III program. Regular FM broadcasts were scheduled to start late this summer in Hungary, over two Soviet-made ultra shortwave transmitters at Budapest and Pecs. Czechoslovakia has two FM transmitters with a 50-kilometer range at Bratislava and Prague, and countrywide FM transmission is due by 1964.

FM broadcasting was recently started in Bucharest, but reception difficulties have developed in certain parts of the country. The Romanian regime has angrily blamed this on interference by Western stations which, the regime charges, are usurping the frequency allocations.

The number of radio sets in Eastern Europe is multiplying, and in a significant direction; wireless (tube) radios are progressively prevailing over the wired version. During the Stalin era, wired radio ("radiofication" in the Soviet terminology and on the Soviet model) was being advanced on a scale which, by 1953, seemed to portend possible elimination of private wireless radio in the area. In 1959, the trend is clearly reversing. The rate of increase in wireless radio has quickened in the past two years; wired radio has not kept pace, and in some places is declining absolutely.

Wireless radio density in the Soviet bloc now amounts to approximately one set to every four people in Czechoslovakia; one to five in Hungary; in Poland, 1:9; in Bulgaria, 1:10; in Romania, 1:18.

In Czechoslovakia, radios are a common household item, at least in the industrial regions. There are 3,101,000 wire-less radios registered in the country, and 273,000 wired sets,

A member of a boys' hobby club in Poland learning to repair radios. Magazyn Hustrowany (Warsaw), May 1-15, 1959

indicating a 15 percent drop in wired radio registration since May 1958.\*

The total number of wireless radios in Hungary is 1,738,000; wired sets, 262,000. Nepszabadsag (Budapest), May 1, 1959, said that 70 percent of the households in Hungary (92 percent in Budapest) have radios.

Wired radio in Poland has shown a sharp decline, which began soon after October 1956 and accelerated in the past year. The number of these sets is now about 1,400,000 (in December 1956: 1,500,000). There are 3,031,000 wireless

<sup>\*</sup> Television facilities are also increasing at a rapid rate. There are now about 500,000 registered television sets in the area. Over half of these are in Czechoslovakia, with the number in Poland increasing rapidly (from about 7,000 in the summer of 1957 to 85,000 in December 1958.) In Hungary the number went from 9,000 to 16,000 sets between May 1958-59. In Bulgaria and Romania the number is negligible.

<sup>\*</sup> Figures for individual countries cited here are based on radio set registration reported by the regimes as of May 1959. Radio sets are required by law to be registered with the State and are subject to a monthly licensing fee. These figures are incomplete, not only because regime statistics are unreliable, but because they do not include the admittedly large number of unregistered sets in the area. The total of so-called "black" radio listeners in Czechoslovakia was estimated at 80-100,000 by Lidova Demokracie (Prague). October 7, 1958. In Poland, 124,000 unregistered radios were uncovered by the authorities in 1958. (Polityka, March 7, 1959.)

sets, and the regime has announced a 1965 target of 7.8 million, which would amount to a radio for every family in Poland. (Radio Warsaw, February 15, 1959.) Since there is already almost one per family in the cities, the announced plans signal a concerted drive to build up radio ownership in the countryside.\*

In Bulgaria and Romania, the number of wired and wireless sets is more nearly even and the proportion appears to be remaining constant, with both kinds of sets increasing at about the same rate. Romania has 940,000 wireless and 660,000 wired sets, according to tentative estimates, while Bulgaria has 680,000 wireless and 502,000 wired sets.

#### **Prices and Production**

Despite price cuts and credit plans, radio sets are still extremely expensive throughout the area, often as high as an average monthly wage.

Almost 800,000 wireless radios were produced in Poland in 1958. Prices were reduced five to 20 percent in July 1959, and a new credit buying plan offered to buyers. The simple Szarotka set is now priced at 1,200 zloty; the Tatry model, 2,350 zloty; the Belvedere television set, 6,000 zloty. (Average monthly industrial wage in Poland is 1,500 zloty.)

In Hungary, the so-called People's radio, which receives only the Budapest stations, costs 45-60 forint: radios with long-distance reception cost 1,000-3,000 forint. (Average wage: 1,500 fortint.) Some 30 types of domestic sets are in circulation; the main manufacturer, Orion, also does a large export radio trade.

Czechoslovakia also manufactures a variety of models, whose average price is 1,200 koruny, equivalent to an average monthly wage. The wired radio loudspeakers, by contrast, cost only 200 koruny.

<sup>\*</sup> According to the Polish Statistical Bulletin, No. 4, 1959, there are in Poland 3 million registered sets capable of receiving foreign broadcasts; of these, 1,573,000 are in the countryside.



A language lesson broadcast by Radio Budapest.

Radio Ujsag (Budapest), January 20, 1958

#### The Wonder Family

HUNGARIAN RADIO is sufficiently sophisticated to indulge occasionally in self-mockery. The official radio weekly *Radio Ujsag* (Budapest), November 23, 1958, caricatured the format and tone of one of its science programs:

"Who does not know the [various] 'radio families' whose members discuss the most diverse problems before the microphone? These programs are useful since they serve the cause of public education. However, the radio listener is sometimes astonished by the erudition of some members of these families. We wouldn't be surprised to hear this on the radio one day:

"Father: Frankie, did you ever hear of the geocentric cosmic system?

"Frankie (3 years old): Did I ever! The ancients believed that our earth was the center of the universe. Ptolemy—

"Irene (4 years old):—summed up the astrological knowledge of the ancient peoples.

"Frankie (crying): Daddy, Irene's always interrupting me! Yesterday, too, when we were talking on the radio about inertia and angular velocity she told about the dolly experiment. I won't play hideand-seek with her this afternoon.

"Mother: Children, let's talk instead about the heliocentric solar system.

"Frankie, Irene (together): Copernicus . . .

"Father: That's too easy! What is the relation between the major and minor axes of the earth's orbit?

"Gabriel (20 months): 7,200 to 7,199.

"Mother: Good, Gabriel! And how are the squares of the periods of rotation of the planets related to each other?

"Father: Frankie, Irene, Gabriel, not a word! Maggie will answer this one.

"Frankie: Really, Daddy? Maggie?" "Mother (sternly): Yes, Maggie!

"Maggie (5 months): They have the same relation as the cubes of their average distance from the sun.

"After this, Laurie the parrot gave a penetrating lecture on the two components of the earth's force of attraction."

Radio sets in Bulgaria range in price from 720-3,800 leva. (Average wage: 625 leva.) Prices on some sets were reduced in June 1959 (Rabotnichesko Delo, June 2, 1959.) In Romania, wireless radios cost 650-2,500 lei, which is the equivalent of one and a half to six months' wages; and in addition Romania imposes the highest licensing fee in the bloc. Wired speakers, on the other hand, cost only 90 lei.

#### Wired Radio

The Communist regimes have by no means abandoned the idea of wired radio; even in Czechoslovakia, where regular radio seems clearly to have established supremacy, the regime still argues the advantages of wired radio: lower cost, and better reception (including specifically "freedom from interference by foreign stations."\*) Statisticky Obzor (Prague), December 1958, maintained that "radio by wire offers a more attractive program to the broad masses than is offered by wireless."

In contradiction, there have been innumerable complaints from subscribers about mechanical defects in the loudspeakers and the monotony of the single program. (Romania and Bulgaria, trying to meet this latter criticism, are experimenting with transmission of two programs to wired radios.) Although the system seems to have been successfully imposed in the Soviet Union,\*\* wired radio has evidently always been regarded by East Europeans as an expedient, preferable only to no radios at all (as in Poland just after the war). Whenever the choice presents itself, wireless sets are almost invariably preferred, even at the

#### On Western Radio

A RECENT SURVEY of opinion on Western broadcasts carried out among refugees and travellers from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary\* revealed that almost all of those questioned listened to Western broadcasts in their homeland at some time or other.

. To the question, "How have you obtained most of your knowledge about the West in recent years?" the following answers were given:

Poles	Czechoslovaks	Hungarian
90%	75%	88%
33%	42%	22%
29%	23%	47%
2463	146	23%
24%	4%	1256
14%	15%	22%
	90% 33% 29% 24% 24%	33% 42% 29% 23% 24% 14% 24% 4%

The most desirable kinds of Western programs:

Poles		Hungarians		Czechoslovaks	
News	62%	News	720	News	63%
about the		and other		Commentary and other political	
				Information about the West	50%
		Technical and scientific programs		Musical programs	33%
		Musical programs		Technical and scientific programs	

To the question "What did you like in the program of the home [regime] radio?", only an insignificant minority (e.g., less than 2 percent of the Poles) said that they "liked" the news or political broadcasts of the regime radio. The affirmative answers were as follows:

	Poles	Czechoslovaks	Hungarians
Music, including dance music, songs	45%	51%	66%
Radio plays, stage plays, opera trans- missions	20%	16%	27%
Other entertainment programs	16%	6%	25%
Sports programs	13%	8%	9%

The main finding of the survey—that Western broadcasts are the primary source of information for the Eastern European population as a whole—was corroborated by the fact that well over 90 percent of those questioned considered the regime radio primarily as an entertainment medium and did not use it as a source of information. But the interest shown in educational, technical and even entertainment programs of Western radio indicated that the regime radio is failing to meet the needs of its audiences even outside the realm of news and information.

Their replies to questions indicated that the most important function of Western radio for East European listeners is to provide news, political commentary, and information about the West. To satisfy their thirst in particular for information about the West, they relied on Western broadcasts to a much greater extent than on any other source.

<sup>\*</sup>Svobodne Slovo (Prague), May 7, 1954. It was even cited as an advantage that "no tuning or modulation is necessary" (Radio Prague, July 9, 1953).

<sup>\*\*</sup> According to a Tass report of May 6, 1959, there are 27 million wired radio speakers in the USSR, 9.5 million [wireless] radio sets, about 3 million television sets. Tass said that the Soviet Union leads Europe and holds second place in the world in combined power of its radio stations.

<sup>\*</sup>The findings are based on 760 interviews conducted with Poles (555). Czechs and Slovaks, and Hungarians, during the course of the year July 1958-59. Interviewees were either selected on the basis of random sampling methods, or every effort was made to make the sample as representative of the home population as possible. Identical methods of interviewing were used at widely scattered locations in Western Europe.



The entrance of Radio Budapest, center of some of the fiercest fighting in the Revolt of October 1956. The plaque commemorates members of the AVH (security police) who were killed there.

Front page of Radio Ujsag (Budapest), November 17, 1958

much higher prices; and wired radio (except perhaps in Romania and Bulgaria) seems destined to be confined to institutions—schools, hospitals, factories, etc.

## International Broadcasting

A LTHOUGH FILMS, books and personal contact play a growing part in disseminating Communist propaganda abroad, broadcasting is still the most direct method of reaching the masses outside the Soviet orbit. International broadcasts from the Sino-Soviet bloc have increased in volume and variety. (A slight drop in total output from specifically Eastern European stations in 1958 is not thought to be significant.)

The Communist foreign broadcasting service embraces at least three types of programs. The main one is the foreign-language program representing the official voice of the regime. In addition, each of the Eastern European countries conducts a special broadcasting service directed to its own emigres in Europe and America. Finally, there are "unofficial," blatantly provocative broadcasts beamed at particular targets.

Weekly hours\* of international broadcasting (in some 22

\* Total transmission time, including repeats, in nearest round

languages) from Communist Eastern European radio stations in 1958 were as follows:

Europe	427
Near East, South Asia & Africa	128
Far East	14
South America	49
North America	146
Other	80
Total	844

The USSR total for the same period was 938 hours; Communist China's, 353 hours.

#### To the East

Broadcasting to the "uncommitted" countries of Asia and Africa is closely tied in with the other forms of Communist penetration of these countries. The inauguration in 1957 of broadcasts from Czechoslovakia to the Middle East in Arabic and English is clearly related to Czechoslovakia's function as the major satellite supplier, together with East Germany, of trade goods to that area. (The East German radio rearranged its international broadcasting service in May 1959, stepping up broadcasts in Arabic and initiating a program in German to the Middle East.)

#### To the West

In their broadcasts to Western Europe and North and South America, the Soviet bloc radio represents its purpose as the promotion of "international peace"—in contrast to the alleged warmongering of Western broadcasts into the Soviet bloc—as well as enlightenment of misled Westerners. ("When we talk with average people in the West, we are often astonished at the incredibly low political level, the primitive and false concepts [they have] of the Socialist countries," said Radio Prague, August 26, 1958, adding that this is partly the fault of "the capitalist radio which tries to bluff the people and divert them from the essential problems of life with so-called entertainment.")

Radio program exchange is being extended to the West.\* It consists almost exclusively of musical programs, with an occasional sports or folklore event included. According to the 1958 Political Economic Annual published in Warsaw, Poland exchanges program material (texts, recordings) with more than 40 countries (presumably both Communist and non-Communist). Czechoslovakia is most active in this field, claiming to have arrangements with almost 100 radio and TV organizations in 62 non-Communist countries; they exchanged 650 hours of programs in 1958. (Radio Prague, August 26, 1958.) Mlada Fronta (Prague), June 18, 1959, reported that 29 Western radio stations—including three in the US—applied for 11 direct transmissions and 148 recordings of the 1959 "Prague Spring" music festival.

(Continued on page 53)

<sup>\*</sup> All Soviet-bloc radio organizations are members of the International Broadcasting Organization (Communist), with headquarters in Prague, and all have bilateral agreements on exchange of radio and television programs and personnel.



Czechoslovakia put on a display of mass gymnastics at the Festival.

Photo from Svet v Obrazech (Prague), August 8, 1959

# Eyewitness at Vienna A View of the Communist Youth Festival

The following account was written by a Hungarian refugee who left his country after taking part in the 1956 Revolt.

THE PREPARATORY Committee did not accept the application of the Hungarian refugee students to the VII World Youth Rally. I thus lost hope of being a delegate to Vienna. I decided to go anyway. I am no longer a young student, and have two teacher's diplomas (although I had to study again as a refugee in England.) This filled me with somewhat anxious feelings. Was I not too "old" to be a student? All my fears vanished in Vienna. There was at the vouth festival a delegate 69 years old. In the parades, bald or grav-haired "voungsters" were constantly conspicuous, usually as leaders. I then checked the age of the directors of the World Youth Rally and was electrified. One could have felt like a child if one were between 30 and 40. I remembered how hard we had fought in the past in Hungary against old student leaders, and we had set a rule stating that nobody over 28 could be a national youth leader. But dictatorships do not like young leaders.

Communism fears nothing more than the revolutionary spirit, the revolt of youth.

I arrived in Vienna on Saturday, July 25, the day before the opening of the festival. It was a sunny, warm summer afternoon. The Schwechat Airport seemed an agitated ant-hill as our plane landed on the concrete. Behind the barriers, the large reception committee waves small flags and loudly sings the festival march. The greetings are apparently for the colored students who came from London on the same plane. The Cubans must have arrived recently: the big DC-7 of the Cuban Airlines is parked in front of the building, already deserted by its passengers. We reach the Cubans as they are lined up noisily to have their passports examined. Beyond them, at the customs examination, another colorful crowd is milling. Mexicans, ... icans, Asians wearing, if not their national costume, some characteristic hat or other piece of

clothing. Those who are waiting to greet them are even more numerous and noisy. They run to everybody, embracing and kissing them. This overflowing and visibly forced cordiality is strange and a little disagreeable. I notice that in many cases it provokes a reaction. It is heavily studied, one feels that it has been arranged. To have less of it would be much better.

I witness an amusing scene. Before me, two brownskinned, good-looking young men, who flew on the same plane with me, leave the passport inspection. From their conversation I guess that they are Iraqis. Immediately two pretty Austrian girls run towards them. The first one is particularly attractive in her summer dress with a flowery print. They hand a tiny insignia and a small flag to each of the Iraqis.

"What is this?" asks one of them, surprised.

"A small gift from the organizing committee of the World Youth Rally," smiles the girl who greeted him.

The two young men look at each other, then one of them gives back the insignia and the flag. "This must be some mistake," he says, "we did not come to the rally. We are medical students at the University of Vienna."

There is an embarrassing silence. Then one of the girls finds her tongue. "It does not matter. If you are already here, you will certainly take part in the festival, won't you?"

"No. We are not taking part," says the other Iraqi boy, visibly embarrassed by having to contradict the pretty girl. "We still have a one-and-a-half month vacation before the start of the academic year and we would like to spend this time in Switzerland. We are traveling further tomorrow."

And carefully he puts the insignia and the flag down on the bench beside the wall.

My student friend living in Vienna waves at me from behind the barrier. We rejoice at seeing each other again. While we drive into town, he tells me that the work of the "reception committees" was not everywhere so smooth. These groups, from the ranks of the Austrian Communist Party, behaved fairly violently and as if they possessed exclusive rights. Ugly incidents had occurred during the previous night's receptions at the railroad stations. At the South Station, upon the arrival of part of the Brazilian delegation, Austrian students distributed leaflets calling the visitors' attention to their information center. The Austrian Communists attacked and injured them. The police took into custody two members of the reception committee, two "young men" of about 40, and started proceedings against them for assault and battery. Similar cases occurred during receptions at the West Station. The task of the reception committees apparently was to prevent anybody else from greeting the visitors, using force if necessary. All this in the spirit of the rally's slogan, "Peace and Friendship."

The city hums like an upset beehive. Hungarian, Czech and Soviet buses roll by filled with staring delegates. First we think that each bus carries youth of the country it comes from. Later, we learn that the three countries have sent 100 buses each to Vienna and that they stand at the

disposal of the organizing committee. They are centrally directed and sent where they are needed.

In the evening I make a tour of the town and mingle with the crowd. I look for the young people in order to befriend them in conformity with the slogan of the rally. On the boulevard, two of them ask me for information, thinking I am a native. They want to know how they can reach the Opera. I join them for a short ten-minute walk which stretches to a one-and-a-half hour conversation. Both are Syrians, one of them a mechanical engineer. He has just completed five years of study at an American university, on a scholarship, and is on his way home. He heard of the World Youth Rally and decided to go to Vienna. They soon learn that I am a Hungarian and that I left my country not long ago. The engineer declares that he would like to get acquainted with Communism from experience. He feels that no rapid results can be achieved in the economically backward former colonial countries if they do not begin by adopting a planned economy, and it is necessary to force the people to work. He is a Moslem and is unwilling to accept Communism as an ideology, but economically he does not see any alternatives. The standard of living must be raised, he says, and this can be done only by increasing the instruments of production and introducing a faster tempo of work. "We must make up at a fast pace for the time lost, and must cover in ten years the distance that the Western capitalist States covered in fifty."

In the course of our discussion, it becomes evident that our Syrian engineer friend is little concerned with political economy, even less with social science. The Soviet propaganda line that only a system called Socialist can achieve



The Japanese delegation under a banner saying (in German): "Ban the A- and H-bombs!"

Photo from Svet v Obrazech (Prague), August 8, 1959

fast results is deeply rooted in him.

There is a huge, shiny bus beside the Volkstheater. Young people arriving after a long journey are just stepping out of it. They are West Germans. They are gay, cheerful and tell political jokes, mostly about Adenauer. At the corner of Neustift Gasse, Brazilians, Mexicans and Argentinians sing in a loud voice. Hungarian words can also be heard. A group of five is just entering the door of the building. I would like to follow them. Two young men, one husky and dark, the other thin and blond, guard the door. They ask for an admission pass, without which one cannot enter. Opposite the entrance, two Hungarian ambulances and five or six Russian-made Pobeda cars with Hungarian license plates are parked. Judging from their license plates, they are government cars. I step aside and wait

Soon the same group of five comes out of the building. "Didn't you notice anything?" asks one of them.

"No."

"They didn't reveal anything?"

"No."

"This evening we must ask them again."

From their movements and looks, I can see that they belong to the AVH, the dreaded Hungarian secret police. Those who have visited their cellars once will usually recognize them.

#### Opening Day

On Sunday, July 26, the city wakes up in brilliant sunshine. The sun is glittering in a cloudless, blue sky. Streets, squares and buildings bask in the light. I depart with my friends to have a look at the lodgings of the delegations. We already know that the Hungarians, Romanians, Bulgarians and Czechoslovaks will stay in the winter harbor on the Danube-on boats. At the same time, a camp of tents has been set up on the rented peninsula to lodge the majority of the "tourists." This is where we are going first. Reaching the road alongside the Danube, we come to the Yugoslav ship- and tent-camp. The camp is silent, there is hardly anyone in sight. It seems that the delegates are in town, taking advantage of the time until the afternoon's opening ceremony. Some two miles further, we reach the entrance of the Czechoslovak camp. I wonder why they keep so far away from the Yugoslavs? The empty stretch of river bank between them is just as suitable for camping.

There is much stir and movement among the Czechs. We hear them running around, laughing with animation, singing. Passenger cars go in and out the gate. But the camp is isolated from the outside world by a wire fence. Two Austrian Communists stand guard at the gate and ask everyone going in or out for identification. There are also guards along the fences, endeavoring to conceal their role. They try to seem to be loitering or walking aimlessly. But if somebody comes close to the fence, either from the outside or the inside, they are on the look-out and give him a curt warning.

Near the inlet of the winter harbor, the citizens of

Vienna are sun-bathing and splashing in the fresh water. Romanian, Hungarian and Bulgarian ships, decorated with flowers, flags and signs, are at rest in the water. The two Hungarian ships, the "Felszabadulas" and the "Ferenc Deak" arrived yesterday morning, but except for the leaders, nobody has yet been allowed to leave the ships and the area in front of them. There are strict identity checks at the gate. We are also turned back. The correspondent of one of the big English newspapers would like to go in. He shows his press card but without result. He is referred to the festival's directorate, in town. (The day after, the Yugoslav delegation wanted to visit the youth of the Soviet satellites. They were not allowed to go in.)

The situation is the same at the Pötzleindorf Castle which has been rented for the Soviet delegation, 800 strong. It cannot even be approached. The same goes for the quarters of the East German and Chinese delegations. Perhaps the situation will improve later, because now they are getting ready for the parade, we think. We'll find out at the opening ceremony, in the Prater Stadium.

#### The Big Parade

The Prater Stadium is where Vienna's biggest sports events and parades take place. Right now, it is being enlarged so that it may accommodate even more people. The Prater itself is Vienna's amusement park, its big area of green. Now the 17,000 participants in the World Youth Rally are gathering here before entering, with songs and music, the grounds of the stadium decorated with flags of the various countries.

A child remains hidden in the adult and this child wants to play. Who then would not be pleased with youth's games, with the dances, the music, the fun, the pageantry of colors which makes the mood of the crowd soar? The spectator is carried away by the gaiety, and unless his feelings are dried out or unless he does not consciously resist the force of attraction of the crowd, he abandons himself to the collective atmosphere. For the Roman crowds, circus immediately followed bread and this craving never ceased throughout history. The Soviet psychologists know this very well and brought with them the experience of the six previous festivals in order to dazzle the youth of the present World Rally and the citizens of Vienna with even more brilliant shows.

The parade, announced for 5 o'clock, is apparently late. The delegations of the Eastern countries are being brought to the stadium in buses. The uniformed Czechoslovak and Bulgarian gymnasts have lined up long ago along the route of the parade when at 6 o'clock the Czechoslovak motorcycle detachment enters the track of the stadium at the head of the procession. The parade which will last for almost three hours begins.

The lining up of the gymnasts has its own practical purpose. The procession is often jammed, slows down and stops. Those who stand along the road naturally would like to start a conversation with the youths gathered here from all parts of the world. The "sentries" politely but firmly prevent all contact.



Girls from Mozambique, Scandinavia, Japan and Poland.

Suciat (Warsaw), August 16, 1959

The stadium is half filled when the various countries' delegations begin to enter in alphabetical order, each in a uniform especially designed for the occasion or in colorful national attire, accompanied by music. Several of them perform gymnastic exercises or their national dances along the track and on the grass. A group placed above the entrance, some 1,000 strong, has the task of giving the initial greeting, of cheering, chanting slogans and providing what is so familiar behind the Iron Curtain and is called "stormy applause." Their job is to give the proper spirit to the delegation as it enters and to show the stadium the way to applaud. Certainly no easy task with delegations from 92 nations.

As the first rank of each delegation arrives before the box of honor, the greeting of the "Austrian youth" blares forth through the loudspeaker, always with the same text: "Austrian youth greets the youth of friendly Albania [for example]. Peace! Friendship! We greet the ambassadors of peace." The Communist speaker constantly speaks in the name of all Austrian youth, although he only represents the Communist two-and-a-half percent.

But the people of Vienna are friendly. It does not matter who represents whom, with or without right, when such a variety of peoples, nations, costumes, customs and cultures make their appearance. Particularly the delegations from overseas countries and their somewhat exotic appearance meet with great success. The spectators greet with loud applause the Japanese who march with judo fighters at their head; the Brazilians who brought authentic gauchos with them; the African Negroes who entertain with their nation's ancient ritual dances accompanied by the thrilling sounds of their musical instruments (not to speak of their national costumes which will remain an unforgettable experience for the spectator). The Chinese open their procession, which is very large and disciplined, with exhibitions of their famous circus artists. The two giant, richly-colored paper dragons, with tongues stuck out, move like two live giant snakes,

The organizers rather over-stage the parade. They do not content themselves with having the delegations make one single tour, but have them march around four times before taking their assigned places on the stands, increasing the number of spectators and making the empty patches in the stadium disappear. Some of the delegations leave big spaces and slow down their march, which makes the procession appear sluggish despite its success. It seems that there is work competition even here: the parading time of the delegations must be increased.

Here also the Russians are maximalists. They want to stress by the size of their delegation that they come first. They number 800. Men and women alike wear smart, European style sport clothes, with the exception of the song and dance groups which wear their national costume. They push a four-wheeled iron scaffolding with a sputnik at its extremity. Because of the low entrance, they have to push it slantwise. Compared to the gigantic dimensions of the stadium, the sputnik dangling at the end of the scaffolding is a grotesque sight. It is not particularly successful, although the delegations already inside the stadium are applauding.

Sudden shots make the spectators shudder. Cannons placed outside the stadium greet the Soviet delegation by firing over the stands small spheres which explode at a height of 50-100 yards, releasing balloons on parachutes which fall slowly. They are inscribed "Frieden und Freundschaft."

Suddenly, at both ends of the stadium, the doors of the bird cages placed on trucks are opened and flocks of frightened, fluttering doves rise in the sky. There were reputedly 100,000 peace doves. Most of them leave the stadium, but many of them are still there hours later, looking for shelter. More than one became the victim of the evening's fireworks.

#### Watch out for Calf-Face

The Hungarians come directly behind the Soviets. The boys march in front, in ranks of four, wearing steel blue suits. Each rank holds up flags of the same color. Three ranks give the Hungarian red-white-green colors, the fourth carries the flag of the World Youth Rally. The girls, dressed in turquoise blue, wave scarves and are followed by the folk-dancers.

On their last tour, the delegations shout in rhythm the slogan of the festival. The clamor is directed by their leaders walking beside the ranks and gesticulating with both hands to encourage the delegates to shout louder. As they complete the parade they throw their bouquets among the spectators. They take their place in the stadium, the late-comers in the lower part of the stands, the others, higher. This may give me the opportunity to speak to some of them.

I observe them. For a long time, they stand or sit in a tight group at the bottom of the stands. I know that it would be useless to go among them. Their supervisors would fall upon me. I am their compatriot, the slogan of the festival does not apply to me. Night is slowly falling.

Shapes are getting dimmer, although the illumination is strong. I notice that two boys are gradually moving up. I go further down to see if they are not being observed.

When they reach me I ask in a low voice: "How are you, boys?"

"Fine, thank you," says one of them.

"And you here?" he asks, noticing that I must be a refugee.

"I believe better than you at home."

"That's sure," says the other.

"It was a nice parade," I say.

"The whole thing is a circus," he answers. "You have no idea how much work these few hours cost us and all the things we had to go through in order to come out! They were continually screening us. It's lucky that they haven't yet invented a thought-reading machine."

"The important thing is that we are here. At least we can see the West once in this miserable life. How is Ocsi?"

They are asking about Puskas, the Hungarian soccer star. I answer that he is in America right now. Otherwise he is doing fine in Spain, the soccer fans are crazy about him.

"So he is doing fine," says one of them and at that moment the other interrupts.

"Let's go, that fellow with a calf's face saw us."

I wait until they go back and I move away, too. It won't be possible to have any more conversations here, "calf-face" would not fail to notice it.

The long parade ends at last. The greetings begin. Khrushchev's cable, Castro's greetings, Picasso's message are read. Speeches are heard. The audience is bored, only when they hear applause do the delegates dutifully applaud. Suddenly the atmosphere changes. Unexpected words come out of the loudspeaker. Felix Slavik, deputy mayor of Vienna, is speaking. The speech is concise, succinct, without empty phrases. Simple, crystal clear and true. It is worth quoting part of the message and greetings of a people which have become free to the participants of a World Youth Rally gathered for strange purposes:

"We are an enlightened, free nation, everybody can convince himself personally of this, because we write and read what we want to. Freedom of the press is our unquestionable right. We do not have to side any more with the poet who said: 'Thought is free, who can see inside us?' because rejecting every political coercion we attach particularly great value to freedom of speech. With our passport we can reach all parts of the world and visit other peoples and lands, when another country's visa restrictions do not prevent us from doing so. Similarly, anybody can come to us. We already have agreements with many countries which permit us to cross the borders without visa and passport. We want the borders soon to stand open for every nation of the world. Understanding and knowing each other is the prerequisite for the creation and maintenance of peace. We ask our guests to speak with the Viennese, they will certainly hear more than one criticism and sometimes praises, as our people can inform them in complete freedom and unmoved by any influence. We ask you above all to keep your eyes open so that you may get a correct, objective picture of our country."

The Austrian Communists did not like the words of the deputy mayor. Their organized groups disturbed his speech with a concert of whistles. (Just as they whistled at the American delegation marching behind the Hungarians. There were only a few Americans marching; the majority of them were not willing to accept the orders of the festival's organizing committee.)

After Slavik's courageous speech there were a few more greetings, then the lights in the stadium went off and the artistic production began. A couple dressed in Viennese rococo style of the 18th century—Vienna's golden age—and holding a gate decorated with flowers, placed themselves on the lawn. To the tune of the Blue Danube Waltz, dancers of different nationalities leaped forward in pairs until the entire space was filled by hundreds of young people dancing the waltz to the light and radiant music of Strauss.

There followed the collective dance of each nation, by continent. Finally 1,200 Czechoslovak gymnast boys and girls showed their wonderfully coordinated exercises.

Then came the dazzling fireworks display which lasted almost an hour. Surpassing the fireworks of any previous festivals, it was luxurious, varied and—if this word can be used—artistic. Thus began the ten-day long VIIth World Youth Rally.



Closing hours of the Festival: a scene in front of the Vienna Rathaus as the final speeches were being delivered.

Swiat (Warsaw), August 16, 1959

#### The Major Focus

THE FIRST day was a great success for the organizers. Making use of their great experience, the experts succeeded in dazzling the young people gathered in Vienna. During the parade and the artistic productions, the youth of the "Socialist" countries led by the Soviet Union played the leading role and beamed the faith that only the "Socialist" countries were able to organize a festival of such dimension and splendor. In comparison, the delegations from the non-Communist countries looked poor and lacked professional artists and experts. Their material means were also small compared with the limitless state support of the others. This had its effect.

At this festival, the main objective of the Communists was to win over, through the participants, the youth of Asia, Africa, Central and South America, and they knew what traces such an experience leaves on a young mind. For making comparisons, only what can be seen is valid. What cannot be seen does not perhaps even exist. It would be a great mistake to underestimate the psychological effect of the World Youth Festival and to consider only its superficial, cheap and short-lived propaganda value.

This is precisely why these countries were the center of interest of the Vienna rally. This fact was clear before the World Youth Festival, in the plan of the preparatory committee. At the VIth Festival, held in Moscow in 1957, there had been 35,000 participants, mostly from the Soviet Union itself and from the countries of the Communist bloc. Although there were only half as many participants—17,000—at the Vienna Rally, the organizers counted upon the participation of 3,700 Asians and Africans and 1,400 Latin Americans, respectively twice and three times as many as in Moscow.

#### Strange Proportions

The apportionment of the delegations between the various nations gave a strange picture. There was an allotment of 600 delegates from the United Arab Republic, and only 30 from Turkey which has the same population. Algeria, with a population of 10 million, was allotted 100 delegates; Iran, which has 18 million inhabitants but follows a policy favorable to the West, was authorized to send 50. Soviet-favored Iraq was authorized a contingent of 300.

To bring these delegations to Vienna required heavy financial outlay. In most of these countries, the government was unable or unwilling to lend support, and the Festival's organizers had to bear the expenses. In general, the aim was not to send Communists only, but as many non-Communists as possible, who could then be influenced, misled and won over to the movement.

The organizing committee did not completely succeed in reaching its goal with the peoples of the economically under-developed countries, although limitless material means was at its disposal. It appears from the closing statement of the World Youth Rally that of the planned contingent of 5,100, the participation of only 3,090 could be assured. Thus a total of 17,124 persons took part in the

Vienna rally either as delegates or as organizers, broken down as follows:

From countries of the Soviet bloc plus Yugoslavia	7,306
From the so-called "capitalist" countries	6,375
From Asia, Africa, South and Latin America	3,090
Number of organizers	353

This was the account given to newspapermen by the directorate of the festival at the final press conference on August 4.

The chief reason for not reaching the numerical goal was the failure of the delegation of the UAR, 600 strong, to arrive. They sent a laconic cable which read that "because of unforeseen difficulties" they could not come. This was the final result of the differences which arose between Nasser and Communism. On July 28, Reuters announced from Cairo that the chief prosecutor of the UAR had demanded heavy jail sentences for 64 members of the outlawed Communist party. Reuters had previously announced that some 200 persons had been arrested in Egypt and Syria.

#### The Fake Delegations

Under the circumstances, the organizers did not even bother to replace the missing delegation, although this method proved fairly effective in other instances. Ghana, for instance, was represented at the parade by a fairly large delegation, A few days later, Nee Boi Doku, leader of Ghana's governing People's Party, arrived in Vienna from the meeting of the Socialist International in Hamburg, and made an official statement to the effect that Ghana was not taking any part in the Vienna World Youth Festival since "all the country's political parties took stands against participation."

In spite of this, the organizing committee of the youth festival hoisted the Ghanan flag on the facade of the official building and had dance groups from Ghana figure in the performances. Nee Boi Doku was able to establish that instead of Ghanans, Nigerian youths were appearing in Ghanan colors, and he protested the illegal use of Ghana's national flag. Nee Woituk, a second leading member of Ghana's governing party, wanted to express his objections to the organizing committee but was not allowed to enter the building. Two days later, he was able to reach the directors of the festival who ignored his protest and left Ghana's flag flying. The Ghanans were also able to establish that the artistic productions of the Nigerian youths had nothing in common with Ghanan folk-dances.

Joseph Nireli, leader of Tanganyika's Socialist youth organization, had a similar experience. He read in the official program that a delegation from Tanganyika had come to the festival. He went to the organizing committee and got acquainted with the Tanganyikan delegation. It consisted of one person, and when he began to talk to him, it turned out that the delegate from Tanganyika was in reality an Indian student studying in England, whose family, indeed, lives in Tanganyika.

At the opening ceremony, Indonesian and North Korean delegates sat in the stands after the parade. Near them sat some Czechs living in Vienna who noticed the supposed Indonesians and Koreans were conversing in Czech. It

turned out that Czech students from Prague were among the two Asian delegations, wearing exotic dresses only at the opening ceremony in order to swell the size of these groups.

The Vietnamese delegation came as the joint representative of North and South Vietnam. Nguyen Huu Thong, one of the leaders of South Vietnam's Socialist Party and T. K. Phan, South Vietnamese youth leader, objected to this and Mr. Phan made the following statement to the press:

"Two months ago, [South] Vietnam's top youth organization sent a telegram to the Austrian youth organizations and to the preparatory committee of the World Youth Festival to the effect that Vietnam will not participate in the rally. Nevertheless I see with surprise that performances by Vietnamese artistic groups are announced. The delegation figures as the official delegation of the whole of Vietnam although the overwhelming majority of the group are Chinese Communists."

A strange situation developed in the case of the Iraqi and Jordanian delegations. Here individuals who were under warrant of arrest in their own country became the leaders of the "official" delegation. Among the Iraqis was Mustafa Al Bazarani who took part in the Communist uprising and had been condemned for this to house arrest by General Kassim, Iraq's Premier. In August 1958 Bazarani came back from exile in the Soviet Union where he directed the radio program "The Voice of Khurdistan." Bazarani led one of the groups in the Communist plot against Kassim. Despite the interdiction, he left his home and joined the Iraqi delegation in Vienna.

An engineer called Fayad showed up at the World Youth Festival in the name of Jordan. He was the leader of the Jordanian Communist Party operating in London. Fayad had been sentenced in absentia to a heavy prison term.

The organizers also tried to expand the size of the Asian and African delegations by adding to them all the Afro-Asian students studying in Moscow and also the students studying in Western Europe. The leaders were chosen from the former group; the latter did not get represented in the directorate. It was easier to keep the Moscow students in hand as they had to return there to complete their studies.

This unequal treatment provoked dissatisfaction, quarrels and splits in several delegations. In some cases these were so aggravated that they became public. The Indian delegation split into no less than three different factions. The group which called itself official was composed of exactly seven persons. The group of Indians studying in England, numbering more than 50, declared openly that they were not Communists and did not accept the dictatorial rule of the Communist directorate. They objected to the fact that they did not have one member on the Festival's directing board although their group was the largest as far as India was concerned. The Indian students studying in Bonn, who belonged to the so-called neutral center, made up the third faction.

Among the Latin Americans, the Brazilians led numerically, followed by the Argentinians and the Cubans. Here also, substitution was no less rampant than with the Asians.



A Festival crowd at the Prater in Vienna. Przekroj (Cracow), August 9, 1959

But it was even more difficult to keep the Latin Americans in hand. The fiery, temperamental youths ran away from the programs. Their groups showed up at all times on the streets, even when others could be seen only in closed buses. There were some among them who thought that the Festival meant one could dance freely in the streets. I saw myself on the first day a good-looking, dark-haired Brazilian boy go to a very pretty Viennese girl, asking her to dance with him and not understanding why she turned him down. The Latin Americans were particularly embittered because the street balls did not take place. When the organizers saw that the street balls would give a wonderful opportunity for the youth of the "People's Democracies" to mix and talk freely with the youth of Vienna and of the free world, they discontinued them. Even the much-advertised big collective party on Heldenplatz was terminated much earlier than planned, and those from behind the Iron Curtain were driven home immediately after the end of the program.

Thus dissatisfaction and open revolt against internal discipline broke out in the first days among the Latin Americans when the Brazilian delegation divided into two groups. One one side were those leaning towards the Left, associated with 14 congressional deputies who had come to Vienna and held the same ideological view. They were opposed on the other side by the independent Brazilian youth. Already by the second day, this group was protesting against the tight control and threatened to leave the Festival if their demands concerning freedom of movement were not met.

#### From the Bloc

OF THOSE WHO came from behind the Iron Curtain, the number of the Soviet delegation had been set at 800; among them were 400 artists, 150 students and 150 young workers. However, some 3,000 Russians altogether were in Vienna at the time of the Festival. Among the well-known ones were Vinogradov, member of the Academy of Sciences, Alexander Adzhubei, Khrushchev's son-in-law and chief editor of *Izvestia*, Mikhalov, Soviet Minister of Culture, a former Secretary-General of the Komsomol, and a few other "prominent" Soviet scientists and artists. At the press conference of the Soviet delegation, the Western newspapermen asked several "delicate" questions. For instance:

"Can the Soviet youth delegates go to the information centers of the non-Communist Austrian youth in Vienna?"

Yurii Voronev, editor-in-chief of Komsomolskaya Pravda, answered: "The Soviet delegation is much too busy. We will hardly have any time for such visits."

"Why doesn't the Soviet Union abolish the Iron Curtain?"

The answer was: "The Iron Curtain does not exist."

"Why are the BBC broadcasts being jammed?"

"The Soviets do not jam the BBC, but the Voice of America."

"Why the jamming? Anybody can turn off his radio if he does not like the program."

Voronov did not give an answer to that question.

On the first day of the Festival, a group of some 20 Soviet delegates appeared at the exhibition of the Austrian youth at the Künstlerhaus. They had hardly taken a few steps in the first room when a grim functionary ran after them and rudely told them to leave.

The organizers apparently tried to keep the Hungarians in the background as much as possible. On the opening day of the Festival and for days thereafter three airplanes kept circling above Vienna, one with the inscription "Remember Hungary!" The Hungarian Revolt was too close chronologically, Hungary and the Iron Curtain were too close geographically, there were too many refugees to make it advisable for the Hungarians to play a "leading role."

#### Not So Secret Police

The Hungarian leaders did their best completely to isolate the members of the delegation. On the first day, they left the windows of the buses open but from the second day on this was prohibited despite the great heat. The informers and secret policemen placed with each group followed every move. At the Hungarian artistic evening, I recognized one AVO man who in 1947 had been busy beating up prisoners in Budapest. Now he was seeing that the delegates and tourists who formed the majority of the audience had no contacts with foreigners. There was a tremendous mutual mistrust, artificially created. Almost everybody was afraid of everybody, nobody dared to talk before the others. If we met two or more of them, they recited phrases which had an empty, false ring. They opened up only when one of them could be separated from the

group and talked to in private. Then they were frank. They gave a picture of home which often was more heartbreaking than we had imagined. And their eyes continuously searched in alarm. Would somebody see them?

A young factory worker from Budapest met a refugee friend living in Vienna. The latter gave him a copy of Becsi Hirlap, the Hungarian newspaper published in Austria. The worker told about the situation in the factory at home. The people are apathetic and tired, the failure of the revolution had been a great disillusionment; they hate the regime but are not as involved in politics as before 1956. Everybody flees, the youth into sports or hobbies, the elders into every-day worries. As he spoke he saw two men come toward him. Suddenly he threw back the newspaper:

"Get away with this imperialist trash! Do you think that I believe all your lies? I have no doubt about your being an agent, and you are here lying only because you get money for it!"

He ran away. The next day, he came back and found his friend in order to apologize for his behavior.

"I hope you understand why I had to say that. One of them was from the secret police."

As if the other had not already understood.

I also met one or two of those Hungarians who made the trip in order to argue. Zoltan Komocsin, chairman of the Communist Youth Association, thought of them when he declared that "We are not afraid of arguments!" They were the trained propagandists who had an answer for everything. They avoided calling the 1956 Revolt a counterrevolution and spoke only about "the events of 1956." It was obvious that they had been well prepared, and when asked a delicate question, they always tried to elude it.

Besides the 400-strong Hungarian delegation, 600 tourists came along also, followed by others arriving daily by bus. They were brought to Vienna to fill the empty space at the performances of the Festival and to provide enough enthusiastic "Viennese people" for the parades. This was part of the clever organization. Audiences were transported in the same manner from Romania and Czechoslovakia. The trip did not cost anything to the organizers, as the tourists were glad to pay for the expenses in order to come at least once to the West. Their return was assured: their relatives remained home and would get into trouble if they defected. Most of them stayed in the tent camp near the Danube and paid 1,800 forint for a week, which corresponds to six weeks' average wages in Hungary.

I am convinced that the Communists were more careful in the selection of the delegates and tourists than they were in 1957, when at the Moscow festival the members of the Hungarian and Polish delegations embraced when they saw each other. The delegates were chosen after long preliminary training and a preparatory camp with a crammed program. There were hardly any students among them; there is still trouble with the university students. But the majority of the worker and peasant youths, the so-called "good cadres" who entered the selection camps, were also eliminated. They were replaced with a large number of safe young people: the functionaries' children.

The Communists had to make concessions in the selection (Continued on page 41)

# Bulgaria's Press: A Study in Control

"The monkey complained to the parrot: 'I feel like hanging myself. Nobody imitates anybody any more. And since people don't imitate one another, whom shall we learn from?' 'Your lot is easy,' the parrot comforted the monkey. 'Look at me. What shall I do? Everything I used to repeat has proved to be plain stupidity.'" This queerly dated comment on the revelations and changes introduced at the Twentieth Soviet Party Congress appeared in the Bulgarian Trade Union paper Trud (Sofia), May 6, 1956, a time when Vulko Chervenkov had just been demoted from his post as Party boss in Bulgaria, and when literary and journalist circles had high hopes

for a wide liberalization in Bulgarian life. On May 5, 1956, in honor of Press Day, Vladimir Topencharov, editor of the newspaper Otechestven Front (and brother-inlaw of the executed "Titoist" Traicho Kostov), expressed his disgust with "Stalinism" by enumerating the faults of the press in the postwar period. Topencharov declared that the press had abandoned its high principles, waited for ready formulas and failed in its mission to the Bulgarian people:

"Instead of concrete analysis of economic phenomena, there appeared theoretical statements; instead of immediate discussions of . . . cultural problems, there appeared the 'phraseology of culture.' . . . Thormy questions were avoided . . . and the level of criticism dropped drastically. The principle of blind obedience prevailed . . . The need to give the broadest information possible, to tell the whole truth, pleasant or unpleasant, was ignored . . . In practice, our press accepted the theory that issues could be settled administratively [i.e., by force] . . . Data on our development were inaccessible to the journalist and reader. . . . And what did this false method mean? . . That our press should not write about shortcomings or, if so, only about minor ones, that it should criticize only a selected few and overlook those most responsible for shortcomings and failures."

Topencharov's statements, however, were unacceptable to the new Yugov government, which criticized both his article on the press and his policy of publishing outspoken editorials against bureaucratism. Like its predecessor, the Yugov regime insisted that the press could not be a free tribune in which "incorrect and anti-Party statements" would be allowed to "undermine the people's unity and cause mistrust in our ranks." (Rabotnichesko Delo [Sofia], June 10, 1956. On the contrary, it demoted Topencharov. quashed hopes for liberalization, and railed against attempts by literary journals to print works casting doubt on the "utopian" character of Bulgarian life. At the end of 1957, the Party penalized unrepentant "revisionists" by dismissing a number of editors from the Writers' Union periodical Plamak, and in early 1958 it effected a new purge of Otechestven Front, removing Topencharov from the staff, and Stefan Stanchev from the post of editor-inchief. This "purification" was accompanied by numerous statements reiterating that the chief task of the press was to disseminate Party policy and that it could fulfill its mission only under Party guidance.

Although lately there have been few signs of "revisionist" tendencies in the Bulgarian press, there is evidence to show that the press is following regime prescriptions with great reluctance. In the summer of 1959, for instance,



Front page of the humor magazine Sturshel (Sofia), January 9, 1959. The cartoon celebrates the first Soviet moon rocket, which missed the moon and went into orbit around the sun. Caption: "One foot on the Kremlin, the other on the sun."



ОРГАН НА СОФИВСКИЯ ГРАДСКИ КОМИТЕТ НА БЪЛГАРСКАТА КОМУНИСТИЧЕСКА ПАРТИЯ
НА СТОЛИЧНИЯ ГРАДСКИ НАРОДЕН СЪВЕТ И НА ГК НА ОТЕЧЕСТВЕНИЯ ФРОИТ

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Vecherni Novini (Sofia), September 12, 1959. Top of front page. Lead stories describe a "photo-documentary exhibit in honor of the 25th anniversary of the Bulgarian-Soviet Societies," and the Soviet construction of the desert city Nova Kahovka.

Rabotnichesko Delo loudly repudiated a play by Orlin Vasilev called "The Buried Sun," which had been staged in a theater at Burgas and had received fair press reviews. On June 21, Rabotnichesko Delo itself had commended Vasilev's "artistic skill," and on June 27, had called the play an attempt to depict the "struggle of bold, creative labor against conservatism." The faults cited were artistic: the play lacked vitality because it was overloaded with themes. By July 12, however, a closer survey had been made, most likely by top cultural officials. It was found that "The Buried Sun" grossly distorted reality by insinuating that people in high posts with a "rich and pure revolutionary past" had become narrowminded and spiritually and morally impoverished (see East Europe, September 1959, pp 23-25). The fact that Communists had been depicted as "good for nothings" moved Rabotnichesko Delo to conclude that a more "cautious" approach to the ideology of plays was required.\* Evidently what also was required were reviewers who kept Party prerequisites in mind

## The Apparatus of Control

A LTHOUGH ON occasion Bulgarian journalists and writers have managed to take advantage of temporary relaxations in censorship, the Bulgarian press is clearly tightly controlled. This control originates in the Agitprop Section of the Party Central Committee and extends either directly or indirectly to every phase of publishing. For instance, the Press Division of Agitprop keeps a list of journalists it considers "qualified" for leading posts on publications throughout the country, and top editorial slots cannot be filled without the Press Division's agree-

ment. Similarly, there can be no major change in the operating procedure of a publication without Agitprop permission.

Editors and journalists are often sharply criticized by Agitprop for ideological and propaganda errors. It is known, for example, that there were complaints about the poor use of statistics in the anti-Tito campaign. It is also known that even Rabotnichesko Delo, the Party daily, has been guilty of ideological "slips." One such slip was a 1958 editorial informing Bulgarian readers that the individual was more important than the collective.

How strict Party control is was illustrated in an incident reported in connection with the purge of the staff of Otechestven Front. One reason given for the reshuffle was that Otechestven Front had failed to publish a Soviet telegram carrying Premier Zhivkov's name immediately upon receiving it. Otechestven Front was almost ready to go to press when it received the communique and decided to postpone publication until the following day. However, since other dailies did carry the telegram, it was thought advisable to reappraise Otechestven Front's editorial policies.

In exercising control over the press, the Party "guides" circulation as well as editorial policy. Sales of the Party daily, Rabotnichesko Delo, are guaranteed by enforced subscription campaigns, and the "popularity" of various papers is determined by the regime, which allocates newsprint, etc. Sometimes the public shows a preference for papers whose circulation the Communists have limited in favor of more Party-minded publications. This was the case with the Sofia evening daily Vecherni Novini, and the paper Naroden Sport. Kooperativno Selo, September 18, 1958, suggested that greater allocations of newsprint be allotted these papers, evidently to put an end to embarrassing queues at newsstands: "We are witnesses to the fact that queues for Vecherni Novini and Naroden Sport con-

<sup>\*</sup> Vasilev was one of the writers dropped from the Presidium of the Writers' Union in April 1958, in a purge of "literary rebels"



Българската комунистическа партия

Fog. XXXIII, 6pcd 255 София, събота, 12 сентември 1959 г. Цена 20 ст.

ВЪВ ВЯРНА СЛУЖБА

НА ПАРТИЯТА И НАРОЛА

**КОМСОМОЛЯНТЕ ПОЧИСТИЛК** 1,160 TOHA 35PHO

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ВЪНШНИ НОВИНИ

ЧОВЕЧЕСТВОТО ОЧАКВА С НАДЕЖДА ПОСЕЩЕНИЕТО НА Н. С. ХРУШЧОВ В САШ

ЧЕРНИТЕ ОБЛАЦИ ТРЯБВА

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Top of front page of Rabotnichesko Delo (Sofia), September 12, 1959. The articles include items on a tour of Soviet delegates through Bulgaria and "Mankind's expectations in connection with Khrushchev's visit to the UN.

tinue. This must not be tolerated any longer. It is necessary to put an end to these queues."

#### A Nest of Plans

Like almost all activities in Communist Europe, newspapers are published according to a series of plans. Dailies such as Rabotnichesko Delo and Otechestven Front have monthly plans, weekly plans and daily plans. The monthly plans usually are a collection of general proposals, submitted by each section of the newspaper and coordinated with the overall plan by the publication's Secretariat before being passed to the Editorial Board for approval. The weekly plans, usually a refinement of the monthly plans, are coordinated and approved in similar fashion. One or two days before an issue goes to press, daily plans are produced, and constitute a final check. The editor-in-chief or a member of the Editorial Board is required to approve makeup and content before an issue goes into print.

Aside from submitting various plans, each section of a daily newspaper must submit suggestions for editorials. Each month, the Secretariat coordinates these proposals, prepares a draft plan, submits it to the Editorial Board, and then the approved topics are assigned to specific writers, who work closely with the sections responsible for the suggestions. Each lead story is a "cooperative" venture, and the manuscript must bear the names of the author, all the contributors, and all the editors who approved it. This includes the rewrite man, the copy editor, the section chief, the Secretary of the Editorial Board, and the editor who released the story for publication. In addition to its numerous functions, the Secretariat of a newspaper also prepares periodic reports to the Editorial Board on the efficiency and effectiveness of the various departments, indicating to what extent each section has met its plan.

Considering this involved procedure, it is not surprising that newspaper staffs have grown in the postwar period.

For instance, before the war, one of the better Sofia publications, Zora, printed four to six pages daily with a staff of approximately 40. Rabotnichesko Delo, on the other hand, is reported to have a staff of 115, although it is the same size.

The salaries of journalists are determined by the category of their paper as well as their job. The chief editor on Rabotnichesko Delo receives 4,000 leva monthly; a member of the editorial board, 2,000; a section chief, 1,800; an assistant section chief, 1,200; and a regular reporter 800-1,000 leva. On Otechestven Front and Trud the salaries are somewhat lower, ranging from about 2,500 for editors-in-chief to 700-1,200 for reporters. On Vecherni Novini, the highest salary is 1,800 leva.\*

#### The Bulgarian Wire Service

Control of the press is also exercised through the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency which, in composition and organization, is similar to TASS. The BTA employs about 300 people and is directly responsible to the Council of Ministers. It works closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and several ministries concerned with domestic matters. Its foreign section, headed by Stoine Kristev, issues a daily news bulletin in 200-300 copies, consisting almost exclusively of items from TASS and other Communist news services, and selected items from BTA correspondents abroad. A secret bulletin is also issued daily in about two hundred copies and contains news from Western wire services. This is intended mainly as a guidance for individuals handling anti-West propaganda. Thirdly,

<sup>\*</sup> In addition to regular staffs, the Communists have inaugurated a system of worker and peasant correspondents, non-professionals who send reports to local papers in their spare time, and whose chief task is to offer "acceptable" economic and political criticism. These correspondents are often regarded as spies by their colleagues. This subject will be covered more extensively in the article dealing with the Romanian and Czechoslovak press.

the foreign section puts out a secret bulletin, which is concerned with Western press comments on Communism; this is distributed in about 40-50 copies to top Party and government leaders and a few chief editors.

The internal section of BTA also issues three bulletins, one of which is an information bulletin containing political, economic, cultural and human interest sections. All news and propaganda groups in the country must subscribe to this bulletin, which is the only source of Bulgarian Communist Party announcements and speeches. The BTA, or Rabotnichesko Delo, are furnished copies of important speeches in advance, and before they are sent to press the top leaders go over them and instructions are issued concerning the placement and "intensity" of "applause." As is evident, the BTA is a screen, and its primary aim is hardly the rapid and accurate dissemination of news. Indeed, many BTA employees are actually reluctant to file their own stories even on non-controversial subjects without first checking with TASS reports.


#### Press Profile

The Party daily, Rabotnichesko Delo, sets the tone for all other dailies in Bulgaria, and its lead articles are often reprinted in other Sofia papers as well as in the provincial press. The front page of the paper usually covers important political events in the country and the Communist world (international news is often taken from the Soviet Pravda); the inside pages are devoted mostly to news on plan fulfillment, production successes, etc.; and the fourth and last page contains international news briefs, sports, entertainment, etc. The illustrations show workers engaged in some important labors or earnest, stern Com-



Humor, like all the other arts, is required to serve a social function in the Communist world. This cartoon is part of a campaign against the directors of collective farms who failed to ensure that their farms fulfilled State delivery contracts. The peasants are shown carrying their eggs to the free market, while the chairman of their farm tells the State purchasing agent: "We have no eggs at all. . ." The cartoon is entitled, "Chairman—Protector."

Sturshel (Sofia), August 7, 1959



The English-language propaganda magazine Bulgaria Today, No. 6, 1959. It is also published in French, German, Spanish and Esperanto.

munist leaders. There are no advertisements or classified columns.

The other dailies differ only slightly from Rabotnichesko Delo in format and content. The youth daily, Narodna Mladej, devotes more space to the activities of youth and youth groups and to cultural events, and its illustrations have somewhat greater "human interest." Otechestven Front and Trud vary their fare with occasional stories, book reviews or popular science information; and Vechemi Novini, which enjoys somewhat greater independence than the others, being an example of a paper with a "bourgeois past" (there is usually one such paper in each Communist country), combines straight, Party-line news with articles of a more amusing nature and regular advertisements.

#### Contents of the Dailies

A comparison of the contents of Bulgarian dailies on April 12, 1959 (a date chosen at random), reveals their close similarity. Rabotnichesko Delo, for instance, contained articles on the following subjects: a ministerial decree on advance payments to collective farm members; First of May competitions in the Russe Shipyards; better payment for collective workers; competitions between the

Plovdiv and Stara Zagora Districts for fulfillment of the agricultural plan; the laying of wreaths on Dimitrov's tomb by the visiting Secretaries of the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Parties; "a meeting of businessmen"; and a "meeting of the Executive Board of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union with the Agrarian Collective-Farm Union members."

Other articles included: "Italian Communists Heading the Struggle Against American Rocket Bases"; "Anti-Communism in Latin America Fails"; "Irresponsible Statements of Some US Generals"; "De Gaulle and the Repudiated Cold War Policy"; "The Foreign Press on Our Successes"; and an article on an exhibit of Socialist painters in Moscow.

Both Trud and Otechestven Front carried articles on the ministerial decree for collectives, the "meeting of businessmen," the BNAU meeting, and the visits of the Syrian and Lebanese Communist Party Secretaries. Both papers also contained several of the anti-West items which appeared in Rabotnichesko Delo, including the one about the "irresponsible statements of some US generals." Aside from this, the Otechestven Front articles included a broadside against Yugoslavia, an editorial on the broader application of small mechanization, a description of the construction of the Kurdjali Dam, a short story, a book review and a poem. Trud printed a number of popular science articles ("growing vegetables without soil" and "bringing people back to life"), a criticism of Turkish policy, an item on improving postal and telegraph services, a discussion on improving technology and a short story.

Vecherni Novini, which appears in the evening, displayed greater autonomy in its news selection.\* The paper printed the ministerial decree, as well as several of the brief anti-West items carried by Rabotnichesko Delo; it also carried a story on the beginning of air servce between Sofia and Haskovo, slogans of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee pertaining to "peace, democracy and Socialism," an item on activities in one collective farm, a story on production successes in various enterprises in connection with May 1 celebrations, and a description of the construction of the Riazan District in the USSR. In addition, Vecherni Novini carried an article on the poor maintenance of houses ("People with Habits of the Past"), a criticism of bureaucracy ("The Bureaucratic Machine Must Be Stopped"), an article on the musical traditions of a mountain village, a commentary on spring fashions, advertisements for new books, and several commercial ads. The popularity of Vecherni Novini among Sofia residents speaks more for the deadliness of the other Sofia dailies than for the paper's own intrinsic merits.

In the past two years, almost all the dailies have in-

creased their news coverage of events in the West. Eisenhower's speeches, for instance, are almost always noted, and there are regular dispatches from France. The practice of quoting the Western press has also increased, and there are frequent references to The New York Times, The Herald Tribune (particularly the columns of Walter Lippmann), and periodicals such as Newsweek and Time. Many of the items are selected, of course, with the intention of denigrating the West, but some of them are straight news bulletins.

#### Periodicals

A CCORDING TO the 1958 "Catalogue of the Bulgarian Periodical Press," there are 20 central and 31 local weeklies published in Bulgaria. As for monthlies, in 1958, the breakdown according to subject was as follows: 13 political-social; 15 on finance, economics and trade; 16 on technical subjects: 11 on the rural economy; 8 on medicine; 4 for the natural sciences; 9 pedagogical; 15 for art and literature; 4 on philosophy and law; 5 for children; and 7 dedicated to sports and physical culture.

The variety of publications is determined by the regime and follows the pattern common to all the Soviet bloc countries. For instance, there is a humor magazine—Sturshel; a magazine for youth—Mladej; a publication for Party activists—Narachnik na Agitator; a Party theoretical organ—Novo Vreme; a woman's magazine—Jenata Dnes; several literary publications—Literaturen Front, Plamak, etc.; a publication of the Ministry of Health—Zdraven Front, and so on. Almost all these publications represent some aspect of Communist propaganda and indoctrination, depending on their place in the overall publishing scheme and the audience they are directed at.

Aside from publications in the Bulgarian language, there were in 1957 some 38 publications published in foreign languages and destined for foreign audiences. (Rabotnichesko Delo, May 23, 1958). Of these, 11 were in Russian, 10 in French, 6 in English, 4 in German, 3 in Spanish, 3 in Esperanto, and 1 in Turkish.

The Bulgarian regime seems to be increasing the number of its new periodicals. In 1957, for example, 49 new publications were reportedly started, as compared with 22 in 1956. These included the literary journals *Plamak* and *Literaturna Misal*, and a children's publication *Slaveiche*. Among the new publications this year are *Moden Pregled Lada*, a fashion magazine, and *Bulgarski Jurnalist*, a publication for journalists.

The face of the Bulgarian press still bears many, if not most, of the features of Stalinism. Although some slight concessions have been made, such as the increase in publications or the acceptance of "non-Socialist" lyric poetry in literary publications, the general character of Bulgarian journalism has not changed radically in the past few years.

<sup>\*</sup> Vecherni Novini is the successor to Izgrev, put out by the "Zveno" group, a political association of "right-wing" intellectuals and military men which ceased to function in 1947 after incorporation into the Communist-dominated Fatherland Front.

## "The Roads Bypass Each Other"

A heated controversy over the novel "The Roads Bypass Each Other," by Dragomir Assenov, recently appeared in the Sofia publication Literaturen Front. The core of the dispute was whether the author's portrayal of "negative aspects" of Bulgarian reality was "Marxist," as one critic insisted, or an example of "petty-bourgeois" thinking. These "negative aspects" included suggestions that happiness did not depend exclusively on the economic organization of life and that the "ethical ideals" of Communism found little application in present-day life. Although the reviewers were agreed on the subject of the artistic failings of the novel, claiming that Assenov was guilty of gross manipulation of his characters, they hotly disagreed on the legitimacy of the author's "pessimistic outlook," his description of personal tragedy and failure, and his implication that many courageous Communist fighters had become careerists and cynics.

Below are extensive excerpts from two of the Literaturen Front reviews, the first favorable, the second strongly in disagreement. Together, they reflect the infrequent but still continuing efforts of writers and journalists to broaden the limits of "acceptable" public criticism of the system, and the swift rejection such efforts receive from staunch "Stalinists."

"As the main theme of his novel, 'The Roads Bypass Each Other,' Dragomir Assenov has chosen that particular world of personal relationships existing among a certain group of our intelligentsia. No more and no less. The picture he paints, in the first place, is limited, the author himself having no pretentions to some kind of all-embracing insight into all essential aspects of our contemporary existence. . . .

"Bai Doncho is undoubtedly the most important character in Assenov's novel. . . . Naturally not every thought or formulation of Bai Doncho is above . . . ideological reproach. One can argue with some of these formulations; others are uttered in an awkward manner. If this awkwardness were part of his individual makeup, it would be all right. But it is rather the result of the author's clumsiness of thought. Nevertheless, the general atmosphere Bai Doncho manages to create around himself is light, pure, enchanting. I would say a Communist atmosphere. In our times there are thousands of Bai Donchos, thanks to whom the valiant image of the Communist remains unblemished—a man of unusual moral integrity, unselfish, full of love for his fellow men.

#### A Man of Flesh and Blood

"Of course, Bai Doncho is a man of flesh and blood, not a man of steel and stone.... When he learns the truth .... namely that his days are numbered due to a terrible and incurable disease. Bai Doncho becomes dejected, prone to philosophic meditation and filled, as is to be expected under such circumstances, with a desire to take revenge on life. . . . As a reader, I see nothing unworthy of a Communist in Bai Doncho's attitude. . . . And I find nothing to reproach in his thought: 'There you are'-Bai Doncho reasoned during those nights-'we frequently maintain that Socialism will bring happiness to people. This is true, no doubt, but only to a point. For Socialism has created only the common prerequisites for such happiness, whereas man's happiness, true happiness, depends not only on the common, but also on countless personal prerequisites. which can be of the most diverse kind for each individual.

"In this text, which is irreproachable from a Marxist point of view, I would change only one single word: in-



The magazine Bulgaria, intended for foreign consumption, is published in Russian, Chinese, English, French, German and Spanish. The cover of this issue (No. 2, 1958) shows People's Artist Mikhail Popov as Kutuzov in Prokofiev's "War and Peace" at the Sofia Opera.

stead of true, I would put individual, because this is what Bai Doncho really has in mind, as does every other Communist in his place. . . . Bai Doncho [in any case] never relied merely on his personal peace of mind and prosperity. Even now, when the inevitable departure from life lies before him, he does not regret the path he has followed, he does not pity himself or those who depend on him. . . .

"What can there be to condemn in Bai Doncho's behavior? Perhaps, having heard of his impending death, he should recite brave verses or sing revolutionary marching songs? What is nearer to the truth? . . .

"The second Communist, of secondary importance in the novel, is Alexandra. She is a young girl, a young journalist, a young Communist, even though she has not joined the Party yet. But by her entire behavior . . . she is a Communist. Even when she goes through a serious crisis, as she does in her marriage to Dr. Mladenov, and when she attempts suicide.

"Has it ever been stated anywhere . . . that a Communist may not suffer in his private life as a result of great and cruel disappointments? No, and I fail to see where and how Alexandra besmirches our conception, the ideal of a Communist. Actually, the only Communist who crumbles before our very eyes, who does indeed do something condemnable, is Vesselin. He is a careerist, the villain of Dragomir Assenov's novel . . . who succumbs to his own cold careerist inclinations—marrying Tania Novakova even though he does not love her. When we view his action in the light of reality—we see that this is not only possible, but sadly enough, frequent in our times. Is it not in such actions that the residue of the past lurks? . . .

#### Negative Occurrences

"It would be naive in the extreme to believe that negative types and negative occurrences have disappeared . . . or that they are to be found only outside Party circles. . . . But certain hypocrites exist, who kick up a fuss when any mention is made in an artistic work of such occurences or such types. Why is it considered a blow to the Party's prestige when literary works mention the existence of such types? On the contrary, it is stated in many Party documents, that the Party is, in fact, strengthened, becomes stauncher, when purged of unworthy members. . . I have never felt that the image of a Communist should be the image of a saint, or that our faith in it would suffer any if literature were to draw some of its faults to our attention.

"It is quite another matter if the author's attention were focussed exclusively on the negative aspects, and if he failed to see beyond them the tremendous, constructive work of the Communists. [This the author does not do.]

"Who is Vesselin? At the beginning of the story, Vesselin awakens our reader's sympathy. . . . Because we are confronted with a clever, keen and professionally scrupulous man . . . and journalist. . . . But Vesselin is concealing something ugly in the depths of his soul. An oppressive secret, left over from the time of the illegal struggle, an unjust removal from Party activities haunts him. . . . And

so, a heavy, poisonous distrust of people has settled . . . within him. And, once implanted, this 'poisonous' distrust turns the honest man into a dishonest one. Having once become a scoundrel, though not without some mental anguish, Vesselin acts and inflicts destruction, not in his job, not in his social ties, but in the world of his private relationships. . . . What a contrast between outward social behavior and the true inner moral state.

"Do we witness such a phenonenon in our daily lives?
... Should we fight it, or shout hypocritically: 'No such thing exists in real life, we are all perfect, why then should we burrow into the seamy and dark sides of life.'?"

Yako Molhoff, August 6, Literaturen Front.

## Slander of Communism

VESSELIN IS an example of those middle-aged Communists who grew up and toughened in the fierce struggle. . . . After September 9 [1944], Vesselin, the professional revolutionary, put his heart and soul into organizational work. . . . Even after being unjustly punished for his positive qualities, Vesselin continues conscientiously and with a sense of duty to carry out his tasks. And to this same hero, Dragomir Assenov ascribes the following thoughts: The magnetic force of any idea is primarily in the vicinity of the stomach' or 'Man, Happiness. Striving. Beautiful words, Alexandra. These are luxuries for Communism. We can only indulge in them once we have become industrially stronger, more powerful than capitalism. As long as the bourgeoisie has a greater general potential on a world scale than we-they must remain a luxury. A dangerous luxury.' It is hard for us to understand how a Communist like Vesselin can evolve a theory that happiness is unthinkable under Socialism, even under Communism, so long as the capitalists are richer than we. But it is even more difficult to fathom Vesselin's downfall. In a matter of just a few days, he foresakes Alexandra, crushes all (not only Communist) standards, marries Tania Novakova, becomes a cynic, a careerist and a cad. . . . Here the question arises—is this not then a slander against Vesselin's image and against his fellow men in life? . . .

"It is hardly likely that anyone will say that in our life there are no negative occurrences, that among those who bring about such occurrences there are no people with Party cards. . . . But these mistakes and weaknesses, these shortcomings are a retreat from Communist morality, they are incompatible with the laws and norms of a Socialist society. The people who permit them do so not because they are Communists but because they are bad Communists. Therefore, the mistakes and weaknesses are not inherent to a Communist, they are an alien body in him, they blacken his image and he must fight for their removal. Assenov's book would have been useful and interesting had he justly and artistically unfolded against the background of the new life, how, and under the influence of what factors Vesselin changes from a Communist fighter into a careerest and a cad. But such justice and artistry are lacking in the book. Lacking also is the atmosphere of the new life, leaving only the bare thesis of the author,

# **OTEYECTBEH**



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# Послание на Чжоу Ен-лай до Джавахарлал Неру

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Top of front page of Otechestven Front (Sofia), September 12, 1959, with articles on wool-shearing, First Secretary Zhivkov's attendance at a meeting of former partisans, and Chou En-lai's message to Nehru.

backed by criticism, that the good Communist Vesselin can be just as much of a rogue as anyone else.

"Not infrequently similar theories have been put forward by various critics in the USSR, but both in theory and in practice they have always suffered total defeat. They might serve to justify certain feeble, pessimistic works, but can never meet with success in our country, because they are contrary to life itself, because they divert the writer's attention from the basic task which the Party has laid down for him, so clearly stated in the Party Central Committee's message of greeting to the Writers' Union gathering in 1958: The Party, it said, appeals to the writers to create images of heroic fighters and builders, who reflect the most striking features of the Bulgarian nation, its revolutionary character, manliness and industry, its sense of purpose, loyalty to the cause of Communism, images which serve as an example to the workers, mobilize the forces, call men to exploits in the name of the people's happiness.

"In this novel . . . the main characters are mouthpieces for the author's ideas. . . They are devoid of national peculiarities. Their thoughts and utterances are closer to those of the Western intellectual, than to their prototypes in life. . . .

me....

#### Bleak Light of Reality

"What are these ideas? Briefly stated, they express the following: in the struggle against Fascism, the Communists, because of the supreme trial to which they were subjected, recruited and concentrated all their forces on the realization of the great ideals they were fighting for and therefore their images were pure and exalted, but after the victory, under peaceful conditions, they were demobilized, gave in to the temptations of a regular petty bourgeois life, and they failed. The exalted ideas of Communism, once put into practice, lose their fascination. . . .

"[Bai Doncho] elaborates on these thoughts to Alexandra with greater precision: 'I think that during tense moments in history, human nature cannot reveal itself in all its fullness, some characteristics predominate and suppress others. . . At the time of the fight all my comrades appeared to me beautiful and courageous. But times have changed, we are in power, characters develop freely and unhindered, and suddenly certain things come to light, which previous conditions did not allow us to glimpse. It has turned out that some people rapidly become petty bourgeois, others careerists, and yet others invertebrates and the like.'

#### "I Hate Them"

"In accord with these contemplations are also the malicious hissings against the Communists by the bloated reactionary. Dogramadijey: 'Yes, I hate them. I cannot bear them. I loathe them. And how can I put up with them when they do all kinds of evil things, are known to the people, but only from behind the facade of lofty aspirations. Every day I see how their careerist passions are inflamed, how they gossip, how they intrigue.' And further on he evolves the thought that all people now are hypocrites, obedient tools, that everything has been brought to the point of the absurd. Having sensed his superiority over his wife -a Communist-he states: 'You appeal, for example, for discipline, but discipline you turn into training. You want conscientiousness, but turn conscientiousness into ritual. You call for high principles, but high principles have become fatalism. Not one of the aims previously announced has been realized in the way you proclaimed and planned.' Maybe here we should also recall the words of Bai Doncho, who says 'one of the serious shortcomings of our journalism is the fact that it teaches the masses to be not so much creators and fighters but rather 'carry-outers' or, if you like - 'conductors of ideals.'

"In his replies to Alexandra, Kanazirsky brings all these thoughts to a 'logical conclusion' by saying that the ideals of Communism have already lost their value. 'I should

## ТВОРЧЕСКИ ДА ПРИЛОЖИМ ПРИМЕРНИТЕ ИЗИСКВАНИЯ В ПИОНЕРСКАТА ОРГАНИЗАЦИЯ

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# народна МЛАДЕЖ

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QENA 20 CTOTHURN

#### Напрегнати дин

Момогронация се стералия или ред Даранамия поисорена инибенат "Дучалия" в Русу с обласи в зопенноватия обект Поисопелция са добри найствори, побри дами Била начер цебрите, отбеламия била начер цебрите, отбеблявия в табанти, почит 150. 180 на сто. Тум поставлена из задвеждата надриге строилила В 180 на сто. Тум поставления из держивания по почита и задвеждателя на пример задвеждателя на премер задвеждателя на премер

## ДВИЖЕНИЕТО, ПОРОДЕНО В ЗАВОДИТЕ, СЕ ПРЕНАСЯ И В СТОПАНСТВАТА

Младите животновъди от кооперативното стопанство в гара Крички ще се борят за завоюване на званието «Ферма за ударен комсомолски труд»

. Ал съи дълбово учести те дважението ве тдарен консемвасни труд де обтавие цлялате пашая надаже във осници отресях на материалноте произведстве, във всичид синтори на социалистическоте спроизведстве.

Narodna Mladej (Sofia), September 12, 1959. The headlines announce: "The movement [for plan fulfillment], born in the plants, is being transferred to the [collective farms]," and "Intensive days in a Komsomol project."

like to know, to ask you, with what right you shout for honesty, preach honesty, when you yourself are dishonest? . . . I speak of all of you, the whole host of preachers and moralists who have sprung up lately. . . . I refer to the so-called men of ideals . . . journalists, propagandists, agitators . . . the new beings. . . . Through your recent deafening criticism and self-criticism, you yourselves have given the whole world a chance to peer into the kitchen of your ideals. And what was the result? What? They held their noses. You get my meaning, don't you?

"And such a philosophy has become the life-blood of this novel. . . .

"One can hardly say that the author's habit of emphasizing mainly, I would go as far as to say, exclusively, the shortcomings not only of the negative but also of the positive characters, this viewing of reality from 'back to front,' is the correct approach to reality. According to the novel,

it would seem that it is the careerists, scoundrels, moral murderers, misanthropes who triumph in life, that, as Dogramadjiev says, a destruction of the personality takes place, a thing which is entirely contrary to Socialist reality. From this is derived that pessimism and feeling of disgust with life which drains the reader's strength, and has an oppressive and stifling effect on him.

"Similar works, which appeared two or three years ago, were justly condemned by the Party and literary press. It is strange that the readers should now so belatedly be presented with thoughts and moods, which turned out to be harmful and misleading and to a large extent belong to the past stage of social and literary development. It is even stranger that the essence of these moods and thoughts is not perceived and that works such as 'The Roads Bypass Each Another' are approved by critics like Yako Molhoff."

Vassil Kolevsky, Literaturen Front, August 13, 1959,

## Can't Hear You, Comrade

"What can an enterprise do if it receives unacceptable planning instructions? It can prove to the authority providing the plan that . . . it cannot accept a higher target—or it can accept the 'corrections' imposed by the authority. The authority on the other hand can pass over complaints from enterprises or answer them with slick phrases like, 'You managed to surpass the target last year, you will manage this time too.' . . . Under such conditions an enterprise can do three things:

"(1) Accept the plan as imposed, seeing some vague hope of fulfilling it, possibly with supernatural help. (2) Accept the plan as imposed without any hope of fulfilling it, thus giving up in advance all hope of premiums for the workers. . . . (3) Refuse the imposed plan, appealing to the arbitration of the branch, which will probably not arbitrate objectively since—after all—the arbitrator represents the interests of the higher economic strata of the same branch which has just imposed the plan.

"This situation, created by excessive 'directing' on the part of the authorities, tends to undermine belief in the lawfulness and realism of economic planning. The workers, deprived of their quarterly premiums, grow disgusted and slowly drift off to other establishments from the one which cannot provide them with the reward for hard daily work....

"These remarks are directed to the functionaries who will establish the plan for 1960—behind dry figures lies everyday human toil, and every error can bring serious consequences."

Zycie Gospodarcze (Warsaw), August 23, 1959.

# Leading Bulgarian Publications

Dailies Lead	ing bu	Igarian Publications		
Title	Circulation	Description		
Kooperativno Selo (Cooperative Village)	90,000	Organ of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Centra Trade Union Council of forestry workers.		
Narodna Mladej (People's Youth)	223,000	Organ of the Youth Union.		
Otechestven Front (Fatherland Front)	200,000	Organ of the National Council of the Fatherland Front and the Presidium of the National Assembly.		
Rabotnichesko Delo (Worker's Action)	500,000	Organ of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 4-6 pp.		
Trud (Labor)	110,000	Organ of the Central Committee of the Trade Union Council.		
Vecherni Novini (Evening News)	116,000	Organ of the Sofia City People's Council, the City Committee of the Fatherland Front, and the Sofia City Committee of the Com- munist Party. Reportedly very popular in Sofia.		
Zemedelsko Zname (Agrarian Flag)	122,000	Organ of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union.		
Weeklies				
Izvestia na Presidiuma (News of the Presidium)		Official Gazette of the Ministerial Council; twice weekly.		
Literaturen Front (Literary Front)	30,000	Organ of the Writers' Union: criticized in the past for publishing ideologically dangerous works.		
Naroden Sport (People's Sport)		Appears thrice weekly; reported to be very popular.		
Narodna Kultura (People's Culture)	60,000	Organ of the Ministry of Education and Culture; follows Party line strictly.		
Septemeriiche (September Child)	272,000	Magazine for children up to 13 years of age; twice weekly.		
Sturshel (Hornet)	272,000	Organ of the Bulgarian Party Central Committee; devoted to satire; frequent anti-West propaganda.		
Tsarkoven Vestnik (Church's Newspaper)		Organ of the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church.		
Zdraven Front (Health Front)		Organ of the Ministry of Health. Mostly for doctors and health personnel.		
Monthlies				
Bulgaria		Illustrated monthly in foreign languages. Destined for abroad.		
Bulgaria Dnes (Today's Bulgaria)		Illustrated periodical; appears twice monthly in English, French and Spanish.		
Bulgaro-Sovetska Drujba (Bulgarian-Soviet Friendship)	33,000	Organ of Bulgarian-Soviet Friendship Society.		
Bulgarski Voin (Bulgarian Fighter)		Ministry of National Defense Publication for soldiers and officers Propagates Party line; praises Soviet Army.		
Drujinka (Small Battalion)	53,000	The largest children's magazine; ten times annually,		
Duchovna Kultura (Spiritual Culture)	5,000	Periodical on religion, philosophy, science and art issued by the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. Sharply attacked by <i>Literaturen Front</i> in 1957 for advocating introduction of religious education in schools. In 1958, its editor-in-chief was removed.		

Title	Circulation	Description
Filosofska Misal (Philosophical Thought)	4,200	Bimonthly publication of the Bulgarian Academy of Science, Philoso- phy Institute; strict Party line pronouncements.
Finansii i Kredit		Publication of the Ministry of Finance, the Bulgarian National Bank,
(Finance and Credit)		the Investment Bank, the State Savings Bank, and the State Insur-
		ance Institutes. Appears ten times annually. Contains articles and data on financial matters. Also furthers Party propaganda.
Ikonomicheska Misal		Bimonthly published by the Economic Institute of the Bulgarian
(Economic Thought)		Academy of Science.
Istoricheski Pregled		Bimonthly publication of the Bulgarian Academy of Science and
(Historical Review)		the Institute of Bulgarian History. Contains extensive articles propa- gating the Communist version of Bulgarian History.
Jenata Dnes	254,000	Periodical for Women.
(Today's Women)		
Kooperativno Zemedelie (Cooperative Agriculture)		Most important publication on the rural economy. Issued by the Ministry of Agriculture every two months.
Literaturna Misal	7,050	Bimonthly organ of the Institute of Bulgarian Literature at the Bul-
(Literary Thought)		garian Academy of Science. Contains articles on literary history and criticism.
Mladej (Youth)		Organ of the Communist Youth Union.
Narachnik na Agitatora		Agitator's handbook modelled on the Soviet Blokat na Agitatora;
(Agitator's Handbook)		appears twice a month.
Nasha Rodina (Our Fatherland)		Political-literary periodical issued by the Party Central Committee.
Novo Vreme (New Times)	33,500	Theoretical organ of the Party Central Committee.
Pionerski Rakovoditel		Publication of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth
Pioneer's Instructor)		Union; used for education of "pioneers" (children up to 13 years of age).
Plamache	24,000	Issued for young children.
(Small Flame)		
Plamak		Organ of the Bulgarian Writers' Union, contains stories, novels and
(Flame)		poems, as well as criticisms and translations of foreign works. In 1958 criticized for not following Party line. Started in 1957.
Planovo Stopanstvo (Planned Economy)		Publication of the State Planning Commission: contains comprehen- sive articles on planning and plan fulfillment.
Semeistvo i Uchilishte		Periodical for parents issued by the Ministry of Education and Cul
(Family and School)		ture ten times annually. Stresses the importance of the Communis
		education of youth.
September)	51,200	Organ of the Writers' Union. In past, criticized for publishing storie and plays not in accordance with Party line.
Slaveiche (Nightingale)	86,000	Successful new magazine for children; appears ten times annually
Sotsialistichesko Pravo (Socialist Law)		Publication of the Ministry of Justice: appears ten times annually contains articles on law and information on Supreme Court deci- sions.
Statistika		Put out by the Central Statistical Institute once every two months.
(Statistics)		
Teater		Organ of the Ministry of Culture and Education, the trade union of
(Theater)		workers in education and culture and the Bulgarian Writers' Unior Criticized for publishing the play "Fear."
L'anshna Targovia		Owen of the Ministry of Trade Contains news and actions on fac

The above circulation figures are based on official statistics. All the periodical mentioned are published in Sofia.

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Organ of the Ministry of Trade. Contains news and articles on for-

L'anshna Targovia (Foreign Trade)

#### (Continued from page 29)

of the artists. But the young Hungarian writers were all left at home. It seemed that even those who follow the Party were not reliable enough to be allowed to go to Vienna. According to the official announcement, there was not a single writer in the delegation. Only Gabor Gellert, of the Europa publishing house, was there as translator for the press center.

Among those who came from behind the Iron Curtain, the Poles enjoyed the greatest amount of freedom. They were glad to talk to Hungarian emigres and almost without exception sympathized with the Hungarian cause. Many said that at the time of the Hungarian Revolt the Poles demanded that troops or units of volunteers be sent to Hungary.

They had much more freedom than the others from the bloc. They wandered freely throughout the city and lacked the awkwardness and fear so plain in the others. They were more optimistic when evaluating their own situation although they were full of criticism towards the situation in their country. One boy from the Mazowsze dance ensemble complained that private economic initiative was being suppressed again in Poland. On the other hand, they unanimously agreed that they had much more cultural freedom. The Poles also got the most pocket money among the Iron Curtain delegates: 45 Austrian schillings per day.

A boy from Gdansk told one of my Hungarian refugee friends that in 1958 a delegation of the Hungarian Communist Youth Association from Szeged visited their city, and that they had long arguments about whether there had been a revolution or a counterrevolution in Hungary. The Poles maintained to the last that there had been a revolution.

Among the other East Europeans, the Czechoslovaks could be most easily approached. However, the 1,200 gymnasts were taken home immediately after the opening of the Festival and the defections which occurred during the Festival tightened their control. (Two border-guards and one flier fled to freedom.) At one of the "information

rooms" a Czechoslovak student was given information material in the Czech language. Other Czechoslovak delegates coming back from a performance were gathered around their buses parked in the nearby streets. Slowly they began to come in one by one asking for printed material. Half an hour later, a functionary appeared and forbade them to ask for any more books. He gathered the youths, took a roll-call, then ordered them into the buses. He ordered a search and ten minutes later he brought back the confiscated brochures, torn to pieces, and gave them to the Austrian boys. As they examined the scraps of paper, they found among them the top of a cigarette-box with the words: "All the same, we thank you gratefully."

These "information rooms" were organized by the combined association of Austrian youth groups, the Jugendring, which also ran daily bus trips to the Hungarian border for all who wanted to see the Iron Curtain itself. There the barbed wire passes besides a cemetery, almost at the foot of the graves. Behind it is the mine field, in front the watchtower. Some 4,000 persons came to see the Iron Curtain.

In the second half of the Festival, an East German teacher stood at the place where the buses left and tried to dissuade the colored students from going, saying that it was a fake, that there was no Iron Curtain and that the whole thing was a put-up job. One day he tried to convince two Pakistani students, but one of them had already been there the day before, and they decided to go. The teacher followed them, talking and talking, even when the bus was about to leave and the students were already standing at the door. The Pakistani had enough of it and pulled the German inside the bus saving "Then come and see it, if you don't believe it!" The teacher begged the driver to stop and let him out, but the latter did not seem to hear him. The passengers laughed. The teacher came back shattered from the sight. He did not say a word during the trip, and disappeared as soon as the bus arrived.

The next day he was out again reciting his lesson, as if he had not been to the Iron Curtain the day before.



# Current Developments

#### AREAWIDE

#### Luniks Lauded

The East European press and radio unleashed a flood of adjectives to describe the Soviet rocketry achievement in hitting the moon on the eve of Soviet Premier Khrushchev's visit to the USA. The rocket reached its destination a few minutes after midnight, September 14, Moscow time, and later that day Radio Prague rhapsodized:

"This first envoy from the earth was not dispatched by a god, but by human ingenuity. For the first time in history, a heavenly body outside the earth has been reached; and this is only the beginning. . . . Western propaganda still persists in calling Soviet science enslaved. If in a Socialist system, according to that propaganda, there is no freedom but a leveling of the human mind, how could clipped wings fly so high? The red flag on the moon is the best answer, and innumerable further replies will be given by successes in Socialist construction, both in the USSR and in the other Socialist countries."

The Polish press viewed the Soviet success as an augury of peace. Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), September 15, called Khrushchev's American journey and the lunar rocket "symbols of the end of the cold war and emergence of an new era of peaceful coexistence."

Other striking examples of Soviet scientific prowess, such as the launching of the nuclear-powered icebreaker "Lenin," September 12, and the firing of a third lunar probe, October 4, were hailed as further proofs of "the superiority of the Socialist system."

#### Communist China Feted

Delegations from all the Soviet bloc countries, including Premier Khrushchev, turned up in Peiping for the October 1 celebration of ten years of Communist rule in China. There were also festive celebrations in all of the East European capitals, with speeches by local dignitaries and Chinese representatives. A major theme of these speeches was the demand that Communist China be admitted to the United Nations.

Of last year's great innovation in China, the agricultural communes, relatively little was said.

Only Polish Politburo member Stefan Jedrychowski, at a Warsaw meeting in honor of the Communist Chinese anniversary, spoke at length about the communes, praising their success (which is ironic in view of the minimal collectivization which now exists in Poland); he was also the only one to mention "errors" in their formation. As reported by Trybuna Ludu (Warsaw), October 1, Jedrychowski said: "The Chinese People's Republic can be proud of its



Caption: "Peace and Friendship!"

Urzica (Bucharest), September 15, 1959

glorious achievements in the field of production increase. . . . Of decisive importance to these successes was the process of rapid Socialization of China's agriculture which . . . led to the establishment of 740,000 production collectives, which were, in turn, transformed into a new type of social ownership—26,000 people's communes." The Polish Communist added that the Sixth Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party (in December 1958) had "corrected some errors which arose during the stormy period of the spontaneous establishment of the communes. . . In this connection, there was a departure from the Socialist principle of sharing on the basis of work in favor of the equalitarian principle of sharing on the basis of need; too broad a scope of unpaid services; and excessive centralization within the commune, and so on."

(For Yugoslav reaction to the Communist Chinese anniversary, see below.)

#### Khrushchev in America

As might be expected, the press of the area viewed Nikita Khrushchev's American visit (September 15-29) as an unqualified success for the Soviet Premier. News coverage, often restricted to Soviet news agency dispatches, played up the "positive" aspects of the trip; embarrassing questions concerning the 1956 Hungarian Revolt or Khrushchev's behavior during the Stalinist era were discreetly omitted. Standard fare for the reading public was the contrast between the "warmth" of the "common people"

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and hostility of "reactionary elements," who wished to prolong "the cold war." For example, Rude Pravo (Prague), September 23, after producing "an ordinary American woman, Mary Newman," who deeply supported the exchange of visits between President Eisenhower and the Soviet leader "because they can save the world from war," roundly condemned "the provocative manner" of the Mayor of Los Angeles.

The refusal to allow Khrushchev to visit Disneyland was also seen as an attempt to "prevent him from meeting the masses." On the other hand, Khrushchev's warm reception in San Francisco was inevitable "once the local authorities" allowed "any contact between the common man and the Soviet leader." (Scinteia [Bucharest], September 22.)

Khrushchev's talks with American trade unionists in San Francisco, characterized by heated exchanges between the Soviet Premier and the labor leaders, were heavily edited for home consumption. AFL-CIO Vice President Walter Reuther was accused of "grossly misrepresenting [Khrushchev's] pronouncements," and after a brisk summary of "irreconcilable positions," the news story continued with a description of Khrushchev sailing through San Francisco Bay.

The disarmament proposals Khrushchev laid before the UN, calling for "total disarmament," were greeted with paeans of praise while "reactionary circles" were criticized for calling the plan "utopian."

In sum, commentary on the Khrushchev tour ranged from the rapturous to the ecstatic, from the Warsaw Party



Caption: "On land, on sea and in the air." A Bulgarian cartoon showing Nikita Khrushchev on his way to the United States, the Soviet ice-breaker Lenin and one of the moon rockets. Cartoons of high Communist personalities are rare in the Satellite press. Sturshel (Sofia), September 18, 1959

organ's statement that "Khrushchev's . . . personality, sincerity and simplicity have crushed the blind wall of prejudice, ignorance and distortions which have separated the USSR . . . from the people of America" (Trybuna Ludu, September 30), to the rhetorical essay in Prague's October 3 issue of Literarni Noviny—"Try to find a similar trip in history: leaf through thousands of pages of the world's history. You will not find a parallel. . . . Powerful figures of the international bourgeoisie . . have had to realize the might of the Soviet Union, the immense power of the social order which has freed mankind from century-old fetters. . . Yes . . . we may well say (and with great justification): we have all, people of peace and progress, won a great victory."

#### East German Anniversary

October 6 marked the Tenth Anniversary of the founding of the Communist German Democratic Republic in the Soviet Zone of Germany. The *leitmotiv* of Satellite praise on the occasion was to hail "the transformation of Germany from a hotbed of war danger into an important factor of peace in Europe." (Radio Sofia, October 6.) At the Budapest reception on the eve of the anniversary, Laszlo Orban, head of the scientific and cultural department of the Hungarian Party Central Committee, recalled "with gratitude" that the workers of East Germany "had rallied around during our grave trials of October 1956 in the fight for the defeat of the counterrevolutionaries and their revisionist allies." (Radio Budapest, October 6.)

Progress in the economic development of East Germany was dealt with by the Czechoslovak Deputy Premier Ludmila Jankovcova at ceremonies in Prague. After the USSR, she said, the German Democratic Republic "is our biggest trade partner. From 1950 to 1957, the volume of foreign trade between our republic and the GDR has more than trebled." (Radio Prague, October 6.)

#### Yugoslavs Strike Back

Strong counterattacks against Albanian and Communist Chinese criticism characterized recent Yugoslav relations with the Communist bloc. The Belgrade Party organ, Borba, September 8, said tartly: "After a very short break (which, judging by everything, seemed an eternity to some people in Albania) the old vocabulary used to describe Yugoslavia has reappeared in the Albanian press and radio." On September 20, Marshal Tito and Albanian Party boss Enver Hoxha opened fire on each other. Tito, speaking in Niksic, declared that he "wished the Albanian people good fortune," but wished the Albanian leaders no good. He also singled out the Albanians for renewing the anti-Yugoslav campaign: "Thus, after a certain calm, as it were, they were the first ones to say something. . . . And on this occasion, let me say this: we believed that people would at least . . . realize that there is no sense in . . , having such bad relations with us. . . . Matters stand well with the USSR and with many other Socialist countries . . . but [the Albanians] have been the first to attack us." (Radio Belgrade, September 20.)

On the other side of the border in a speech in Bicaj,

## Current Developments-Areawide

Enver Hoxha spared no adjectives to describe his loathing of the "Yugoslav revisionists." At one point, referring to the task of consolidating Albanian friendship with the USSR, he contrasted this goal with the necessity "to increase hatred against the main enemies—the imperialists and their servants, the Yugoslav revisionists." (Radio Tirana, September 21.)

#### "The Last Mohican"

A detailed reply to Hoxha's attack came in *Borba*, September 26, which labeled the Albanian leader "a cold war champion":

"Enver's way of expressing himself in speaking about Yugoslavia is by using a traditionally primitive language . . . obviously, [he] still considers the systematic slinging of mud at Yugoslavia a 'job' which should be his first task as a politician and statesman. . . At the moment when the entire international development is bent in the direction of general stabilization . . . Enver Hoxha is spoiling relations between Albania and Yugoslavia. . . .

"But sometimes Enver loses his head and all sense of proportion. This is how he 'supported' Premier Khrushchev's proposal for disarmament. After informing his listeners about that proposal, Enver went on to say: 'But that does not mean we should sleep in peace . . . we should be very much on the alert, because the imperialists and their servants, the revisionists, are waiting for the moment when we are weak to stick a knife in our back.' Such men [as Hoxha] are usually called by the people: 'The last Mohicans of the cold war,'"

Other anti-Yugoslav onslaughts included an article in the Albanian Party organ, Zeri i Popullit, delineating the "inhuman circumstances to which the national minorities in Yugoslavia are being subjected." The journal described the Albanians living in Yugoslavia as enjoying the following "rights": "The right to remain unemployed . . . the right to run across the road to find a piece of bread, the right to die from hunger and cold in front of the doors of the new revisionists." (Radio Tirana, October 3.)

An interesting item in the uncomplimentary exchange was the following Yugoslav description of Hoxha's Albania (from Borba, September 28):

"Enver Hoxha has State enterprises with a police regime, and we have workers' councils and free working collectives. They have peasant work cooperatives into which the peasants have been driven by force, and we have free peasants whom society helps to lift out of backwardness. That is why they attack us so violently."

#### Communist Chinese Criticism

There has also been considerable friction with Communist China, centered on the strong anti-Yugoslav criticism in Peiping during the celebrations of the tenth anniversary of Communist control. In connection with this celebration, an article in the Belgrade journal, *Politika*, October 1, analyzed the reasons for Chinese criticism:

"During the past few years, the Chinese government has chosen methods of internal development which caused . . . certain difficulties. . . . This internal trend could not help but affect China's foreign policy which, especially in the past months, was often hard to understand and directly harmed China's reputation and position, for it amounted to a departure from former peaceable principles. One of the expressions of this orientation is gross and unbridled attacks on Yugoslavia without provocation or reason, without logic or need."

Foreign affairs spokesman Drago Kunc, at a Belgrade press conference, September 2, discussed the political implications of the pamphlet, "The Real Physiognomy of the Modern Revisionist Tito Clique," published in Peiping:

"From the viewpoint of the policy of peace and international responsibility, as well as from the viewpoint of political and human morale, this Chinese [pamphlet] is nonsensical. If in the Chinese slanders and attacks on Yugoslavia and its leadership a certain political meaning should be sought, then it lies in the prevention of normal relations among States, inflaming of hatred among people, and increasing of international tension."

A sore point with the Chinese was the Yugoslavs' free discussion of the recent Chinese admissions that previously claimed economic triumphs were simply not so. (The countries of the Soviet bloc had glossed over these admissions.) In this regard, Kunc blandly insisted that the Yugoslav press had only transmitted the data published in the Chinese press and the corrected figures had not been invented in Yugoslavia. (Radio Belgrade, October 2.)

Belgrade also saw a connection between Communist China's troubles with India and the ardor of its anti-Yugo-slav campaign: "In worsening its relations with New Delhi . . . Peiping in effect has denied its former contention—which . . . no one believed anyway—namely, that the campaign against Yugoslavia had the character of an ideological discussion. The policy toward India . . . only confirms once again that China is deviating from the principles of active, peaceful coexistence, which had been manifested much earlier in its relations toward Yugoslavia." (Radio Zagreb, October 6.)

## Very Like a Whale

Radio Belgrade, September 30, amused itself at the expense of the Soviet-bloc students and intellectuals who are forced to dance to the capricious, shifting winds of doctrine:

"Previously, Soviet philosophers were forbidden to occupy themselves with formal logic as it was a tool of the class enemy, and later they were ordered to work out textbooks in the subject, in order, it was stated, to teach the Soviet people to think consistently. At one time all references to Hegel were forbidden, and his philosophy was proclaimed to be an aristocratic reaction to the French Revolution. Later this ban was withdrawn.

"A whole branch of science, sociology, was totally ignored, making its development impossible. Musicians were expected to give up the modern technique of composition, the contemporary musical idiom, and so on. All this was explained by ideological needs, although such manifestations have nothing in common with Marxist ideology." (Radio Belgrade, September 30.)



"Why do you insist on being the first man to fly to the moon?"
"Because I criticized the chairman of my collective farm."

Szpilki (Warsaw), October 4, 1959

#### Other Scattered Shots

Yugoslav relations with the rest of the bloc, while hardly cordial, were at least lacking in invective. A rather belated criticism of Polish Party Chief Gomulka appeared in the Belgrade periodical, Socijalizam, No. 4, August, when the Yugoslav theoretician Kiro Hadzi-Vasilev cited Gomulka for contradicting himself while discussing "revisionism" and "dogmatism" at the Third Party Congress last March: "[Gomulka] was guilty of an inconsistency of terminology" when he claimed that "dogmatism and revisionism are at two opposite poles." This is not true, said the Yugoslav, "since dogmatism . . . represents the revision of Marxism." (See Texts and Documents, p. 54.)

Although Bulgarian Party leader Todor Zhivkov and Marshal Tito telegraphed fraternal greetings to one another while Zhivkov was flying over Yugoslavia enroute to a vacation in Albania, at least one unhappy note marred the increasingly pacific relations between the two countries. According to the Yugoslav version, Sofia continually maintains that Bulgarian Communists during World War II fought with their own "rebel army," when, in fact, they joined the Yugoslav partisans who, in turn, went to the aid of the Bulgarians. Even more ridiculous, from Belgrade's point of view, is the Bulgarian claim that "the forces of the new Bulgarian army took an active part in the

liberation . . . of Yugoslavia." (Nova Makedonija [Skoplje], September 20.)

#### POLAND

#### The Meat Shortage

The crisis in meat supplies which forced the regime to introduce "meatless Mondays" at the beginning of August (see East Europe, September, p. 47) has been the subject of considerable discussion in the Polish press. An article in the weekly Zycie Gospodarcze (Warsaw), September 27, blamed a faulty pricing system. Relatively low prices for meat in comparison with other consumer items (such as shoes), it said, had channeled purchasing power in the wrong direction. At the same time, prices offered to farmers by the State purchasing agencies were not high enough to induce them to fatten livestock for the market. While it cost the peasant 17 zloty per kilogram to raise pork, the State paid only 17.50 zloty per kilogram in 1958. The peasant found it more profitable to sell fodder (chiefly potatoes) on the market than to feed it to hogs. State farms had considerably reduced their stockbreeding in order "to make the State farms profit-making enterprises."

On October 2, an article in *Polityka* (Warsaw) sought reasons for the shortage in a "too rapid" increase in demand resulting from rising wages and population pressures. Reduction in the supply of meat was again charged to the shortage of fodder. Bad potato and other fodder crops had necessitated increased imports of grain for livestock consumption. This had further aggravated the meat supply since the import of agricultural products must be paid for by processed agricultural exports: "For grain we must pay primarily in meat."

Tough measures were at first avoided in hopes of averting public indignation, the paper said, but in Warsaw additional restriction on meat sales had to be imposed on September 24. The maximum quantity which can be

#### Less Is More

A N INTERESTING example of progressive inequality:

"The Workers' Vacation fund helped pay for the vacations of 360,000 trade union members in 1949 and 518,000 in 1958. . . . Since 1955, the number of manual workers taking advantage of their vacation time has steadily decreased by about nine percent a year. In 1958, out of 437,000 vacations, 390,000 were requested by white collar workers and only 47,000 by manual workers.

"The worker's vacation allowance depends on his salary, and amounts to 120 zloty for those whose wages go up to 600 zloty [a month], 150 zloty for wages up to 1,000 zloty and 220 zloty for wages above 1,000. Thus vacations are proportionally most expensive for workers with the lowest salaries. A worker earning 800 zloty, for example, must spend approximately 19 percent of his salary, while one earning 3,000 zloty need spend only 7 percent." (Przeglad Kulturalny [Warsaw], August 13, 1959.)

purchased each day by one person is: 1.5 kilograms of meat of varying quality, 1 kilogram of pork butchers' meat (sausages, smoked meat), 2 kilograms of slaughtered meat, 2 kilograms of pork butchers' meat products, 1 can of meat. No more than 2 kilograms of all the meats can be bought at any one purchase. In order to hold the shortage in check, the regime has recommended the substitution of macaroni, barley, butter, cheese, rice and herring, guaranteeing that growing demand would be met by increasing supplies of such articles through imports from other bloc countries. The USSR has supplied an additional token 3,000 tons of meat, fat and canned fish—one day's supply for Poland.

On October 17 a plenary session of the Party Central Committee considered the problem and decided to resort to the unpopular measure of a price increase. Meat prices were to rise by an average of 25 percent on October 18. (Radio Warsaw, October 18.)

#### Anti-Alcoholism Bill

A bill designed to combat drunkenness has been placed before the Sejm (Parliament). It bans the sale of drinks containing more than 18 percent alcohol in cafes; in restaurants, alcoholic drinks can be sold only to customers having meat dishes and then only in limited quantities. Stern measures are promised for those breaking the law. (Radio Warsaw, September 23.)

#### Church Developments

Polish Catholics are greatly disturbed by reports of thefts in numerous Warsaw churches during the past few months, according to well-informed sources. The most widely-publicized case recently was the theft of the relic of Saint Ladislaus from the Church of Saint Ann. Finally, when official investigations did not result in apprehending the criminals, Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski publicly appealed for the aid of the entire nation. In a pastoral letter, read in all Warsaw churches, September 18, the Primate declared; "Deep-felt shame was the reason for our previous silence, but since police investigations have, so far, brought no results, we can remain silent no longer." The announcement was reputedly delayed due to the request of Polish police who felt that this would disturb the investigation.

In a sermon in Warsaw, September 25, Cardinal Wyszynski called on the Polish people to rally to the defense of "Christian morality." He added that "in 1956, the Government had shown good political sense in giving back freedom of worship" and also in returning him to his flock, and he expressed hope that "good sense would still prevail."

#### Papal Letter to Bishop

Western Catholic sources reported that Pope John XXIII sent a letter on September 19 to Czeslaw Kaczmarek, Bishop of Kielce, which included the following statement: "We have learned that you are threatened with new dangers. . . . However, we express the hope that all will turn out well and we constantly pray to God that the causes which are bringing you anxiety will disappear as quickly as possible." Bishop Kaczmarek had previously

been arrested in January, 1951, accused of "collaboration with the Germans." Sentenced to 12 years imprisonment, he was released after 4 years and fully rehabilitated, following Gomulka's accession to power. Recently, he has been the object of frequent attacks in the regime press.

## Youth Organization Plenum

A critical evaluation of the leadership of the regime-run Socialist Youth Union (ZMS) occurred during the Plenum of the organization's Central Committee, held in Warsaw, September 26-27. Although membership has increased from 41,000 in March 1957 to 320,000 in April of this year, a speaker complained that "it is a fact that the increase in our ranks has been frequently coupled with a lowering of the requirements for membership and a superficial treatment of ZMS members' duties. . . . Outside the ZMS, there are still thousands of worthwhile people,

## The Pick and the Pen

COAL MINERS IN Poland now earn as much as most university teachers, and considerably more than most industrial workers. The salary scales of miners and teachers compare as follows (in *zloty* per month):\*

Miners		Teachers		
Unskilled worker		Assistant lecturer	1,350	
(underground)	1,800	Senior assistant	1,680	
Loader		Lecturer	2,030	
(underground)	2,100	Deputy professor	2,100	
Skilled worker		Reader	3,000	
(underground)	2,400	Professor	3,600	
Junior miner	2,700	Professor-in-		
Miner	3,000	ordinary	4,350	

Average salary of all industrial workers: 1,500 zloty.

In addition to their base pay, the miners receive higher premiums and better living quarters than other workers. Despite these and other perquisites, the manpower shortage in mining is so great that the government ran an advertisement in the Peasant Party newspaper Zielony Sztandar (Warsaw) on April 15 offering special inducements to young men of military draft age if they would volunteer for the mines: exemption from military service, additional premiums, free work clothes, etc.

Polish university teachers are often forced to take secondary jobs in order to support their families. An article in the weekly *Polityka* (Warsaw), April 18, reported that a poll of faculty members showed that only 27 percent did not have such jobs. About 35 percent had extra income exceeding 50 percent of their base salaries, and 10 percent made more from their secondary jobs than they did from teaching.

<sup>\*</sup> According to the sources cited in the text,

dear to us, whom we have been unable to reach." (Trybuna Ludu [Warsaw], September 26.)

One of the basic difficulties facing the youth group, according to Party Politburo member Roman Zambrowski, "is still the lack of properly trained people to lead the ZMS. A considerable part of the ZMS is composed of young people who do not yet have the proper experience and political polish; their selection is frequently accidental. There is no doubt that many difficulties could be avoided if it were not for the fact that some of the ZMS cells maintain only 'holiday time' contact with them." (Zycie Warszawy [Warsaw], September 26.)

#### Ochab in US; Benson in Poland

Polish Minister of Agriculture Edward Ochab arrived in the USA, October 1, for a two-week visit. The announced aim of his trip was to acquaint himself with the scientific and technical achievements of American agriculture, but since his program included a meeting with Under-Secretary of State Douglas Dillon, negotiations for a renewal of American aid to Poland may well be in order.

Enroute to Moscow, American Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson visited Poland for two days, September 28-29. During a two-hour conversation with Ochab, according to Radio Warsaw, October 2, Mr. Benson stated that in Poland he had seen many small farms where it was impossible to apply the mechanization necessary for agricultural progress: "According to [Mr. Benson], the most serious problem of our agriculture is the splitting up of farms. This is a problem not only in Polish agriculture; it also exists in the United States, and each country tries to solve it in its own way."

The regime propagandists were emphasizing a point which they customarily use as an argument for the collectivization of agriculture—so bitterly resisted by the Polish peasant.


#### Underground Press Discovered

An underground press, allegedly operated by members of Jehovah's Witnesses, was discovered by security forces in Zakopane, southern Poland. The press was located in a well-equipped underground bunker, according to *Kurier Polski* (Warsaw), September 12-13.

#### CZECHOSLOVAKIA

#### Brno Trade Fair

The International Trade Fair which opened September 6 in Brno, the capital of Moravia and the second-largest city in Czechoslovakia, closed September 20 in a fanfare of comments heralding its successes. The fair concentrated on the machine industry, which represents 50 percent of Czechoslovak foreign trade: 40 percent of all the country's machine production is for export. The list of products on display ranged from passenger cars and trucks, textile machines, machine tools, measuring instruments and farm machinery to complete industrial plants. Exhi-



The Czechoslovak circus "Humberto" visiting Warsaw, Swiat (Warsaw), September 20, 1959

bitions from thirty countries, including the countries of underdeveloped areas and individual firms representing Western Europe and Japan, were shown.

According to the official Czechoslovak news agency, by the close of the 15-day show over 2,350,000 people had reviewed the exhibited wares; of these, 13,500 were foreign visitors. In fulfilling its purpose of increasing trade, the news agency said, the fair had "exceeded all expectations." Contracts valued at 4,000 million koruny had been concluded by the closing date; 58 percent of this represented exports from Czechoslovakia and 42 percent imports. About 90 percent of the business was done with other Soviet-bloc countries.

This was the first international trade fair since 1951, when international tensions and Stalinist policy brought them to a close; before World War II and again after 1949, they had been a regular institution in Czechoslovakia.

## Congresses Held

The Third Congress of Czechoslovak Historians took place in Prague, September 16-19, its avowed purpose to "guide" the historians in their coverage of "the completion of the Socialist revolution." Party ideologist and Central Committee Secretary, Jiri Hendrych, in the main address, stressed the necessity of presenting the nation's history "correctly." Modern history is a subject which most older historians have shied away from, he said, and asserted that experienced scholars would be well-advised to pay ade-

## Current Developments-Czechoslovakia, Hungary

quate attention to recent history." (Rude Pravo [Prague], September 17.)

At the Third Congress of Czechoslovak Journalists in Prague, September 19-20, further evidence was forthcoming that the Stalinization of cultural life in Czechoslovakia was still the order of the day. Pledges of fealty to the Party characterized the convention; Rude Pravo, September 20, proclaimed: "The entire discussion of the Congress ... again showed the unshakable loyalty of our journalists to the people's democratic order and their firm determination to continue the fight for the completion of the building of Socialism under [Party] leadership."

#### **Doctors Bribed**

Low-paid physicians—now virtually civil servants of the State—and bureaucrats working in the social insurance system were accused of accepting bribes after certifying that healthy people were actually invalids. The trial of 37 of these so-called "saboteurs" began in Prague, September 21, according to the Party organ, *Rude Pravo*, the following day.

#### Oil Pipeline Starts

The Czechoslovak press announced on September 24 that work had begun on Czechoslovakia's section of the international oil pipeline that is to extend from Kuibyshev in western Siberia to Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany and Hungary.

In Czechoslovakia the pipeline will run from the Soviet frontier to Bratislava on the Danube, where it will connect with a pipeline in Hungary. It is expected to be completed by the beginning of 1962. (Rude Pravo [Prague], September 24.)

#### Planning Commissions Appointed

The new State Planning Commission, which does the economic planning for Czechoslovakia's State-run industry, and the Slovak Planning Commission which does the same for semi-autonomous Slovakia, held their first meetings in September. They replace the State Planning Office and the Slovak Planning Office which were abolished on July 8. The heads of the old organizations, Otakar Simunek and Pavol Majling, have been appointed chairmen of the new commissions. (Rude Pravo [Prague], September 13 and 15.)

#### HUNGARY

## Seventh Party Congress Program

In preparation for the Seventh Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' (Communist) Party, which will convene on November 30, the Party newspaper Nepszabadsag (Budapest) published the "Guiding Principles" on September 27. The program set forth differs in no essential respect from the policies the Party pursued before the 1956 Revolt: to push on with the collectivization of agriculture and with the development of heavy industry. The



The Chinese pavilion at the Brno trade fair in Czechoslovakia.

Svet v Obrazech (Prague), September 19, 1959

main task of the Congress will be to approve the draft of a new economic plan for the years 1961-1965, and the lineaments of this plan (as published in *Nepszabadsag* on September 29) indicate that any new departures in economic thinking since the Revolt have been effectively squelched by the Party's old guard.

The Party now has about half the membership it possessed before the 1956 Revolt, according to the "Guiding Principles," which state that the Party has sloughed off "careerist elements alien to Communism." It has also lost "several hundred thousand decent, cooperative but insufficiently firm former Party members," whose departure "strengthens the Party both politically and ideologically because the burden of their irresolution has been eliminated." Despite this defection, the Party presents itself as "the vanguard of the working class, the Party of the working people," in an apologium for its recent history that is understandably more complex than most such manifestoes. "The Party turned to the masses quite openly and with confidence, but rejected the incorrect demands of the misled workers. The Party fights for the true interests of the working class and the people and, if these interests so demand, it even swims against the current, but never abandons the task of winning over the masses."

The economic program envisioned by the "Guiding Principles" aims to raise industrial production in the period from 1958 to 1965 by 65-70 percent; labor productivity in industry by 37-40 percent; agricultural production by 30-32 percent; national income by at least 50 percent; real income per capita by 26-29 percent; and total consumption by 40-45 percent. In the countryside, the Party will attempt to "bring about every necessary condition for convincing the individual peasants . . . to complete the Socialist transformation of agriculture in the ensuing years."

## Party Unity Stressed

In attempts to strengthen the Party's ideological unity before the November Congress, various articles have appeared criticizing the shortcomings of Party activists and the implicit divergences which exist between the Kadarist and Stalinist factions. At the very outset of the campaign, Party boss Janos Kadar had warned against the seductions both of "revisionism" and "dogmatism":

"It is a known fact that neglect of theoretical work was one of the factors enabling hostile forces . . . to create ideological confusion among Party members and among the working masses generally. The counterrevolutionary uprising in 1956 would have been impossible without this ideological and political chaos. The counterrevolution has taught us, as did other things, that it is the duty of even the simplest people, even rank-and-file members, to study Marxism-Leninism. . . .

"The purity of Marxist-Leninist theory is constantly endangered by various ideological trends. In the first place, I would mention bourgeois-reactionary views. . . . Of course, backward views manifest themselves not only when one person professes reactionary, bourgeois views and another progressive, revolutionary, Marxist views. The two, unfortunately, often intermingle in the mind of the same person. . . .

"Of course, we are Marxists and . . . know that revisionism is the main danger. Dogmatism and sectarianism are equally dangerous, however, if a policy issuing from them takes root in the practical and theoretical work of the Party. . . In the last analysis, as in the case of revisionism, the lower middle class serves as the breeding ground for dogmatism and sectarianism." (Nepszabadsag [Budapest], September 6.)

Other high Party officials have complained recently that there are "Communists not on speaking terms due to personal matters, who fail to come to agreement on insignificant matters, and even start court proceedings against each other," and admitted that at Party meetings little mention has been made "of ideological and political questions." (Nepszabadsag, September 24; Delmagyarorszag [Szeged], September 13.)

#### Nationalism Under Fire

Considered as a contributory factor in the 1956 Revolt (and a threat to the Party's dependence on the USSR), nationalism has been attacked by Party propagandists as "the ideology of the bourgeoisie." According to the ideological review, Tarsadalmi Szemle (Budapest), August-September, "the bourgeoisie, deprived of its power, is trying to gain the support of the masses for an attack on Socialism through nationalism." One of the weapons of the "bourgeois imperialists" is "national Communism" which the "imperialists thought... would disrupt the ideological and political unity of the Communist Parties, loosen the alliance of the Socialist countries... and create favorable conditions in our country for a capitalist restoration."

"[In 1956] the counterrevolutionary bloc was composed of Imre Nagy's 'national Communists,' former Social-Democrats, rightist leaders . . . bourgeois and petit-bourgeois groups . . . and Fascist elements. . . . The chief role

## Long Road Ahead

"THE CHIEF WEAKNESS of our ideological and cul-tural life still is that the majority of the intelligentsia, a number of scientists and cultural workers, have failed so far to identify themselves with the Marxist-Leninist ideology. . . . The chief aim of our ideological and cultural work is that the working class, the working peasantry and the intelligentsia as a whole live and think in a Socialist manner. Nationalism, remnants of the capitalist attitude, and the small-holder way of thinking among the peasantry, the urban petty-bourgeoisie and a part of the intelligentsia are some of the main obstacles to our advance. Petty-bourgeois ways of thinking, individualism and an indifference to the interests of society still affect the more backward strata of the working class. We have to continue the ideological struggle against these backward views in order that the Marxist-Leninist ideology shall dominate every field of our social and cultural life."

From the "Guiding Principles for the Seventh Party Congress," *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), September 27.

in inciting anti-Soviet feelings fell to the revisionists [who] demanded a 'Hungarian-Soviet friendship based on equality,' thereby assuming . . . that Hungarian-Soviet relations were not based on equal rights. . . . Their demand for Hungary's neutrality was directed against the unity of the Socialist camp and weakened the forces of Socialism and progress at home and abroad. . . . It was proved finally in 1956 that contemporary Hungarian nationalism is an anti-national and traitorous program and ideology."

This polemic concluded with an evocation of Soviet Premier Khrushchev's prophecy that frontiers would finally be superfluous within the Socialist world system.

#### Agriculture Secondary

The emphasis on agriculture at the expense of industry is another reactionary idea which springs from "counter-revolutionary arguments for nationalism," according to the Budapest political review, *Belpolitikai Szemle*, September. In 1956, it said:

"This line of reasoning] led to the view that the prospects for our industrial development are limited and that Hungary will be able to become rich only through her agriculture. . . These views . . are dangerous and harmful because they form the point of departure for reactionary political implications, contradicting reality. Namely, if agriculture has a more important role in the prosperity of our country than industry, and if it is developed at a greater pace than industry, some people might draw the conclusion that the peasantry and not the industrial working class has to be the leading force of the country. This necessarily implies that the Party of the working class, the Communist Party, cannot fulfill a leading role."

## Current Developments-Hungary, Romania

YORGY BOLONI, a Gyorgy Bollows writer, who died September 11, at the age of 77. He was President of the Literary Council. Chairman of the Hungarian PEN Club Executive Committee and Editor of the Budapest literary journal. Elet es Irodalom. A reliable Party member. Boloni was one of the first writers to rally to the Kadar regime after the crushing of the 1956 Uprising. Photo from



Orszag Vilag (Budapest), September 16, 1959.

#### Difficulties in Collectivization

"Alien views" on agricultural collectivization are under criticism by the Hungarian press. The county organ Vas Nepe, September 9, warned against the "dogmatic and sectarian views" which are still prevalent in the Party. Under fire was the Secretary of the local Party organization for his "emphasis on a much tougher policy." Earlier, August 30, the same paper had voiced disapproval of Party members who objected to the "Socialist transformation of agriculture" and had glorified small-scale farming. It complained that an executive member of the Koszeg Party organization was unwilling to help in winning over the people to the Party's principles. The daily paper in Bekes county, Bekes Megyei Nepujsag, August 26, editorialized about the "ferocious struggle filled with hatred against the formation of the collective." Nepszabadsag (Budapest) on October 5, criticized County Bekes, stating that there were many cases of "outright dogmatism" and Party members who "openly oppose the Party's line on collectivization." Such members must be "convinced" of the errors in their thinking, the paper said.

#### Writers' Union Re-established

After many months of preparation, the new Hungarian Writers' Union was formed on September 25. After the old Union had been dissolved in April 1957, due to the major role it played in the ferment leading to the 1956 Revolt, it was replaced by a Literary Council, a group completely subservient to the regime; however, the vast majority of writers in the new organization are also those who "in the days of the counterrevolution stood by the side of the people and of the Party," according to Minister of State Gyula Kallai. President of the Writers' Union is Jozsef Darvas, former Minister of Culture, and its Secretary-General is Imre Dobozy, both willing lackeys of the regime.

At the first meeting, Kallai gave a frank report on what the Party expected of the reconstituted Union: "The guiding principles of the [Party] Central Committee... form the political basis of the new Writers' Union... Today nobody who desires to support the interests of the people without the Party, or in opposition to the Party, can call himself a 'people's writer.'... The basic task of the Writers' Union is to help Hungarian literature to become Socialist-realist literature as soon as possible. The Writers' Union must also help its members and every Hungarian writer to master the views of Marxism." [Magyar Nemzet [Budapest], September 26.]

#### Erratum

In the October issue of East Europe, p. 48, under the heading "State Approves Church Appointments," the opening sentence should read: "The Hungarian government recently approved the appointments as Apostolic Delegates of Suffragan Bishop Vince Kovacs for the Diocese of Vac; of Archepiscopal Vicar Artur Schwarcz-Eggenhoffer for the Archdiocese of Esztergom; of Vicar Capitular Pal Brezaniczi for the Archdiocese of Eger; and of Episcopal Vicar Sandor Klempa for the Diocese of Veszprem."

#### ROMANIA

#### Critics Criticized

Honeyed words of praise are poor weapons with which to wage the "ideological fight" against "bourgeois influences" in literature and art, as far as the Romanian cultural dictators are concerned. The Party organ Scinteia [Bucharest], September 23, in a long article attacking literary "apologists" for "lacking the critical spirit," also assailed "this spiritual climate of incense-burning and self-satisfaction" where a writer or artist believes that his talent "gives him a privileged position which cannot be criticized." Critics were urged to learn their lessons by observing "Party organizations and enterprise collectives which submit their activities to both praise and criticism."

Music critics came under fire for praising the recently-

## "Socialist" Legality

"The strong people's State, which is the materialization of the power of the working class, protects the people and their Socialist interests through the organized force of the workers, against all enemies, both inside and outside. The political role of suppression of the people's State grows or diminishes according to the attitude of the former members of the exploiting class and the development of the international situation."

From the "Guiding Principles for the Seventh Party Congress," *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), September 27.

## Current Developments-Romania, Bulgaria

performed works of composers Pascal Bentoiu and Sergiu Sarchizov. Their reviews were incorrect because they were not "based on scientific, Marxist analysis." Dissatisfaction was also displayed when the paintings in the State Exhibition in Bucharest were termed "mannerist and superficial." (Contemporanul [Bucharest], September 18.)

#### "Practical" Education Stressed

"The new school year starts with ever-closer ties between school and life," according to Radio Bucharest, September 14. As proof of this, the broadcast stated that "the number of students who have applied to professional schools of agriculture and technology is for the first time higher than the number of students who have applied for general education." At the same time, the basic educational program for all students includes new courses in agricultural and industrial production.

#### BULGARIA

#### Economic Confusion

Entering the last quarter of the first year of its "big leap forward," the Bulgarian regime seemed to face growing disorder in the channels of supply and distribution. While the collective farms were being exhorted to double their production over that of last year, cities and towns all over the country found produce supplies dwindling. "It is paradoxical but true," observed the Party newspaper Rabotnichesko Delo (Sofia) on September 17, "that there is a lack of fruit and vegetables in Plovdiv." The same was true of Ruse, Gabrovo and Burgas. According to Radio Sofia on September 11, "Sofia needs 100 to 150 tons of various kinds of fruit every day, but only 30 to 40 tons are being supplied. At the same time, the fruit trees in the districts of Kustendil and Vratsa are bending under their weight." There was also a meat shortage. The Agrarian Union's newspaper Zemedelsko Zname (Sofia) said on September 16 that deliveries in the district of Burgas were short by 11.5 million eggs, 23,000 kilos of poultry and 1,658 tons of pork at the end of August.

Complaints of this kind have been appearing in the Bulgarian press since April (see East Europe, June, p. 48 and September, p. 49). The regime blames the difficulties on the peasants in the collective farms, who openly break regulations and sell their produce on the free market rather than delivering it to the State purchasing organizations. Rabotnichesko Delo, September 17, said that in the district of Kustendil, where egg and poultry deliveries were seriously lagging, some of the offending farms were headed by former Party and government officials:

"The case of the collective farm in the village of Koniavo . . . is flagrant. When the president of this farm, Dimitar Botsev, was secretary of the Party committee in Kustendil he lectured the collective farm chairmen on how and why they should observe State discipline. Now, when he is a farm chairman himself, ought he to forget the State interest?



Members of the Communist Youth League building a stable at Kisvarda in Hungary. Jovendonk (Budapest), August 23, 1959

"The collective farm in Krainentzi village has sold 57,250 eggs to the free market, and the farm in Kustendil village more than 16,000. The chairmen of these farms—Kiril Nikolov and Atanas Gerginov, former chairmen of the executive committees of the People's Councils in Stanke Dimitrov and Kustendil—should as administrative officials fight to protect State interests, rather than initiating violations of State discipline. The bad example of the large farms, administered by government officials and Communists, has been followed by the other farms in the district."

Even more serious difficulties were beginning to arise as a result of the general huggermugger of economic speedup. An article in *Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia) on September 17 described a chicken hatchery in the village of Krivodol in the district of Vratsa where the writer had seen "heaps and bucketsful of dead chicks":

"On September 15 there were 25,000 chickens at the hatchery, while its capacity is 12,000. By September 17 the incubators will turn out some 15,000 newly hatched chicks which will have to perish for lack of space, just as 5,200 chicks died before. . . . The attendants do not know what to do, because the chickens must be furnished to the collective farms according to a planned schedule, but the collective farms do not send their people to fetch them and if the chicks are taken to the farms they refuse to

## Current Developments—Bulgaria



Hungary's Premier Ferenc Munnich calling on Mao Tse-tung in Peiping. Hungarian Review (Budapest), August 1959

accept them and send them back."

Throughout the rural areas, there were signs of poor coordination between production—relatively easy to increase—and the services and facilities necessary to dispose of it. On September 16 Zemedelsko Zname stated that in the district of Tolbukhin the number of livestock had trebled over the previous year, but that the completion of barns, chicken houses and pigsties was lagging dangerously. In the district of Yambol a pumping station that was to have been completed by the end of May, as part of the vast irrigation program, was not ready in mid-September for lack of the necessary pipes. (Zemedelsko Zname, September 17,)

#### Difficulties in Export

At the end of September the Council of Ministers fired two factory directors for violation of discipline that had resulted in "serious losses to the national economy." They

were Racho Radev, director of a shoe factory in Gabrovo. "who permitted excessive and unjustified use of valuable imported material and serious deterioration in the quality of footwear and leather goods," and Georgi Papachev, director of a wood-processing factory in the district of Stara Zagora, "who permitted very poor and substandard production . . . for export and for the domestic market, and also failed to ensure proper preservation of finished goods." The government also scolded two directors of tile factories for producing goods of such poor quality that they could not be exported. The accompanying statement took a resolutely optimistic view of the economy's progress during the first eight months of 1959, but added: "The number of enterprises which continue to produce poor quality goods for export and for the domestic market is not small. Cases have been established of flagrant violation of State and plannning discipline, and also cases in which priority is given to local interests over national and State interests." (Rabotnichesko Delo, October 1.)

#### Prisoners Freed

There have been unconfirmed reports that in honor of the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Bulgarian "liberation," a large number of political prisoners were released from internment camps. No public announcement to this effect has appeared as yet.

#### Greek "Chauvinism" Scored

In the aftermath of the Greek rejections of Bulgarian proposals for a nonaggression pact and a denuclearized "zone of peace" in the Balkans (see East Europe, July, pp. 36-37: October, p. 52), Bulgaria has started a campaign against Greece's treatment of its Macedonians (considered Bulgarians by Sofia). An article in the Party organ, Rabotnichesko Delo (Sofia), September 14, compared the alleged Greek actions to the Inquisition:

"It seems that certain circles in . . . Greece are not content with what the inquisitors of the Middle Ages did . . . [and] are forcing the people of Aegean Macedonia to give up their mother tongue and forget the language they have spoken for centuries. . . . Here are the facts: for two months a widespread denationalization campaign has been in progress in Greece against the compact Macedonian population. . . . Men, women and children . . . are being taken to the village squares where, with full ceremony and public prayers, they take an oath not to speak the Slav-Macedonian language. This is the text of the oath: 'I promise to God and the official State authorities that, as of today, I will not speak in the Slav dialect which only helps the enemies of our country—the Bulgarians.'"

## Sample Radio Schedules (Home Service)

#### R ADIO Budapest I July 7, 1959—Evening

- 5.15 Heart Sends to Heart (birthday etc. greetings exchanged among listeners)
- 6.00 "The Szabo Family" (a complete short drama)
- 6.15 Opera records
- 7.00 Factory Siren (workers' program—production propaganda)
- 7.20 French popular songs and poems
- 7.50 Children's program
- 8.26 Antal Budai Nagy (prewar dramatist). Premiere of the Radio Theater with the Szekler Theater of Marosvasarhely (recorded)
- 10.15 Through Modern Eyes (discussion of modern literary, aesthetic trends)
- 11.00 Broadcast from the Academy of Musical Arts
- 11.30 Selections from Leo Fall's operettas
- 12.10 Dance music

# Radio sofia August 12, 1959—Evening

- 6.00 News
- 6.10 Korean music
- 6.30 Moscow Speaks (commentary)
- 7.00 Folk music
- 7.30 Youth program
- 8.00 Dance music
- 8.30 News
- 9.00 Music-arias from Verdi
- 9.21 Evening radio-newspaper (news and commentary)
- 9.40 Music of Bulgarian composers
- 10.30 News
- 10.45 Light music
- 11.45 News

Czechoslovakia broadcasts in French, English, German, Italian, Spanish, Swedish, Greek, Arabic, Serbian and Czech and Slovak. For the estimated 2 million emigres there are two half-hour and one hour-long broadcasts daily. According to Mlada Fronta, January 31, 1959, the Czechoslovak radio received over 37,000 communications from foreign listeners in 1958. The Italian-language broadcasts were reported to have elicited the greatest response. Over 10,000 letters, almost twice as many as during the previous year, came from the US and Canada, the paper said.

The Hungarian radio broadcasts in French, English,

German, Italian, Spanish, Greek and Turkish, in addition to the Hungarian-language broadcasts of "Radio Homeland" for emigres in the West. In 1958 Radio Budapest sent questionnaires on program preferences to its North American listeners. It also announced that it would organize an "International Peace Club" at the suggestion of its foreign audience.

Romania broadcasts in 11 languages (the five major West European languages plus Greek, Turkish, Yiddish, Serbian, Persian and Romanian) and has a daily service, "The Voice of the Fatherland," for emigres. Radio Bucharest, May 8, 1959, claimed that letters from listeners in 34 foreign countries doubled during the first six months of 1959.

Poland's international broadcasts (the five major Western languages plus Danish, Finnish, Swedish and Polish) were reportedly reduced by 25 percent in 1958. Radio Kraj, a foreign broadcasting service with its own transmitting facilities set up in 1955 primarily for the purpose of propagandizing emigres to return to Poland, ceased operating as an independent station at the beginning of 1958. Most of its activities have been taken over by Radio Warsaw III.

The Bulgarian radio broadcasts a total of 15 hours daily abroad in the five major Western languages plus Arabic, Greek, Turkish, Serbian, Macedonian and Esperanto. "In these broadcasts, Radio Sofia tirelessly popularizes the great successes of our country in building Socialism, explains the struggle of the Soviet Union, our Fatherland and other Socialist countries for preservation of world peace, and . . . unmasks the aggressive policy of the American and other imperialists," said Rabotnichesko Delo, May 7, 1958.

#### Black Broadcasting

Not on official listings are the clandestine radio stations located in Eastern Europe, of which the broadcasts of "Oggi in Italia" ("Today in Italy") are characteristic. This program is broadcast from Prague by a group of Italian Communists forced out of Italy by their liability to criminal prosecution for activities during the partisan fighting at the end of the war. The program follows the format of the Italian State Radio's regular news service. Budapest, Leipzig and Warsaw transmitters assist Prague in beaming the broadcasts to Italy.

Bucharest is the point of origin of the broadcasts of Radio Espana Independiente, which is on the air seven hours a day as the voice of the Spanish Communist Party. Broadcasts to the Algerian rebels originating in Hungary have been picked up intermittently in the West during the past two years.

# Texts and Documents

## TWO KINDS OF REVISIONISM

The title of "revisionist"—meaning a Marxist who wishes to revise the traditional corpus of Marxist belief—has always been a term of obloquy among orthodox Communists, who maintain that theirs is the one true faith. Eastern Europe today is full of so-called revisionists, including the supporters of Tito as well as Communists in other countries who oppose the dictatorship of Moscow. Recently Tito's men have counterattacked with the thesis that the real revisionists are to be found in Moscow and Peiping. The thesis is outlined in the following article by M. Popovic which appeared in Kommunist (Belgrade) on August 6, 1959. A few inessential lines have been deleted.

THE CONTEMPORARY workers' movement is developing under the concrete economic, political and ideological conditions of contemporary society as a whole with all its national and political peculiarities. It is natural that it is burdened with the influences of all the factors and elements of contemporary society.

The entire development of society in the last several decades since the Russian] October revolution has led to the creation of many differences in the roads and forms of social development. Economic, political and national differences are greater. That is why the workers' and Socialist movements in general followed different roads under the influence of various political and ideological trends. All this is expressed in the wide range of various ideological, political and organizational forms in which the contemporary Socialist movement is developing. Only a careful, detailed and concrete scientific analysis can give a full answer to the question concerning the nature and character of all these trends and currents. . . .

As in the past, the workers' movement is still influenced by the bourgeoisie, the contemporary bourgeoisie with contemporary means of influence. This influence is expressed in an exceptionally varying way in the present period and all this depends upon how far the working class as a leading conscious force for the development of Socialism has achieved its aims in the struggle for Socialism. Considered from that angle the influence of the bourgeoisie can be expressed directly (as in some trade union movements in the West or through the policy of some sections of Social-Democratic parties in the West-for example, Guy Mollet) and also by means of elastic forms of ideological influence by various non-scientific and non-Marxist conceptions which are spread among the ranks of the working class.

A very important form of bourgeois influence is expressed by means of various kinds of nationalism and chauvinism in parts of the workers' movement both in developed and undeveloped countries in the West and East alike. The anarchic petty-bourgeois reaction to the narrowness and drabness of the bureaucratic nationalization of all forms of social development is also an essential form of the influence of the bourgeoisie upon the workers' and Socialist movement. From the ideological point of view, the common point of all these influences is that they are varieties of petty-bourgeois, reformatist, anarchic and revisionist conceptions.

#### Stalin's Revisionism

But, for a proper orientation in the contemporary workers' movement—for understanding contemporary Socialist thought—one has also to perceive something new, i.e., that the workers' movement is exceptionally influenced by statism through the strengthening of bureaucratic tendencies in the workers' movement. And bureaucratic statism as a political tendency even under Stalin's influence became for the time the ruling tendency not only in the Soviet Union and in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, but also in leaderships of the majority of Communist Parties.

Both these non-Socialist trends—the petty-bourgeois and bureaucratic—tend to become ideologically, politically and organizationally independent and ruling in the contemporary Socialist movement. And this means that the contemporary Socialist movement, beside and within all numerous differences, contains three basic ideological and political trends: the really Socialist trend, and the petty-bourgeois-reformist and bureaucratic-revisionist trends. And it is precisely from this fact that numerous misunder-

standings come in contemporary Socialist thought and Socialist practice.

Various petty-bourgeois, reformist and revisionist theories and conceptions suit the petty-bourgeois, reformist wing in the workers' movement.

Various bureaucratic revisions of Marxism and Leninism suit the bureaucratic revisionist wing. The Stalinist bureaucratic revision is the most important so far and somehow or other it is the initiator. But after Stalin's death one could already discern the varieties of the post-Stalin bureaucratic revisionism and of a more or less independent bureaucratic revisionist idea (for example in China, in connection with the first stage of the movement for communes).

The basic philosophical and scientific ideas of Marxism-Leninism correspond to the actual, consistent Socialist trend, to the one which is in keeping with actual historical interests of Socialism. We must say immediately that this does not mean that all of these genuinely Socialist trends and the people who lead them have unanimous views on contemporary problems. This is impossible today, first of all because a scientific Marxist elaboration of modern reality falls behind; second, because the living conditions in which these Socialist movements live and work in the period of transition are so varied that one must not expect equal views on all problems of Socialism. In addition, an important reason for the lack of unanimity of views should be sought in the fact that many of these movements are freed in the process of struggle either of petty-bourgeois-reformist ideological influences or of bureaucraticrevisionist ones, that the process of learning the truth about contemporary society and contemporary conditions of the struggle for Socialism is linked with the struggle against dogmatism of both

#### State And Socialism

In spite of all the differences existing between the one and the other non-Marxist and non-Socialist tendencies in the workers' movement, they have something in common. This time we are interested in exactly this.

The one and the other non-Socialist and non-Marxist trends confuse the State and Socialism. Ideologically and politically they confuse Socialism with statism. In this, they differ only in the fact that each of them proclaims "their" State and "their" statism to be Socialism.

Further, both these trends in the Socialist movement have a common trait in their new version of the old and well-known idea on spontaneous and automatic development of Socialism. While revisionism previously started from the idea that Socialism will win by itself through the development of capitalism (and later monopoly), contemporary revisionism claims that Socialism automatically wins by strengthening "the welfare State" or "Socialist State."

Forty years ago the Socialist movement was divided into two independent, contradictory trends: reformist Social-Democratic and revolutionary Communist. As we already know, the social foundation of this division-which appeared as a natural tendency in social movements themselves-was the appearance of monopoly, development of capitalism into monopoly capitalism and imperialism, the entire social development of industrial countries in the West, which developed on this basis, as well as the appearance of a workers' aristocracy as a social basis on which reformist trends legally and objectively grow in the labor movement.

#### Revisionism in the West

In the ideological field this split found its expression in the reformist-revisionist ideology of the Second International and later of a series of Social-Democratic parties, while on the other hand, under the influence of Lenin and the October Revolution, the revolutionary, consistent, scientific, Marxist ideological basis of Communist Parties was shaped.

The further development of the last four decades, primarily in the industrially developed countries of Western Europe and America, did not go in the direction of weakening those objective economic, social, political factors on the soil where the reformist wing in the labor movement developed. By the further increase of production forces, by the further uneven development between the small number of most developed countries of Western Europe and the USA and a large number of countries and peoples of undeveloped areas of the world, by strengthening on that basis surplus profits, by switching over to a State-capitalist organization of economy and economic relations and by strengthening statism, the social structure of the working class changed, bureaucratic forces strengthened within the organizations of the working class, which resulted in strengthening the influence of reformist circles in the labor movement-with their own evolution on the line of bureaucracy.

That is why Social Democracy, as the ideological and political representative of

this trend in these countries, in its essence has not lost its political and ideological influence. To a certain extent its influence has even increased, which is understandable when we have in mind the objective development in these countries—while on the other hand the fact helped greatly that in a greater part of

evolutionary Communist wing of the land removement the Stalinist bureaucracy temporarily won and became predominant.

Because of all this, despite all the long and inexhaustible polemics, the dispute between these two wings in the labor movement could not be settled through discussions. Polemics were conducted first on the subject: who is more properly interpreting Marx and Engels. Social Democracy pretended to start from Marxism-only it interpreted in a different way this or that philosophic, political, economic and in general theoretic postulation. However, after the October Revolution, especially after World War II, the tendency grew in these political movements to reject this revised Marxism, To the extent the idea is winning more ground in these movements that Socialism is equivalent to "the welfare State," to that extent, certainly, any reference made to Marxism causes danger and hindrance. By Marxism it is impossible to convince anyone that "the welfare State" equals Socialism.

#### Revisionism in the USSR

In the interpretation of ideologists of these movements it appears as dogma that Marxism is obsolete, and should be rejected. It is true that it is "obsolete" for them, because such a "Socialism" is impossible to build on the ideological grounds of Marxism, no matter how much they dilute it. Marxism—because of its stress on the importance of the class struggle for Socialism, abolition of private ownership over means of production, etc., even in spite of all revisionist interpretations of these principal postulates-is more and more the bogey to these circles. Social Democracy lives as a political movement first of all because it is daily borne up by objective social conditions, and not because some people or leaders of these movements wrongly and inaccurately understood Marx.

Bureaucratic revision of Marxism also, has its objective social-historical basis from which it grew. It is not and cannot be only the result of the incorrect interpretation of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

The term "dogmatism" or "bureaucratic dogmatism" is frequently used instead of the term "bureaucratic revision" of Marxism. It seems to us that these other terms are not sufficient to express this new essence. It is true that one of the characteristics of bureaucratic revision is dogmatism. But this is only one of its properties, regarded from the theoretical-empirical standpoint. Its essence is that the worked-out ideology of bureaucracy lies behind this dogmatism whose meaning is to justify and perpetuate the rule of bureaucracy in the minds of people, in the minds of the workers.

The social basis of this revision is the State authority, and linked with it is social monopoly and privilege. The fact that at the transition from capitalism to Socialism in one stage of this development there is and could be no other way than that the State takes over the role of the economic factor in the development of society, the fact that we have throughout contemporary society statism as a natural phenomenon—this fact is the objective social basis from which bureaucratic revision grows.

#### Inevitable Bureaucratic Trend

The historical experience of the building of Socialism so far has shown that it is possible and that it has happened that bureaucratic State tendencies win a victory and become, in practice and theory, the official line of policy of one or another section of the workers' movement. If they do not become the official and predominant line of policy, they nevertheless become a very influential factor in the life of every Socialist movement.

For that reason it was historically inevitable and indispensable that there should have occurred this revision of Marxism which was in its social nature bureaucratic and statist. But, for the same reasons, it was inevitable that there should have occurred another, opposing tendency, an anti-bureaucratic tendency, which was genuinely and consistently Socialistic. That tendency occurred at the time, in those countries and at that stage of development, when statism became superfluous and harmful, when it became an obstacle to the development of Socialism, and when it amounted to deformation and stagnation in the development of Socialism.

Bureaucratic revisionism was bound to become the more or less predominant line of policy in the workers' movements of those countries where the bourgeoisie had been overthrown, the dictatorship of the proletariat instituted, and the economy nationalized, all by means of force. As we have said above, a reason for this should be sought in the fact that it is just in these countries that the State authority of the working class has been instituted, and this State authority under specific, well-known conditions, becomes a social basis from which bureaucratic revisionism grows.

#### The Yugoslav Solution

But it is just in those same countries that reaction to that revisionism must have occurred, it is just that situation which could have given birth to those conscious and consistent Socialist forces which became ideologically, politically and organizationally capable of combating bureaucracy, of winning a decisive victory over it, and of directing social development to proceed further along the lines of Socialism. From an ideological point of view this means to do away, resolutely and fundamentally, with this kind of revisionism, to defend, under new, modern conditions, the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and to develop further one's own scientific conceptions of the problems of modern society.

This is just what happened in Yugoslavia. This is just what the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia did.

As we know, in order to achieve this it was necessary to perform an immense revolutionary and democratic transformation, to reorganize social relationships, economic and political, so as to enable society to continue to develop further, lawfully, in a direction opposite to that of statism, but in the direction of direct Socialist democracy—so as to make sure that the State in society "must wither away."

Bureaucratic tendencies are to be noted, in one form or another, in the workers' movements of Western countries as well. Statism, which is steadily gaining ground in those countries, must inevitably influence the workers' movement itself. This is manifested in the attitude and policy of a whole series of trade union leaderships which are under the ideological and political domination of Social Democratic parties, as well as a whole series of leaderships of the Socialist parties themselves. Bureaucratic tendencies in Social Democratic parties assume various forms. The very ideology of a "welfare State" is bureaucratic in its essence. Therefore, the modern pettybourgeois reformism is not an ordinary continuation of the old Social Democratic reformism of the Second International. In many of its aspects it relies upon and starts from that reformism-but ideologically and politically it corresponds to the modern conditions in which there is, as its material foundation, the special role played by trade union and political organizations of the working class in the system of State capitalism.

Of course, bureaucratic tendencies in these parties, in the ideological sphere, most often occur not as a revision of Marxism, but as directly anti-Marxist tendencies.

Since statism is a lawful stage of development for the whole modern world, all the three ideological and political trends are to be found in the workers' movements of all countries. It is another question which of these trends has become, in any given workers' movement or in any section of a workers' movement, the predominant force.

#### Need for New Analysis

Starting from this question viewed from this angle, it might be claimed with a certain measure of accuracy that in Social Democratic parties the modern petty-bourgeois reformism has become the predominant and official policy, whereas in the majority of Communist Parties which followed the policy of the former Cominform, the bureaucratic and statist revisionism has mainly become predominant. But it would be wrong to claim that in these same workers' movements there were no genuinely and consistently Socialistic revolutionary and democratic tendencies. . . .

Inasmuch as three trends or three tendencies emerge in the ideological and political life of the workers' movement, the struggle for Socialism becomes more complicated. Or, to put it more plainly, inasmuch as social development in the world-with regard to the development of Socialism-brings more and more prominently into existence, besides the two essential classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, bureaucracy, in the political field, as a relatively independent socialpolitical force, so the more is the workers' movement placed under the influence of all the three forces . . . the more the struggle which is conducted by the conscious Socialist forces for the sake of Socialism is incomparably far more complicated today than forty years ago, or in the days of the October Revolution.

Relying on the old categories ruling the class struggle and the revolution exclusively, without entering into an analysis of contemporary movements and the introduction of new ideas and notions in political thought and political strategy, it is imposible to realize the meaning of current events.

The best example is furnished by the October 1956 events in Hungary.

In terms of the ways of thinking of a good bureaucrat, the events in Hungary marked a counterrevolution, from start to finish. And, without examining socialpolitical motives or explanations, limiting himself to the aspect of theoretical concepts alone, the good bureaucrat is likewise unable—on the basis of his own formal, logical scheme—to view the events other than as a counterrevolution. And this very incapacity is only an expression of his own social-political backwardness and limitations, behind which the defense of the interests of bureaucracy is concealed.

In the light of petty-bourgeois reformism, on the other hand, those events can be nothing else but a "revolution," again from its very beginning to the end, both when the working class is involved in that struggle and when the reaction, the bourgeoisie is involved.

Neither of these two ways of thinking is essentially able to grasp the complex nature of those events. First, because of their renunciation of dialectics as a way of thinking, and, secondly, because of their incapacity to make a scientific analysis of such complicated developments.

#### The Lesson of Hungary

Naturally, behind this misunderstanding, quite understandable as well as determined social, economic and political interests of conservative and reactionary, non-Socialist positions, can be detected.

The champions of the above mentioned concepts are reminiscent of a man who knows the rule of three and moreover knows how to use it both efficiently and "very logically." So, "very logically," they allege that that was a "revolution," i.e. a "counterrevolution." And if this particular man with "very logical" "common sense" comes to differential equations, or, even further, to still more complicated mathematical notions and categories, they are nonsense to his "common sense." He simply cannot understand what is going on, and then he naturally blames differential equations.

The advancement of Socialist thought must therefore pass through an ideological struggle against both the former and the latter non-Marxist and non-Socialist tendencies-but for a further, more overwhelming and deeper initiation of Marxist science and scientific Socialism into the workers' movement. Starting from those positions and thoroughly examining contemporary movements in society, it is possible to find an answer to current problems in terms of science. A struggle waged on two fronts, against bureaucraticstatist revisionism and influence, and against petty-bourgeois reformism and its influence on the Socialist movement this constitutes the only correct orientation in the current situation, . . .

## Recent and Related

Karamzin's Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia, a translation and analysis by Richard Pipes (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959, 266 pp., \$5.50). By presenting the first complete translation from the Russian of the political memoirs of an outstanding conservative thinker of the early nineteenth century, Nicholas Karamzin, Mr. Pipes, an Associate Professor of History at Harvard, throws some light on a littleknown yet very important aspect of Russian history, namely its conservative tradition. "The writing of modern Russian history," he states, "has been largely the preserve of Russian scholars whose own political views were either liberal or Socialist, that is, of persons who were in varying degrees hostile to the old regime. The history of tsarism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was for them not an object of mere intellectual curiosity, but a political weapon which they used in their struggle for reform or revolution." Mr. Pipes feels, therefore, that the subject has not been treated with the detachment which history requires and that a dispassionate explanation of the behavior and motivation of Russia's ruling groups in the century preceding the Revolution is greatly needed. He supplies this work with explanatory notes, commentaries, and bibliographies, as well as with an introductory historical essay which provides the background of Karamzin's political thought in terms of both his environment and personal growth. Index.

Democratic Manifesto, by Ferdinand Peroutka (New York: Voyages Press, 1959, 181 pp., \$3.00). The author, a Czechoslovak journalist now in exile, believes that contemporary Communism is an artificial society dedicated to stifling the natural play of social forces. "Communism," he writes, "will also be judged for the boredom it has caused. It has revived and surpassed all the drabness of early capitalism. . . . Because it imposed upon itself objectives that are partly unnatural, Communism spoils the life of those it rules. . . . The dictatorship knows that it has created a system which runs counter to many natural emotions and therefore feels in constant jeopardy. How does it cope with this situation? It keeps watch at the exits from the underworld, it relies on its guards. But there is a constant strain between the political system and man's emotional make-upno less a conflict than the one arising when the development of the means of production is in contradiction with property relations. The question of how long the present form of Communist dictatorship will last simply reduces itself to how long it will be possible to keep watch." Despite its lip service to "dialectical materialism," Communism cannot admit the truly dialectical nature of reality which finds its fullest expression in a society where there is political freedom. The author suggests that the traditional division of Western history into three periods-ancient, medieval and modern-is no longer adequate, because since 1914 a new modern age has emerged from the impact of national. social, economic, technological and psychological trends. The most significant phenomenon of this Modern Age is the gradual transformation and ripening of the democratic social order, despite the challenge of the antithetical but essentially similar movements of Fascism and Communism. He analyzes the problem of power in Communist society, the monopolistic character of the State, the emergence of a new class structure, the uses of propaganda and the corruption of political language. He argues that democracy, by which he means political freedom, is not committed to either capitalism or Socialism in the economic sense of these terms, but rather to the fundamental ideals of freedom and


The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917-1958, by Ivan Spector (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1959, 328 pp., \$5.00). A study. based largely upon Soviet primary sources, of the Muslim world as seen from the vantage point of the Soviet Union. Mr. Spector puts particular emphasis on those periods when Soviet policy in the Muslim world has been most dynamic, rather than on those in which relations were routine in nature. The book deals, therefore, with "the three great Soviet drives for the conquest of the Muslim world of the Middle East; the first, immediately following the revolution, 1917-1921; the second, from World War II to the Truman Doctrine. 1941-1947; and the third, the drive for the Arab world, from the Baghdad Pact of 1955 to date." Included in this volume is the first English translation of the "Documents of the Programs of the Communist Parties of the East," published in Moscow in 1934, and other documentary material. Maps, illustrations, bibliography, and index.

The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces, edited by Asher Lee (New York: Praeger, 1959, 311 pp., \$7.50). This volume presents an evaluation of Russia's strength in the air by American, British, German and Russian experts in the field. A former Soviet officer describes the development of the Soviet Air Force from the Russian Revolution to 1941. The military editor of The New York Times and a Luftwaffe commander who fought against Russia discuss the Soviet air performance in World War II. Britain's Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert writes on the problems of long-range strategic attack as they pertain to the Soviet forces, and Asher Lee, the editor of the book, discusses strategic air defense. Dr. Ravmond L. Garthoff reviews Soviet Air Force organization, and J. M. Mackintosh assays Soviet power in airborne and parachute troops. The subject of Soviet rockets and guided missiles is covered in several chapters by Asher Lee and Richard E. Stockwell, and Dr. Kenneth Whiting of the American Air University contributes a study of Soviet air strategy in the atomic age. Illustrations, bibliographical notes of contributors, index.

Decade In Europe, by Barrett McGurn (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1959, 288 pp., \$5.00). Mr. McGurn, who has been an eyewitness to many important events that have shaped the world during recent years, combines in this volume a comprehensive analysis of Europe's political conflicts with an account of his personal experiences as a foreign correspondent in Western Europe, the Soviet Union and other Communist-dominated countries, North Africa, and the Middle East. Index.

Dragon and Sickle, by Guy Wint (New York: Praeger, 1959, 107 pp., \$2.50). This concise little book is chiefly about how Communism came to power in China, and about the relations of Russia and the Chinese Commuist Party. In addition it describes how the Chinese model of revolution influenced the rest of Asia. Index.

The Emergence of Modern Lithuania, by Alfred Erich Senn (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, 272 pp., \$6.00). A documented study of Lithuania's emergence as a national state following the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917. Bibliography. Index.



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